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Near East/South Asia Report

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14 August 1985

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EGYPT

RESTRICTIONS ON LEAVING COUNTRY EASED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 8-14 Jun 85 p 18

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Tawwab: "Easing of Restrictions on Travel and Assurance of Principles of Freedom of Movement"]

[Text] Reduction of the number of those denied foreign travel privileges from 150,000 during the al-Sadat era to 500 during the Mubarak era. There is nothing to prevent travel today except a decision from the investigating authorities or a court ruling.

As requested by President Husni Mubarak, the Egyptian Interior Ministry has completed the reduction of the lists of those denied foreign travel, numbering more than 150,000. Now only 500 political figures remain on the list and no others will be added to the list of those denied foreign travel except by order of the court, the public deputy or socialist public prosecutor or military prosecutor general.

It is well-known that the lists of those denied foreign travel goes back to the era before the 23 July 1952 revolution and across consecutive regimes. Each ruling administration adjusted the lists, expanding or reducing them according to the identity of the regime and the nature of its relationship with the political and social forces present. However, the largest additions were made during the al-Sadat era, especially during the period accompanying the incarcerations of September 1981.

Since President Mubarak came to power in October 1981 not one name has been added to the list of those denied foreign travel except by court order or by request of one of the three investigative authorities: the public deputy, the socialist public prosecutor or the military prosecutor general. President Mubarak has requested an elimination of the lists of those denied foreign travel and the Ministry of Interior has formed a special committee to review the lists. About 3,000 names were removed in one shot and the review operation continued until only 500 names remained, down from 150,000 during the al-Sadat era.

The lists of those denied foreign travel during the al-Sadat's era were applied in two directions, prohibiting those present from leaving and prohibiting those outside from returning. President Mubarak has requested the application of

constitutional rights to all Egyptians with regard to residency and travel so that each Egyptian will have the right to leave and come back to the country whenever he wants without restriction or condition except for political or criminal reasons requiring the placing of a specific citizen on the list of those denied foreign travel, and this must be with the knowledge of the judicial system.

The system of lists of those denied foreign travel is not restricted to only one state apart from the others, but the size of the lists and the extent of the legality of dropping and adding names to it is what provokes hot discussion and causes some of the regimes to get away from their basic goal in having these lists: to prevent those wanted for investigation from travelling or to protect the nation. The crucial factor here is not legal provisions but the extent to which the authorities observe constitutional principles guaranteeing the rights of the citizen to residency and movement.

The idea of the system of denying travel was originally set up with the system of passports, which requires a citizen to obtain an exit visa at the airport to attest to his being outside the borders of the nation. Exit and entry visas are considered legal evidence, of course, to establish a person's presence inside or outside of the country.

The system of lists of those denied foreign travel has been used to remove political adversaries as occurred in the era of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, which resorted to the system of denying foreign travel as a precautionary measure accompanying the institutionalization of political, economic and social changes since 1961. At the beginning of al-Sadat's era in 1971 the list of those denied foreign travel was reviewed and the number of names on the list was reduced 50 percent only to increase again with the events of May 1971, the first and second disengagement agreements, the Camp David Accords and the peace treaty, and then the incarcerations of September 1981. This is what led to the inflation of the lists of those denied foreign travel to about 150,000 citizens, which led to many strange situations, not only relative to those denied travel but also to those not denied travel, merely because of the similarity of names.

The committee formed by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior has nearly finished its task as requested by President Mubarak: reducing the lists of those denied foreign travel, applying freedom of movement to each citizen and altering the process of registering names on the list of those denied foreign travel so that names can be placed there only by court order or by decision of the investigating authorities.

The decisions to remove from the lists of those denied foreign travel the prohibitions on ports, airports and personalities are being decided gradually. In this the authorities are assuring that the lists of those denied foreign travel are not permanent, but that they change according to changing security situations. It could be that the denial of travel is to protect the rights of the state as in the case of preventing tax evasion. However, there are special, sensitive cases in which the security organizations hurry to take precautionary measures to combat international terrorism or to help the international police,

"Interpol," but this can be done only with the immediate agreement of the judge of preventative affairs or the public deputy in each case.

There are other measures to deny travel or entrance to a country other than lists of those denied foreign travel or entrance. Every nation in the world applies these, but they are limited to overtaking terrorists and smugglers even if they are not registered on a list of those denied foreign travel.

Where has the effort to reduce the lists of those denied foreign travel gotten to then? Based on what officials in the Ministry of Interior say there are only 500 names of political figures left on the list of those denied foreign travel. Those remaining on the list are there because of orders from the public deputy, socialist public prosecutor or the military prosecutor general. The number of those denied foreign travel has been reduced by 50 percent from what it was during al-Sadat's era and even the remaining number is being reduced until only those remaining are there because of economic or criminal reasons such as tax evasion, narcotics and currency smuggling, writing of bad checks or attempting to escape the execution of justice. The reduction of the list of those denied foreign travel is still continuing.

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CSO: 4504/395

EGYPT

GOVERNMENT BAN ON AL-DA'WAH MAGAZINE CRITICIZED

Kuwait AL-MUJTAMA' in Arabic 2 Jul 85 pp 28-29

[Article: "When Will the Egyptian AL-Da'WAH Magazine Be Published? The Communist Grouping Party Published 15 Newspapers, Magazine and Periodicals While the Islamic Movement Faces Such Hardship in Obtaining for Monthly Magazine?"]

[Text] Would you believe that the government of Egypt is now preoccupied with the adoption of a decision it considers more serious than the decision to expel the Russian advisors, the economic open-door policy and the opening of the Suez Canal, and even the crossing of the Egyptian army during the Ramadan war.

That is why it is "taking its time" in issuing it and it taking all the necessary measures to avoid any repercussions! It is the decision to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to found the Islamic Press, Publishing and Distribution Company in accordance with the law and the constitution! It is for this purpose that meetings are being held, conferences convened and studies and research conducted. Delegations are being sent for this lofty matter and serious event (!): the publication of AL-DA'WAH magazine to be once again the organ of the Muslim Brotherhood in accordance with the law and the constitution! Have you noticed how "right" it is in its "deliberate" position, which at the same time was "decisive and prompt" on the question of applying the Islamic Shari'ah in the country and in closing the doors of debate about it during one of the assembly's "sociable" sessions!

But it is difficult, now that intentions have come to light, to set a date for the new publication. Will it be in 3, 6 or 9 months, or a year or longer? Only God knows!

The Story from the Beginning

It all began with the enactment of Press Law No 148 of 1980, about which the well-known journalist, Mr Mustafa Amin, said that it was the strangest law known to the press in the world and that it was unrivaled in any civilized country that respects its people. The former head of the Journalists Syndicate, Mr Salah Jalal, said that it was enacted especially for the sake of AL-DA'WAH, AL-I'TISAM and AL-MUKHTAR magazines, but AL-DA'WAH particularly. The government did not wait for the expiration of AL-DA'WAH's license with the death of Shaykh

Salih Mustafa 'Ashmawi, the licensee. It confiscated the magazine and revoked its license in the September 1981 decisions, arresting all its editors. In the first court ruling, condemning the September decisions, the Council of State's Administrative Justice Court ordered the stay of execution of the president's order to revoke the license of AL-DA'WAH magazine. This was in February 1982. Shaykh Salih 'Ashmawi did everything he could to enforce the court order and publish the magazine, but to no avail, even though administrative court rulings must be implemented. The government, however, used the emergency law in its refusal to carry out the court's orders. Shaykh Salih 'Ashmawi persisted in his efforts until he was able to open the magazine's main office in January 1983, about 11 months after he won his case. He kept on trying, to no avail, until his death, but was unable to implement the successive court orders supporting the right of AL-DA'WAH's owner to publish it. He died in September 1983, and the magazine's management received a promise from government officials to allow the magazine to be published in March 1984. However, the death of Shaykh Salih 'Ashmawi, the licensee, rendered the officials' promises useless because, under the press law, the licensee's death terminates the magazine's license for republication. Thereupon, the Muslim Brotherhood decided to publish AL-DA'WAH under the press law which regulates the republication of newspapers. This was in January 1984. They submitted an application to the Higher Press Council--the party having jurisdiction over the publication of newspapers--to obtain a "form" of the contract to found companies in accordance with the law. They were surprised to learn that the form has not yet been prepared, although more than 4 years had passed since the press law was enacted! They went to court to ask for the contract and were able to get it 1 year later, or in January 1985. During that time, the brotherhood tried to combine the press law and the joint stock companies law and to submit the company's papers on this basis, but this attempt failed and was rejected by the Companies Administration. The company establishment contract was the epitome of red tape and backwardness, and placed indescribable obstacles such as: capital must be no less than 100,00 Egyptian pounds and the share of any individual and his family (wife and minor children) must not exceed 500 Egyptian pounds! Also, every shareholder must submit his police record and the approval of his employer--and also a statement that he is legally competent and had no judgments against him by the Ethics Court and is not under sequestration, etc.

In less than 2 weeks, the brotherhood submitted a request for the registration of the Islamic Press, Publishing and Distribution Company which will publish AL-DA'WAH, after they met all the required absurdities. When the papers were being reviewed at the Companies Department, a shareholder, Justice Muhammad al-Samari, temporary board of directors member, died and the department asked that another shareholder be selected. All this was aimed at wasting time and delaying approval as long as possible. Notwithstanding the fact that the law set the time for approving new companies at 60 days and although the founders' attorney filed the papers on 5 February 1985, approval has not yet been granted. The most recent demands, aimed at complicated matters and killing time were ludicrous. The founders' attorney has submitted statements attesting to the fact that the shareholders were legally competent and had no legal judgments against them and that none of them were under sequestration. The Companies Department, however, decided that this format was not the one prescribed by the

law, albeit not at variance with it, and therefore the competency statements must be rewritten in accordance with the provisions of the law!

The second demand, which was even stranger, was that the founders submit a request to the socialist prosecutor inquiring whether the Ethics Court has passed judgments against them. This had the same purpose as the first demand! Do you know any civilized country where such a thing can happen? We asked why the matter was not brought before the court for approval since the law set a 2-month limit and close to 5 months has passed, and the answer was that the judicial process is a long drawn-out procedure and the court's vacation was coming up in one and a half months--for 3 months--and perhaps we could get approval before this long time. And there is no need to go to court against the government because even if we obtained a favorable judgment, the defendants themselves are the one who enforce it!

Newspapers of the Left and of the Islamic Movement

After the approval and official registration of the company comes the role of the Higher Press Council. The law decrees that the council must be informed of the intention to publish a newspaper and must examine the case within 40 days. Failure to return a decision means the legal existence of the newspaper, which must then be approved in assembly sessions which are held every 3 months. But who knows, they may be delayed for 4, 5 or more months since the matter is related to AL-DA'WAH magazine, which is the organ of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt!

We note here that the number of leftist publications in Egypt is close to 15 newspapers, magazines and periodicals while the Islamic movement is facing all this hardship to obtain a license to publish one monthly publication! And finally we ask: Where is Egypt headed, O government of Egypt?!

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CSO" 4504/398

EGYPT

CLASH BETWEEN RELIGIOUS CURRENTS, GOVERNMENT ANTICIPATED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 10 Jul 85 pp 32-34

[Article: "Will the Muslim Brotherhood Seize Power? Clash Between Authorities and Religious Current in Egypt is Imminent"]

[Text] During the last few weeks, the signs of provocations were heralding the imminent outbreak of fire. The confrontation reached its climax when Shaykh Hafiz Salamah called upon all Muslims to leave al-Nur Mosque in Cairo in a green march on the president of the republic, demanding his support in applying Islamic Shari'ah provisions in Egypt.

The authorities, in the person of the interior minister, denied permission for this march to leave the mosque and to head toward 'Abdin Palace. The government said that demonstrations and popular marches are not the ideal way to deal with such issues due to the presence of hired elements that may infiltrate these demonstrations to turn them into chaos uncontrolled except by group instinct and the whims of the masses. Furthermore, demonstrations and assembly are prohibited by law while there are legitimate channels, the most important of which is the People's Assembly, as represented by the nation's deputies, through whom they can submit their demands. Interior minister Maj Gen Ahmad Rushdi threatened to use the Emergency Law, which has been in effect in Egypt since the death of the late president, Anwar al-Sadat, to strike at any kind of assembly, gathering or demonstration.

For a moment, it seemed that a clash might erupt between the worshippers, who were carrying the Koran and placards, and the soldiers, who were carrying rifles and machine-guns and were massed not only to surround al-Nur Mosque, where the march was supposed to start, but the entire al-'Abbasiyah area where the mosque is located, as well.

This massacre was averted only by God's providence and an order issued by the Administrative Court of the Council of State banning such a march.

Shaykh Hafiz Salamah complied with the order temporarily and the green march did not leave the mosque. The fact is, however, that this compliance did not cancel the clash, but postponed it for a while.

Subsequently, President Husni Mubarak, in a public speech, issued a sharply-worded warning against any damage to Egypt's stability, intimating that this radical religious current is backed by foreign elements urging it to impose its opinion by force and perhaps even conjuring up the possibility of seizing power, thus harming stability and upsetting the democratic experience in Egypt. He added that, by virtue of his responsible position, he could not allow such a thing to occur. He said:

"From this democratic rostrum, I warn over and over again that our responsibility to protect and safeguard this society and to promote work, production and social justice obliges us not to fail for one moment to resist any tendency, led by ignorance and conceit, to believe that it is able to impose on the people its views, whims and ambitions. I am not using ambiguous words or fragmentary phrases. My talk is straight-forward and clear and my warning is not open to interpretation."

AL-YAMAMAH has learned that, following these words of warning, an Egyptian "working group" was charged with the task of coming up with a new idea, to be announced in the coming weeks, which provides for the following:

First, employment of the "Emergency Law," which went into effect the day following the death of late President Anwar al-Sadat. This law grants the interior minister absolute powers giving him the right to arrest any individual, group or organization he deems a threat to the nation's security.

It is noteworthy that this law has not been enforced for the last 5 years and that there were attempts in the People's Assembly last year to repeal it. But the government, in the person of the interior minister, insisted on retaining it on the pretext of combatting terrorism.

Second, political action in Egypt will be confined to the six existing legal political parties, which are: the National Party, the Wafd Party, the Labor Party, the Grouping Party, the Liberal Party and the Ummah Party. This measure is aimed at preventing the religious current from engaging in political action. It is well-known that the Muslim Brotherhood has been a dissolved group for the last 30 years and that the issue of its re-emergence is still under litigation. It is also common knowledge that the parties law in Egypt prohibits the establishment of any party on a religious basis.

Third, Islamic group activities will be restricted to religious action and intellectual call only. Within this framework, the Ministry of Awqaf will be given additional powers which will keep it within its religious activities.

Fourth, a "national character" [mithaq watani] will be drawn up to be observed by all the opposition parties in Egypt and their newspapers whereby all the parties will agree on a higher state policy and differ on other things. The purpose of such a charter is to involve the opposition actively in the responsibilities of government, on one hand, and to break up the existing alliance between them, namely the parties and the religious current, on the other hand, thus isolating the religious current from the opposition forces in

Egypt. It is well known that an alliance between the Islamic current and the political opposition forces was forged in Egypt toward the end of the al-Sadat regime when these two parties agreed to get rid of him. Another alliance was subsequently forged between the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood during the People's Assembly elections when eight brotherhood members won seats in the assembly, thus forming the second largest opposition force in the People's Assembly, after the Wafd Party.

Throughout these 4 years, and ever since al-Sadat's demise at the hands of these same Islamic groups, the religious current in Egypt has achieved sweeping growth to become a force to be reckoned with in the Egyptian political street.

The power of the Muslim Brotherhood multiplied quantitatively and qualitatively during this phase and dozens of off-shoot Islamic groups, who agree on the end but not the same means, emerged as a result.

This expansion by the religious current manifested itself in several ways:

On the direct action level, this current gained excessive power and self-confidence after getting rid of Anwar al-Sadat. The assassination incident was the third bloody clash with the government in only 6 years. The first attempt was in 1974 when the Military Technical College was occupied. A large number of its staff was killed and its weapons captured in an attempt to seize power. The second attempt was in 1977 when the awqaf minister, Shaykh al-Dhahabi, was abducted and killed. This was the movement that shook Egypt from one end to another and was known as Repudiation and Renunciation [al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah].

The clash reached its climax in 1980 with the reviewing stand incident which claimed the life of President of Anwar al-Sadat and which was followed by the attack on the security directorate in Asyut, during which 80 officers and soldiers, including the director of security himself, were assassinated.

On another level, this current achieved in these few years other equally important successes.

The Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in reaching the People's Assembly through its alliance with the Wafd. It now has eight seats in the assembly, representing the second largest opposition in the legislative council, in addition to dozens of other non-brotherhood People's Assembly members who are clearly sympathetic to it.

During this period, the brotherhood also succeeded in obtaining a court order to publish its organ, AL-DA'WAH magazine, which Anwar al-Sadat shut down during the famous September events.

Through its candidates, the brotherhood was then able to sweep most of the professional unions and student unions at the universities. All its candidates in the lawyers, journalists and engineers union elections won and likewise the student unions in Egyptian universities, which were almost closed to members of the religious current there.

Meanwhile, the sentences in the great al-Jihad case were handed down. These sentences, on the whole, were reduced in favor of the organization to the extent that the organization's mufti, Dr 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, who gave a legal opinion to kill al-Sadat, was acquitted.

This month the court will hear the case, filed some years ago, in which the brotherhood demands the return of its dissolved group whose activities were completely halted in 1955 following its first clash with the 23 July revolution when it tried to assassinate Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir at al-Manshiyah Square in Alexandria in 1954. The Muslim Brotherhood is confident that the court will rule in its favor.

Following this ruling, the Muslim Brotherhood will have fulfilled all the basic elements for its existence and for undertaking an effective role in Egyptian political life in preparation for seizing power.

A senior brotherhood leader, who was imprisoned for many years during 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime and who plays a prominent role in the group, told AL-YAMAMAH:

"The Muslim Brotherhood is going to sweep the next People's Assembly elections. Then they will have an absolute majority within the assembly to form a government or at least form an opposition government or a shadow government no less important or effective than the government in power."

These words by a leading brotherhood member very clearly signify that the brotherhood has its eyes on ruling and seeking to seize power, and [also signifies] that the formation of a religious government is not farfetched.

Nonetheless, Shaykh 'Umar al-Talmasani denies what historians have unanimously agreed upon and what leading brotherhood members have unofficially and privately stated. He says: "From the day the group came into being and up to this day, the Muslim Brotherhood has not for a moment thought about seizing power. Rather, it sought to improve the country's conditions. We declare that if a man come from the North Pole claiming that he will apply God's law in Egypt and will rule by God's Book and the Prophet's Sunna, the Muslim Brotherhood would support him because we do not look at the person of government, but rather at the application of government and we have no objection whatsoever to the ruler. We have nothing to do with personalities."

This is the crux of the problem in Egypt today. Anything else is just peripheral side issues that revolve around the basic question.

The basic question in one word is a kind of struggle for power.

Anwar al-Sadat released Muslim Brotherhood members from prison when he assumed power in 1970. The truth is that the man did not release them out of concern for them, but because he wanted to win over the religious current in Egypt to

use it in striking at the then-powerful Nasirite current. During these past 15 years, the Muslim Brotherhood has grown considerably and has had dozens of more radical off-shoot religious groups. Now, the brotherhood feels that its power is complete and that it is a stone's throw or closer to taking over all the reins of power in Egypt.

As for the placard which has been raised, it demands the full and total application of the Islamic Shari'ah in Egypt.

What does the application of the Shari'ah mean?

Islamic thinker Khalid Muhammad Khalid says: "It does not in any way mean a feared and dreaded change in our lives. The Shari'ah is oriented toward the establishment of justice, freedom and virtue in the law and in society.

"As for the law--penal, civil and commercial--nine-tenths of it is consistent with Islamic jurisprudence. The penal code needs only the legal punishments which, if we know the philosophy of Islam on them and the conditions for their establishment, will not kindle in the hearts of the ignorant as well as the sensible the least amount of fear and dread.

"The civil and commercial laws will only need an additional provision excluding usury. I do not think this is difficult since Pakistan has eliminated all forms of usurious transactions and has transformed all the banking institutions, including the foreign ones, into Islamic transactions.

"This is with regard to the law. As for society, the Shari'ah says that time is part of the remedy and the Islamic course quite evidently persuades rather than forces people to espouse virtue. Patience and perseverance are its means of refining society and enhancing its behavior. Suffice it to know that alcohol, the gravest of sins, was not forbidden until 18 years after the emergence of Islam. The step-by-step approach is the ideal way to uplift society and refine its behavior.

"The application of the Islamic Shari'ah does not in any way mean--whether the advocates of application like it or not--a backward step or retrogression. The greatest virtue of Islam is its respect for modernity.

"Modernity means its ability, via its principles, spirit and experience, to interact intelligently with the continual development of the forms of life and people's needs. Those who strip Islam of the virtue of modernity deprive it of its right to be a universal and eternal religion.

"Likewise, the application of the Shari'ah does not mean life outside the walls of civilization, for Islam is one of its greatest pioneers. When we say civilization we mean scientific, technical, intellectual, spiritual and social civilization. If Islam, the last of the religions, had distanced itself and turned away from this civilizational commitment, it would have hindered the future of humanity and would have put life in a refrigerator, relegating it to the darkness and gloom of night."

Why the Shari'ah now?

The same Islamic thinker, Khalid Muhammad Khalid, answers this question by saying: "There is a general reason which is that all the officials have acknowledged the necessity of this application and have admitted, including the ruling party deputies, that application is a popular demand, although neither these nor those have set an immediate time for its attainment. This leads me at once to a special reason which convinced me that today, rather than tomorrow, and tomorrow rather than the day after tomorrow, is the best time for this application which has gained the urgent appeal of many people. Delay, in my opinion, means a wider gap between the growing Islamic current and the rulers which gives the malicious foreign forces--and they are many--a chance to split the ranks and make things more difficult.

"Secondly, this persevering current will always find its chance to convert its call into a gaudy embellishment of the government and society which may, and indeed will, lead it to all the means of violence it can muster. Moreover, as long as there is a possibility that this current will some day, sooner or later attain power or participate in government, we have a great opportunity to embark on the codification of the Shari'ah by codifying the system of rule. Herein begins the Islamic current's commitment to such a system, and the people will spend a long time in co-existing with it as an Islamic system that allows no one and no group to violate it."

The words of this honorable Islamic scholar who represents enlightened Islam in Egypt point to two facts:

First, nine-tenths of Egyptian law is consistent with the Islamic Shari'ah and, therefore, from where comes the demand for the application of this Shari'ah?

Second, there is a gap between the Islamic current and the system of rule in Egypt.

This gap during the past phase has grown at a rate that heralds a clash and the resort to "violence," according to Khalid Muhammad Khalid.

The government in Egypt believes that the Islamic groups movement is not a religious movement, but rather a basically political one backed by foreign sides who nurture it with money and weapons and incitement as well, and that its ultimate goal is to seize power after spreading the worst kind of bloody violence.

The educated people of Egypt, including the enlightened wing of the Islamic current, are demanding a dialogue, not a clash, with the Islamic groups. Some go so far as to demand the creation of a political party for them through which, and through whose newspaper, they can express their views and ideas. Here is where the idea of "dialogue" prevails over the idea of "clash."

There is a political point of view which believes that these Islamic groups with their agitated movements are nothing but a cat's paw for foreign conspiracy aimed at striking Egypt from within by fragmenting it into Muslims and Christians and turning Egypt into another Lebanon. These people substantiate this opinion by that serious report, a secret one, which leaked out from by the Jewish World Council, entitled "Israel's Strategy in the Eighties." This report offers a detailed picture of the Jewish movement in the Arab region during this decade, a movement based on the "Balkanization" of the Arab countries bordering on Israel and the transformation of the conflict into an Arab-Arab or an Islamic-Islamic conflict after it had been an Arab-Israeli and an Islamic-Jewish one. It also says that the upshot of such a design is to convert the countries of the region into a group of warring mini-states after fragmenting it from within religiously and racially. With regard to Egypt, for instance, the strategy calls for the establishment of at least two states in the Nile Valley: an Islamic state in the north and a Christian one--Egypt has 10 million Christians--in the south. The same thing goes for the rest of the Arab countries bordering on Israel. The best evidence of the success of this policy are the events in Lebanon and the war in the Gulf between two Islamic countries, Iran and Iraq.

The upshot of the final picture in Egypt seems, nowadays to be represented in three forces:

First, a stormy Islamic current representing the strongest political currents in the Egyptian street today, a current backed by tremendous popular support.

Second, a ruling authority which controls all state agencies. This authority has decided to confront this religious current with violence, if necessary.

Third, an enlightened current represented by scholars and educated people. It is a current which stands between these two aforementioned currents and believes that the likely clash will render Egypt a carbon copy of Lebanon.

There are alarming indications suggesting that the clash, even if delayed, will most certainly occur, if not today, tomorrow, because its seeds are hidden deep down in society due to the absence of dialogue, to the oblivion of the educated, to the bewilderment of the political currents and to the failure to offer radical solutions to the problems afflicting society in general and youth in particular.

The danger is great and reflects a real crisis society is going through because, in the absence of justice, the great disparity in incomes and the lack of the minimum needs of work, housing, marriage and a reasonable life for the young generation, radicalism will surely grow and terrorism will come into being, for despair hatches evil!

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SUDAN

POLITICAL ROLES OF COUNTRY'S PARTIES EXAMINED

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 1, 8 Jun 85

[Series by 'Uthman Mirghani: "Sudans Parties Under the Magnifying Glass"; part 1 of series not available]

[1 Jun 85 pp 20-21]

[Text] In its previous issue, AL-TADAMUN launched a series of articles on Sudan's political parties which have resumed their political activity in preparation for the elections scheduled to be held before April 1986, the end of the transitional period in Sudan. We have dealt with the Ummah, Democratic Unionist and Ba'th parties and we will review in this issue the role and history of the Communists and of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudanese political arena. Each of these two parties has played a major role, reaching the point of participating in and of almost gaining sole control of the government.

Dividing Sudan's parties into big and small parties may not perhaps reflect the real political roles played by some of the "small parties." Though the Ummah and Democratic Unionist parties are Sudan's two biggest parties in terms of a broad popular base and of alternating control of government in the periods of democracy experienced by Sudan in the past, it is difficult to say that the Communist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood movement have played a political role commensurate with their size because each of the two organizations has played a major role in the political arena and in the government and each has come very close to the decision-making center at various times. The Communists staged a coup against ex-President Ja'far Numayri in 1971 and nearly gained sole control of power and the Muslim Brotherhood cooperated with Numayri's regime for 8 years during which the Brothers attained a position of influence over decision making until Numayri turned against them last March and accused them of hatching a plot to take power.

Communist Party

For a long time, the Sudanese Communist Party was singled out as the strongest Communist Party in the Arab and African worlds.

The Sudanese Communist Party came into existence in the wake of World War II and was formed by a number of Sudanese intellectuals who had studied in Egyptian universities and established Marxist cells within the Egyptian Communist Party.

At the outset, in 1946 to be specific, the Communists formed a movement which they called the Sudanese National Liberation Movement and which included a number of intellectuals, students and workers.

From the outset, the Communists followed the approach of underground action and their cells thus proceeded to operate out of sight and in secret to establish a foothold in the circles of the labor and peasant movements, which were then in their early stages. At the level of organizational action, the Communists formed several fronts which they decided would operate under a legal non-communist facade, even though they were in control of those fronts. The most prominent of those fronts was the Anticolonialist Front, which actively engaged in the national activities opposed to colonialism and which took part in the government through its representation in the parliamentary assembly throughout the period from 1953 (when the first Sudanese elections were held within the self-rule framework) until 1958 when the army, led by Lt Gen Ibrahim 'Abbud, seized power.

Even though the Communists supported those demanding Sudan's full independence from bilateral rule (Britain and Egypt), they strongly supported the establishment of good relations with Egypt.

In 1956, the Communists called for establishing a Sudanese-Egyptian alliance "to stand in the face of the policy of subservience to the colonialist camp." They also sent volunteers to Egypt during the trilateral aggression against Egypt in that year. When the border crisis erupted between Egypt and Sudan in 1958, the Sudanese Communists argued the need to contain the issue so that it may not escalate and accused the Ummah Party of touching off the crisis "to muddy the tranquility of relations between Sudan and Egypt and to steer Sudan away from the liberated Arab nationalism current."

From the beginning, the Communists have been subjected to accusations of atheism and hostility to religion. These accusations intensified to the point where in 1954 certain circles demanded the promulgation of a law to fight communism. The Communist Party and the movement supporting it and sympathizing with it confronted those campaigns and issued statements denying that communism fights Islam. They also sent memoranda to the then prime minister, Isma'il al-Azhari, to urge him not to adopt any laws that curtail the public liberties, especially the "destructive activity law" which was thought to be aimed exclusively at the Communists.

With the support they received from some of the other political movements, from the labor unions and from the movements supporting them, such as the Committee for the Defense of Liberties which was headed by 'Izz-al-Din 'Ali 'Amir, and the Federation of Sudanese Labor Unions which was headed by al-Shafi' Ahmad al-Shaykh, the Communists were able to repel the assault against them and to foil passage of the law to fight communism which was advocated by some circles. The Communists also stood behind the abolition of the destructive activity law.

In the period from 1958-64 during which the military, led by Lt Gen Ibrahim 'Abbud, was in power, the Communists were the first to fly the banner of

opposition in the face of military rule and they exerted intensive efforts to escalate the opposition to 'Abbud's regime, issuing statements and memoranda urging the overthrow of the military regime. As a result, 'Abbud's government launched large-scale arrest campaigns against the leaders of the Anticolonialist Front and the labor unions. 'Abd-al-Khaliq Mahjub, the Communist Party's secretary general, was put on trial in 1954 on the charge of membership in an illegal organization.

In the wake of the popular uprising of October 1964, the Communist Party began to engage in open political activity and its representatives entered the election campaigns under the party's banner. But at the end of 1965, the other political parties introduced into the constitution an amendment providing for dissolution and banning of the Communist Party.

What is surprising is that the Communists returned to the arena with their strong support for the 1969 military coup whereas they had been the first to oppose the military regime in 1958. They cooperated with ex-President Ja'far Numayri at the outset and before leading a coup against him in 1971. But the coup failed only 3 days after it was carried out and Numayri returned to power to begin a campaign of pursuing and persecuting the Communists, which lasted until he was ousted last April. During the trials which followed the Communist coup attempt, a number of Communist leaders, headed by 'Abd-al-Khaliq Mahjub, who chaired the party for 22 years, and al-Shafi' Ahmad al-Shaykh, the general secretary of the Federation of Sudanese Labor Unions, were executed. That blow had its impact on the party and its leadership.

In the wake of last April's uprising, the Communist Party resumed its open political activity and elected Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud as secretary general. However, the old divisions have not disappeared. The group supporting China resumed its activity as the Labor and Farmers Party and another movement operating under the name of the National Forces Union and led by al-hajj 'Abd-al-Rahman, a veteran Communist labor leader, has resurfaced.

Even though the Communists have maintained their cells and bases in the circles of craftsmen and students, they will need some time and a lot of effort to regain their old influence in labor union circles. It is most likely that they will regain their ability for active political movement and that their popular support will continue to be confined to their traditional support bases in the circles of university and institute students and labor unions and federations.

Muslim Brotherhood

It is said that the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan possess a superior organizational capability that equals that of the Communists. The Brotherhood has been able to build for itself strong support bases in the universities and higher institutes. It has also succeeded in attracting a number of labor unions and professional federations. However, the Brotherhood has aroused an extensive debate around itself after cooperating with the former regime and supporting it in the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a in a manner that displeased numerous popular and political circles in Sudan.

The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as a force with its weight and presence in the Sudanese political arena in the wake of the 1964 popular uprising and joined the national front which was formed by the various political parties at that time. During the years of national activity against the colonialists, the Muslim Brotherhood had a limited presence in the circles of university and institute students. In 1954, the Brotherhood was subjected to pursuit and persecution because it organized demonstrations and processions demanding the "ouster of the military government in Egypt" and voiced opposition to Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime. Excluding its movement and activities in student circles, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to operate until 1964 as an organization with limited strength.

During the democratic rule period from 1964-69, the Brotherhood surfaced clearly in the political arena under the leadership of Dr Hasan al-Turabi, its grand master. It waged the elections in that period under the name of the Islamic Charter Organization and led large-scale campaigns against the Communists. When the military, led by Col Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, seized power in May 1969 and banned partisan activity, the Brotherhood joined the other political parties and organizations in the opposition and continued to be in the opposition ranks until 1977 when it took part with the other parties (excluding the Communist Party) in the "national reconciliation" pact concluded with Numayri. But the reconciliation did not live long and collapsed less than a year after the pact was concluded. The various parties abandoned the program for reconciliation, while the Brotherhood decided to continue to cooperate with Numayri's regime.

In that period, splits developed in the Brotherhood's ranks between those supporting and those opposing cooperation with the regime. An organization led by Sadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Majid broke away from Hasan al-Turabi's leadership.

The Brotherhood's cooperation with the regime peaked in September 1983 when the laws on implementation of the Islamic Shari'a in Sudan were issued. Dr Hasan al-Turabi, who was then President Numayri's foreign affairs adviser, defended those laws in the face of the opposition they encountered from numerous circles in northern and southern Sudan. A number of Muslim Brothers noted that they were able to make a major gain in shortening the path toward implementation of the Shari'a rules in Sudan. At the same time, the Brotherhood dealt a blow to two of its obstinate opponents, namely the Communist Party, which strongly supports the secular tendency, and the Republican Brothers movement, whose leader, Mahmud Muhammad Taha, was executed in January 1985 after being tried on several charges, including "retrogression." His execution aroused wrath against the regime at home and abroad, especially since the man was 76 years old when he was executed.

Cooperation between the former regime and the Muslim Brotherhood collapsed last March when Numayri launched a violent attack against the Brotherhood, accusing its members of scheming to overthrow his regime, and jailed a number of Brotherhood leaders, including Dr Hasan al-Turabi. Numayri was preparing to try the Brotherhood leaders before the courts when last April's uprising occurred and toppled his regime. It is fortunate for the Brothers that they were arrested in that period because had their cooperation with the former regime lasted another month, they would today be in a different position, perhaps finding themselves in jail as "elements of the former regime."

Dr Hasan Al-Turabi, who is now leading the Islamic Tendency Movement, is trying to form an Islamic front that includes other Islamic groups in order to bolster his position in the face of the currents that have split away from him, the most important being the wing of Sadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Majid which is now operating under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadiq 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Majid's wing has participated in the National Grouping for the Salvation of the Homeland which was formed in the wake of the latest uprising whereas al-Turabi's wing has refrained from participation in this grouping.

In addition to al-Turabi's and 'Abd-al-Majid's wings, there are other Islamic movements in the Sudanese arena, including the Pan-Arab (al-qawmiyah) National Islamic Front, led by 'Uthman Muhammad Taha, the deputy speaker of the previous People's Assembly, now led by Dr Nasir al-Sayyid, a professor at Khartoum University. But the biggest Islamic movement opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood is the Republican Brothers, which was led by the late Mahmud Muhammad Taha who was executed by the former regime at the beginning of this year. The Republican Brothers have been able to gain support in student circles, particularly university students. But the execution of Mahmud Muhammad Taha, their leader with a long history of national activity, has denied the Republican Brothers experienced leadership that is well known at the popular level. This has perhaps greatly weakened their position.

In addition to the main political parties we have reviewed so far, there are the small parties which could play a limited role in the political arena. Moreover, there are the southern parties which will certainly play a role in the government by virtue of the special status of Southern Sudan whose representation in the central government is guaranteed. We will review these parties next week in the third part of this series.

[1 Jun 85 pp 22-26]

[Interview with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, Ummah Party leader]

Within the framework of the series entitled "Sudan's Parties Under Magnifying Glass," we review here the Ummah Party in an interview with Sadiq al-Mahdi, the party leader who is also considered one of the most prominent leaders of al-Ansar Movement. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi held in the past the position of prime minister in the 1960's and led the Ummah Party's opposition to the regime of ex-President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri. In 1976, the regime accused him of involvement in the coup attempt which took place in July of that year and issued a death sentence against him in absentia. But in 1977, the regime embarked on "national reconciliation" with a number of the political opposition parties and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi returned to Khartoum. However, reconciliation soon collapsed and the Ummah Party leader resumed his opposition to the regime. He was jailed for 1 year when he opposed the manner in which the Islamic Shari'a rules were implemented in Sudan.

Since last April's popular-military uprising, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi has turned his attention to organizing the party's ranks and issued recently the Ummah Party's constituent statement in its new form. In the interview conducted with him by AL-TADAMUN at his residence in Omdurman, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi discussed the recent

uprising and the Ummah Party, saying that he will not deal or cooperate with his uncle, Ahmad al-Mahdi. He also warned of the Maladies of democracy and talked of his party's relations with Egypt and other Arab countries.

[Question] Why have the parties been absent from the structure of the transitional civilian cabinet?

[Answer] I don't believe that the parties are absent from the transitional cabinet, meaning that this cabinet's structure has gained the approval of all sides, including the political parties. It is true that the parties are not represented in this cabinet specifically and clearly but this is the result of the view that this phase is an interim phase and that the cabinet will have important and specific tasks. Moreover, the parties should focus on rebuilding their organizations and prepare for the general elections.

[Question] What is your conception of the coming phase and will there be a single Ummah Party or several "Ummah" parties?

[Answer] There will certainly be a single Ummah Party. However, the elements which were exploited by the former regime are agitating even though they have lost all their justifications. It is my opinion that the Ummah Party is not just strong but is stronger now than ever before. In addition to its positions in the traditional sector, it has been able to reach the modern sector.

However, throughout the Ummah Party's history, there have been movements initiated by individuals representing odd segments or organizations. I expect something of the sort to occur now on the hands of some members of al-Mahdi family. But such a problem will be short-lived and will not survive as an experience or as political organizations. Ultimately, there will be a single and strong Ummah Party, God willing.

[Question] Are there any endeavors currently underway to unite the ranks of the Ummah Party?

[Answer] No, because there is no call for such endeavors. What is happening now is that there are individuals taking a peculiar position, such as Ahmad al-Mahdi, who was basically one of the elements used by Numayri to weaken us and who continued to play this role until Numayri's era ended. He was unable to weaken our action in any way, as he was unable to add anything to Numayri. We reject any thought of dealing with this type of element.

[Question] Do you feel any anxiety vis-a-vis the transitional period, and do you experience any fears regarding the possibility of the development of problems and disagreements in the political arena that may obstruct the transfer of power to the civilians?

[Answer] Nobody can foretell the future. But there is no doubt that Sudan has big problems and it is my opinion that these problems dictate expediting the transfer of power to the people in the form of general elections. Many of the problems facing us require a strong rule with a mandate from the people. Such a rule can only be achieved through general elections. It is true that problems

exist and may intensify but I do not think that the means of solving these problems include postponement of the elections. These problems can only be approached and tackled by a strong government given a mandate through free general elections.

[Question] What is the role which the political parties, particularly the Ummah Party, played in the latest uprising?

[Answer] The most significant role performed by the Ummah Party is that it continued to carry the banner for 16 years. This resistance had a very significant impact on all the elements engulfing and besieging the regime. Under states of both open resistance and reconciliation, the Ummah Party took obvious strides in resisting and challenging the former regime. For example, in the struggle and the clashes, the Ummah Party's role in the confrontation had its impact.

As for reconciliation, it was one of the means to liquidate the defunct regime peacefully. When reconciliation was not implemented, it still left behind a degree of tolerance, liberality and freedom of action in relatively obvious spheres, such as the sphere of student opposition and opposition by some worker groupings and professional organizations. These free channels are the ones that played an important role in the movement toward the strike and in leading the political strike.

This is insofar as the background is concerned. As for the event itself, the most important accomplishment made by al-Ansar members in the movements that led to the revolution is that they ended the state of inactivity in student circles. The student unions were nearly frozen politically because the Muslim Brotherhood controlled and suspended, on its own decision, the student movement's activity against the regime. This grip was broken and when it was broken, the Muslim Brotherhood's grip on the student movement in Sudan's higher institutes and universities was loosened, except for the Khartoum branch of Cairo University. This breaking of the Brotherhood's grip was initiated and prepared for by the alliance of al-Ansar and the independents and this was tantamount to the prelude to the Rajab revolution (meaning the April uprising). The presence of a student movement prepared to perform its traditional role as the people's conscience was an important factor which prepared the way for the revolution because the students, especially the students at Omdurman Islamic University, were the one who staged the procession of Tuesday, 5 Rajab, which was tantamount to the first spark of the revolution. That procession was the first test of the Sudanese street's response to the student movement. The student movement then turned from processions and demonstrations to strikes led by the professionals, beginning with the strike of the Khartoum Hospital's Doctors Union to which the other doctors responded. The strike then spread to include the Khartoum University faculty and the lawyers. Those strikes culminated with the procession of Wednesday, 3 April 1985, in which the Ummah Party participated, represented by al-Ansar leaders and masses, not to mention al-Ansar's presence in the union.

What is important in this regard is that that procession culminated with the declaration of the National Salvation Charter. It was the Ummah Party's opinion from the start that the procession should culminate with a charter and not with a protest memorandum or anything of the sort. This charter is what united the ranks against the regime and defined the needed alternative regime that is, outlined its features. We took part in formulating this charter from the time it was a mere idea until it became a plan and a concept.

Moreover, we made it clear to the brothers who took part in the procession that after that success which was achieved by that procession and in the wake of the general strike which was about to be declared, we would continue our contacts with higher authorities in the armed forces so that the armed forces would side with the people. The fact is that we started as of Monday, 1 April 1985, concerted contacts with a number of officials holding prominent positions in the government and discussed with them the numerous developments then taking place in Sudan and the need for the army to take a distinct position vis-a-vis the oppressive May regime. It had actually been expected that those contacts would lead to a condition whereby the armed forces at their various levels would examine the situation in Sudan and would then side with the people. This role transformed the issue from a protest to a charter and transformed the popular position from a purely popular position to a movement integrated with a military position.

The other thing is that on 5 April 1985, we opened a new front, in addition to participating in the existing fronts through the above-mentioned processions and positions, when I addressed the Friday congregation, pointed out our positions toward what was happening and called for toppling the regime and establishing a free system, for abiding by the National Salvation Charter and for emerging in to the street in a clear fashion to express this position. Within the framework of this mobilization, we publicly appealed to the armed forces to move and settle the situation in the people's interest. This activity, which took place on Friday, had its impact on the armed forces which had to take into consideration the matter of al-Ansar's movement, as well as our joint movement with the others, which was an open movement defying the regime.

This is the sum total of the actions and contributions which can be described as a specific contribution to this great event embodies in the Rajab revolution. In the wake of the army's seizure of power, we played an important role in mobilizing support for the new transitional regime, in uniting the ranks and in reaching agreement on the form of the transitional system and in resuming Sudan's political activity through the popular movement. I believe that these features sum up the role which our group performed in the Rajab revolution.

[Question] You said that you contacted a number of military commanders before 6 April. Did those commanders include any of the military officers now occupying positions in the TMC [Transitional Military Council]?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Was Gen 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar-al-Dhahab one of those military commanders?

[Answer] No.

[Question] You met recently with Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, leader of the Khatmiyah Group and patron of the Democratic Unionist Party. What did you discuss in that meeting and is there a possibility of a coalition or an alliance between the Ummah and Democratic Unionist parties or plans to form a national unity cabinet that safeguards Sudan's stability in the coming phase?

[Answer] As you know, we have projected the national course concept. My meeting with Muhammad 'Uthman took place within this framework, which seeks to unite the ranks through certain alliances to surpass this phase and to chart a stable course after the transitional period. Naturally, the relations that have continued to be prosperous between us in the past are what paved the way for this meeting and under these particular circumstances within the framework of a building plan which we have called the national course.

[Question] Insofar as the coming phase is concerned, have you prepared projects or plans to deal with the economic crisis and to contain the consequences of the drought and the famine?

[Answer] We have no premeditated plans because to prepare a complete plan you must have the detailed figures and statistics. But we have had programs with clear-cut features and priorities since our First National Congress and we wrote detailed articles on these programs which were published in various issues of AL-SAHFAH in 1978.

These programs chart the sound priorities for what must be done to tackle the economic crisis, and what must be done is summed up in four important points:

first, to put a halt to the spending drain; second, to raise production; third, to stem corruption; and, fourth, to reexamine the development projects to improve their performance.

These, in our view, are the fundamental features of the steps to stop the economic decline and to solve the economic crisis. As for the future, there are bases for an economic development plan we advocated. This plan is needed for the post-transition phase.

The problem of drought and desertification is a long-range one. We have a study bureau which has formulated regarding this problem several ideas that may be valuable if they can be conveyed to the executive positions. In addition to our efforts, there have been other beneficial efforts, such as the study prepared by a group of experts delegated by the EEC to examine this problem in Kordofan and Darfur. This study offers extremely valuable ideas and we have studied them and believe that they are useful in confronting the consequences of drought and desertification in the immediate and distant future.

[Question] Insofar as the problem of South Sudan is concerned, what is your projection for solving and settling this problem?

[Answer] In our discussions with the various forces, we have always said that we must first define how and why this problem developed, meaning that we must agree on determining the causes first and then agree that the south has a special status within a united Sudan. We believe that this special status must be secured constitutionally and politically.

Whatever is agreed upon regarding the south must be new and must take into consideration, first, the new democratic conditions; second, the Addis Ababa mistakes and the pitfalls into which that agreement has slipped; and, third, the fact that it must be acknowledged that the south is actually suffering from backwardness, that it has special economic grievances, that the south, we well as Sudan's other provinces, are entitled to plan a special developmental effort and that this special effort must be achieved through establishing a balance in Sudan's regional development.

Fourth, there is the issue of oil and of the other precious minerals discovered and the struggle over the distribution of oil revenues. We believe that a flexible approach toward this issue dictates that a fair base be established for the distribution of oil revenue and the revenues of other precious minerals between the regions and the central government, with special attention devoted to the priorities and needs of the province or the provinces and to the task of dealing with their economic problems.

Fifth, we believe that there is a truth embodied in the fact that the southern citizens and the citizens of the other regions generally were absent from the arena past periods of Sudan's modern history due to a lack of education and other circumstances. But recently, they have been able to catch up with the bandwagon of education and qualifications and this dictates that consideration be given to fair distribution and participation at all political, economic, administrative and technical levles.

Sixth, it must be made clear that Sudan is a single country and that the intellectual conflict existing in it can, after insuring all the above mentioned factors, only be settled democratically. In case the intellectual conflict is settled democratically, then the parties concerned are entitled to insure two things: that the rights of citizenship be guaranteed to all and that religious liberties also be guaranteed to all, regardless of the majority's position on settling the main intellectual issues.

I believe that these six points can be the subject of agreement by the entire Sudanese political movement through the holding of a national conference whose objective is to reach a comprehensive national agreement on solving the southern problem within the framework of Sudan's unity. We have advocated such a conference so that it may formulate a comprehensive concept for solving the problem under the current circumstances.

[Question] Have you had contact with Col John Garang, the leader of the armed opposition movement in Southern Sudan?

[Answer] No, not directly. However, our delegates abroad have met with representatives of John Garang and presented to them our ideas on the issue of the south and on dealing with the problem generally.

[Question] You were among the first opposition leaders to criticize implementation of the Islamic Shari'a in Sudan in the manner in which it was implemented. How do you view the Shari'a issue now?

[Answer] To start with, I would not call what was implemented in Sudan the Islamic Shari'a but rather a May-type (reference to ex-President Ja'far Numayri's regime which seized power in May 1969) Shari'a. This May-type Shari'a was a distortion and a defacing of the Islamic Shari'a.

Naturally, there are some matters over which there is no disagreement, such as prohibiting alcohol. We have welcomed and will continue to welcome such measures. But there are such things as the criminal proceedings law, the law concerning the principles of court sentences, the alms and taxes bureau law, the civil transactions law and the pledge of loyalty to Ja'far Numayri. All these are, in our view, muddled laws with fundamental mistakes and laws that cause justice, by its Islamic criterion and by its positive criteria, to be lost. We have issued a pamphlet entitled "The Sudanese Regime and Its Islamic Experience" which deals in detail with all these laws and makes it clear how they have nothing to do with Islam. I have also published a book entitled "Shari'a Penalties and Their Place in the Islamic Social System." This book defines the nature of the Islamic penal codes, how they are implemented, how we can set up an Islamic system and how we can establish such a system in such a manner as to make it a civilizational alternative.

Our view of the penalties in the Islamic Shari'a, of establishing the Islamic system and of Islam as an alternative civilization differs fundamentally with Ja'far Numayri's implementation of the Shari'a, and this is why we opposed this implementation at the time. We believe that our opposition to Ja'far Numayri's distortions of Islam is what saved Islam's name in Sudan from being linked with Numayri's experiment and prevented arousing the people's wrath against the entire experiment, and against Islam with it. Were it not for our positions, the features for which Numayri's experiment were faulted would have been mixed with the position toward Islam, thus greatly weakening Islam in Sudan. This is why our position saved the Islamic call in Sudan from Numayri's distortions, which could have gravely damaged Islam's present and future in Sudan.

[Question] Regarding implementation of the Islamic Shari'a, do you foresee a special status for South Sudan?

[Answer] We believe that the Islamic application in Sudan dictates that agreement be reached with the Non-Muslim elements to secure their rights as citizens and to insure their religious liberties. One of the points for which we fault Numayri's experiment is that it disregarded this aspect and thus turned the non-Muslim elements into enemies and aroused their suspicions from the first day.

The application must be preceded by prior agreement clarifying these issues and must begin with the constitution so that there may be no contradiction between the constitution and the law, as happened in Numayri's time, for example. On this basis, Numayri's experiment was not only distorted but did not, in fact, exist constitutionally and was implemented with the stick. The law in accordance with which this experiment was implemented contradicts the

1973 constitution which was then in force and which is a secular constitution. If there had truly been sound democracy in Sudan at the time, a decision would have been issued by the Constitutional Court stating that these laws are unconstitutional.

I can sum up this opinion in three fundamental points: first, these laws were unconstitutional insofar as the May constitution itself is concerned; second, they were laws with a distorted content and laws which wasted justice by its Islamic criterion and its positive criterion, and, third, these laws contradicted the means of Islamic activity which state that "their affairs be conducted with consultation." It is certain that when these laws were issued, they did not come through consultation but rather by a faulty but urgent presidential decree.

In their method, constitutionality, priority and internal structure, these laws are faulty laws. Our viewpoint of the issue is that the sound inlet comes, first, through clearly insuring the status of the non-Muslims and then through the need to examine the laws after insuring their constitutional base and that the issue must be examined through consultation and by the parliamentary council so that it may take into consideration during the debate all the elements, assurances and clarifications needed. Any law issued by a presidential decree bypasses debate. Therefore, such important laws must be subjected to debate so as to eliminate any ambiguity engulfing them, to take the objections into consideration and to answer such objections.

Consultation is not a luxury but a must for the management of politics and is an essential part of developing confidence and of the essentials of political education and of psychological assurance. Therefore, consultation is a must, not a luxury. This is why an agreement must be reached with the non-Islamic groups, why the constitutional basis must be defined before any law is issued and why consultation is a necessary means for drafting laws.

What happened in Sudan in the past period was in violation of all these prerequisites and this is why we do not consider it legal or Islamic.

[Question] Will you demand the political trial of the leaders of the former regime?

[Answer] Yes, we believe that there is a maximum need for questioning on public issues and believe that a popular punishment law that is fair and acts as a deterrent must be issued insofar as these issues are concerned. Whoever is subject to this law must be tried. There are a number of issues which must be covered by the popular punishment law. The first is the issue of the violation of the 1969 constitution, the second is the issue of the prisoners who were killed by the regime while they were in jail during the Aba Island incidents and the third is the issue of the May regime's corruption and tampering with the people's monies. This is a major issue which covers the foreign loans and how those loans were manipulated.

The fourth issue is the issue of high treason, such as the issue of the Falasha, and the fifth is the issue of manipulating religion insofar as applying

penalties which were applied by the regime were not Islamic but were rather intended to protect an economically, politically and socially unjust system.

There is also the issue of the pledge of loyalty given to Numayri. A pledge of loyalty requires certain conditions which Ja'far Numayri did not meet. Moreover, the pledge was given through un-Islamic means, namely the means of coercion instead of the means of consultation. We consider this and the issue of penalties practices harmful to and manipulative of Islam. Therefore, major questioning must be conducted on this issue and those who tampered with these important religious concepts must be brought to trial.

The sixth issue is the issue of the acts of torture committed against political detainees who were arrested and subjected to extreme torture in the detention camps. All these issues must be the subject of questioning in accordance with a just and deterrent popular punishment law.

[Question] Within the framework of this presentation, you have noted that the fifth issue pertaining to trials is the issue of tampering with religion. Does this mean that you will demand that some leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood be brought to trial?

[Answer] A law is not tailored to individuals. I am not speaking of individuals here but speaking of a law which must be promulgated to round up those who perpetrated certain acts. Any person committing a crime must be brought to trial, regardless of what his organization or party is.

[Question] What is your idea of the manner in which the forthcoming elections should be conducted? Should the elections be founded on the same old divisions and electoral districts, or do you have new proposals and ideas on the issue?

[Answer] There are no new proposals in this regard. But we believe that the rules of democracy need to be clarified and rationalized so as to protect democracy from its own maladies. We have a plan which we will present to the others to consider with the aim of establishing a clear base to protect and secure democracy against the excesses and maladies that may harm our future.

[Question] Do you believe that the Sudanese political map and the bases of support for the traditional parties have changed, have been influenced or have altered in the past 16 years and do you think that this has had a negative or positive impact on the traditional base of support for the Ummah Party?

[Answer] To start with, I do not call the Ummah Party a traditional party but rather a popular party which still maintains its well-known popular bases, and has even added to them by expanding to the modern sector.

As a political organization, the Ummah Party did not devote its efforts to partisan issues but planned and led the Sha'ban uprising, which was a movement in the modern sector. Moreover, the party planned and led the July 1976 movement which was not conventional by any criterion but rather innovative. In addition, the party led, on the opposition's side, the national reconciliation government with such unconventional means that it was able to engage with

Numayri in a game very much like yoga [as published]. In yoga, you have to beat your opponent with his own means and strength, meaning that you have to exploit the opponent's strength with a certain move that enables you to throw him to the floor. Ultimately, the reconciliation led to this result.

The proof that the Ummah Party is not a conventional party is that it is the only party which possesses a politically and intellectually clear program of action that enables it to keep pace with the events of the hour, considering that we have offered our analyses on the southern problem and regional rule, on the so-called Islamic experiment, on the economy and foreign policy and on other issues. All this means that the Ummah Party has a strong popular presence.

Moreover, the Ummah Party's foreign relations are more diverse and numerous than those of the other parties. We maintain relations with both conservative and revolutionary countries. This indicates that we do not move conventionally but cooperate with international forces flexibly.

In response to the question concerning the Sudanese political map, I believe that the map has actually changed. Today, there is a higher degree of Sudanese national awareness. For example, the southern movements do not project themselves as secessionist movements, which is something new in the Sudanese arena. I also believe that the scope of regional awareness has expanded at the expense of some parties. The emergence of problems and the worsening of these problems mean that there is no place for oneupmanship. Consequently, the door will be shut in the face of the parties that have built their political tactics on oneupmanship.

But ultimately, if we want to ask if the May regime wanted to erase the Sudanese political map and replace it with another map founded on the organization of the "leader" and the "pioneer" and other such vocabulary, and if this regime succeeded in achieving what it had sought to achieve, then the answer is no because the May regime completely failed to change the political map. The socialist Union, for example, has left the Sudanese people more divided, fragmented and radical than it found them. This Union is perhaps the worst testimony against the May regime's efforts to achieve national unity.

It is indubitable that the Sudanese political map not only suffered from failure in the May regime era but also witnessed further disintegration and fragmentation. As a result of the faulty method of implementing the regional rule, a sort of setback occurred insofar as the multiplicity of parties is concerned. The situation got even worse insofar as sectarian multiplicity and tribal multiplicity and conflict are concerned. The gist of it is that the May regime left Sudan more fragmented and divided from the partisan, tribal and sectarian aspect than it had been during the civil war.

Because of all of this, we aspire to find a response to the national appeals, especially since the harmed elements have realized, in a wake of this abundant multiplicity, contradiction and conflict, the imminent danger lying in this direction. These elements will, perhaps, respond now to the call for voluntary unification.

[Question] Inasmuch as one notices the signs of satisfaction in the Sudanese street with the change that has taken place, one also senses a feeling of anxiety among the common people regarding what may happen if the political parties resume their preoccupation with the conflicts and the differences. What can you say to reassure the Sudanese street?

[Answer] I believe that much of what is in the view of the partisans and politicians is scary. During the October revolution, we warned that democracy must be safeguarded by democratic practices different from those that let matters go unchecked. But nobody heeded our warning at the time. The parties situation has returned to what it had been. You perhaps know that I resigned from the government at that time not because of any immediate political reason but because I defined essential reforms for democratic practice and said in effect that failure to adopt those reforms would expose democracy to danger. This is actually what happened. Those reforms were not adopted and so I resigned from the government.

We now say clearly that democratic activity without organization and through an onrush of competition will open the door to democracy's maladies. This is why we have drafted a study and why we urge that this study be the subject of discussion by a national conference to agree on regulation democratic activity through a voluntary national agreement in which we protect democracy from its maladies. I say that this is the right course to avoid and prevent the vicious cycle into which we, in Sudan, fell and as a result of which we moved from democracy to chaos and then to a coup. After a coup there comes oppression, then opposition, then an eruption and then democracy. This cycle must be broken with proven facts. Democracy, not dictatorship, is the rule and it is from democracy we should proceed to find the cure for democracy's maladies.

When we consider democracy the rule, we are required to secure the principles for establishing the democratic system. It is my viewpoint that these principles are, first, that the rule must be parliamentary in one form or another; second, that basic liberties must be guaranteed in one way or another; third, that the judiciary's independence must be guaranteed; and, fourth, that the supremacy of the law must be insured.

These principles must be applied in a manner that takes the Sudanese reality into consideration and that exerts efforts to eliminate democracy's maladies.

[Question] Concerning your foreign policies and relations, I don't think that it is a secret to you that the majority of political observers say that there is some sort of sensitivity in the relations between al-Ansar and Egypt and point out that Egypt prefers to cooperate with the Khatmiyah and the parties supported by the Khatmiyah. What is your opinion on this issue and how do you view the relationship between yourself and Egypt?

[Answer] My response to those who project matters in this manner is that they are conventional analysts who have not comprehended the changes. We have no sensitivities toward Egypt. Rather, there are positions. We have had the following positions and phases in our modern history:

The first position was that of Imam al-Mahdi, who did not deal with Egypt with any sensitivity but dealt with it as an important Islamic country and urged it to join the liberation movement under the canopy of the Islamic unity for which he aspired.

The second phase in our modern history was connected with the independence issue. On this issue, there was no hostility toward Egypt nor any denial of the true nature of the religious, linguistic, geographic or political bonds between Egypt and us. Rather, there was in that phase a reply to some ruling classes in Egypt which claimed at the time Egyptian sovereignty over Sudan. The more intense that claim grew, the more intense became the position that all the Sudanese cling to Sudan's full national sovereignty. That was not a partisan position but rather a national position.

Insofar as we are concerned, the proof that our viewpoint is no longer the same old viewpoint is that we started more than 3 years ago developing our relations with the Egyptian political movement in the government and the opposition, that we have opened an office in Cairo and means of communication have been established between us and all the Egyptian political parties and between us and the entire Egyptian press. We believe that these contacts have played their role in alerting Egyptian public opinion to the problems existing in Sudan, to Ja'far Numayri's isolation and to the Sudanese people's wish to find an alternative.

The current position is that it has become obvious that Ja'far Numayri's regime, which dealt with Egypt with emotions and integration, was talking of one thing whereas the reality is something else. There is no doubt that when the Egyptian brothers examined matters carefully, they found that their vital interests in Sudan were threatened. They want the Nile water to flow through friendly territories and reach them peacefully. In Numayri's era, the situation became shaky because the Nile water, for example, began to flow through hostile territories in South Sudan. Moreover, Numayri's regime was not able to secure the major Nile projects, such as the Jonglei Canal in which Egypt is interested.

It is my opinion that any person ruling Egypt should not view emotionally whoever or whatever force is capable of securing Egypt's vital interests. The issue is not one of emotions. Rather, the important question is who or what are the forces capable of ruling Sudan and which are the northern forces more capable of holding a dialogue with the south and of achieving stability in Sudan with their fundamental ties in the various parts of the country.

I believe that the Egyptian leadership's responses to these questions will be objective, not emotional, responses. We believe that since we opened our office in Cairo, our view of the relationship with Egypt is no longer influenced by the mistakes of the past or by the rule of emotions. We have said from the outset that we must define and surpass the mistakes, define and surpass the emotions and then define the vital interests so that we may build upon them in their capacity as the objective, not the emotional, factors.

I believe that this rational view is what characterizes relations between Egypt and us. Within this framework, we look forward to an Egyptian reexamination of the positions, not just within the framework of the government but also within the framework of Egyptian public opinion as a whole. This reexamination should not be made through the approach of "for al-Ansar" and "against al-Khatmiyah" or vice versa because such an approach is unsound and unbeneficial. Rather, the approach must be objective. I believe that there must be a national conception of Sudanese-Egyptian relations within a framework that is neither partisan nor emotional but a framework that is fit for all times.

In this regard, I would like to say that when we discussed this issue, we formulated a plan which has produced a different kind of relations. We look forward to a new image of relations founded on supreme national interests and free of sensitivities and emotions.

[Question] If you attain power, on what will you establish your foreign policies?

[Answer] Our foreign policy must be founded on the principle of nonalignment, good relations with our neighbors and affirmation of our Arab and African membership in international circles.

[Question] How do you view the Iraq-Iran war?

[Answer] We view it as a war that should not have happened. This war has gone through different phases and I believe that the opportunity can be now made available for a solution by having the two sides agree on a third party, first, to determine how the war started so as to determine historical responsibility; second, to determine the volume of losses and what must be made available; third, to polarize the Arab and Islamic efforts to contribute to these preparations; and, fourth, to develop a dialogue formula for the purpose of dealing with the problems existing between the two sides. All this comes after a cease-fire for a certain period to permit the initiation of such efforts.

[8 Jun 85 pp 21-24]

[Interview with Dr Hasan al-Turabi, head of the Islamic Tendency Organization]

[Text] In recent years, the Muslim Brotherhood has aroused extensive debate around itself because of its cooperation with the regime of ex-President Ja'far Numary--a cooperation which peaked with the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a laws in September 1983. But the Muslim Brothers and their leader, Dr Hasan al-Turabi, departed the government for jail last March when Numayri arrested the Brotherhood leaders and charged them with planning to engage in acts of violence in Sudan and to overthrow his regime.

Within the framework of the series of interviews conducted by AL-TADAMUN with the leaders of the Sudanese parties, we publish here our interview with Dr al-Turabi, who is considered one of the most prominent figures in the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Sudan and who now leads the Islamic Tendency organization.

[Question] Why were you absent from the negotiations which were held between the parties and unions on one side and the army on the other to form the transitional civilian cabinet?

[Answer] We took part in the university meeting which combined all the political and labor union forces and the representative of the TMC. But we then retreated from the partisan-labor unions grouping because it was formed before our release from jail. Moreover, we did not find in this grouping the proper framework for a comprehensive and inclusive national grouping. However, we did take part in the consultations held to lay down the constitutional bases for the transitional period. We take part in all these issues as forces independent of the alliance established within the framework of the grouping because we are trying to hold true to a political principle by which we have abided since the 1960's, specifically after the first comprehensive national consensus phase when an attempt was made to betray the transition trust between 1964-65. Since then, we have decided that the Sudanese Communist Party does not abide by the will of the national parties in the Constituent Assembly. The Communist Party was dissolved as a party whose ideological principles are founded on total antagonism to the principles of Sudan's social life and as a party that does not accept the national framework because of its tie to the Russian line. Moreover, it is a party that does not accept the principles and rules of democratic relations while exploiting these rules and principles and exploiting the other forces to crystallize a classical theory in which this party has never stopped believing, namely a red revolution to achieve a proletarian dictatorship.

This is why we are now trying to hold true to the same position. But if all of Sudan unites in a single framework and in a single charter, then we will sign such a charter. This is the reason for our steering away from the grouping. The second reason is that contrary to the initial tendency adopted by the grouping, we have decided that the transitional period requires that the authority be assumed by men who are independent in their political tendencies so that we may guarantee through their control of power that neutrality is observed in creating the climate for forming parties and holding new elections and may also guarantee that they will devote their efforts to dealing with some of Sudan's urgent problems and will not preoccupy themselves with the political struggle or with what comes after the election period. Even though we did not discuss extensively the details of the nominations to the transitional cabinet, we did express our opinion on the candidates presented by the grouping.

Mistakes of Past

[Question] Does this mean that you view the labor union and professional grouping as being under the influence of the left, if not the influence of the Communist Party?

[Answer] We went through the October 1964 experience which culminated with the creation of a closed grouping including several labor unions and dominating in the name of the labor union movement and political movement and attempting to be the force containing the October 1964 revolution. What is more, the

Communist Party wanted to monopolize power and to disregard totally the trust of restoring power to the people through elections.

We do not wish to commit the same mistake twice. In any case, the labor union group enrolled under the banner of the grouping is a small group and I do not think that it exerted great efforts in those few days [of April 1985] because the demonstrators who exerted the major efforts were common people. This is why the present labor union grouping has no right to dispense with all the other labor unions. The other labor unions are not present in this group, nor are the farmers and teachers unions, which include 100,000 members. We even find that most of the professional labor unions are outside this grouping.

We consider this some sort of violation. A new national democratic page cannot begin with such measures. We do not wish to repeat the mistakes of October 1964 because the parties front led us to a struggle which almost turned bloody, considering that the armed forces stepped aside at the time and left the arena completely to the civilian forces.

This time, the civilian forces were too weak to take power alone and so the armed forces have participated with them, with this participation to end by the end of the transitional period.

To put it briefly, we do not wish to repeat the experiences of the past.

[Question] Have you presented any memorandum or proposal regarding formation of the transitional cabinet?

[Answer] Yes, we presented an independent proposal for a national charter covering the way in which the transitional cabinet should be formed, namely have its elements chosen from among independent professional elements. The proposal also contains the basis of the constitution. We decided that the provisional constitution was no longer suitable under the current circumstances and that constitutional rules must be derived from the charter to be agreed upon so that these rules may go into effect after the provisional constitutional regulations and until foundation of the constituent assembly. Our memorandum was within this framework.

[Question] As an organization, did you play any role in the popular uprising of last April?

[Answer] Our organization's leaderships who are known to the people were incarcerated in jails. As for the relatively known secondary leaderships, we determined that it was better for them not to move in an apparent manner because if the movement were doomed to failure, such failure would perhaps only intensify the premeditated tendency to bring the Muslim Brotherhood to trial and liquidate it. The Brothers did take part as individuals but they moved among the common people, stirring the unions and student circles which they controlled. They wanted it to be a national movement so that it may not be attributed to a certain party and then be isolated and struck under this pretext.

Dispute with Numayri

[Question] What are the reasons for your dispute with ex-President Numayri?

[Answer] When we entered into national reconciliation in 1977, Numayri realized that we did so with a degree of distinction and independence. We began to engage in many public activities outside the framework of the Socialist Union (the only political organization existing in the political arena during Numayri's era) and through legal organizations distinct from the Socialist Union. We spoke with a distinctive voice and were accused and attacked by the Socialist Union, the president and the press. These accusations and attacks were moderate and we endured them patiently. With the rise of the country's Islamic tide and of its cultural, social and economic consequences, Numayri tried to pull the rug from under our feet by embracing the Islamic tendency. He thought that he would thus monopolize the Islamic call's attraction and deprive Muslim fundamentalists of it. But what happened is that Numayri's adoption of the Islamic slogan made us stronger and this strength was reflected clearly in the holding of the international Islamic conference in Khartoum, which was the biggest ever witnessed by Sudan, and in a massive procession unprecedented in Sudan. It became evident that the procession, with the cheers and slogans it voiced, was independent of the regime and of the existing political organization. Numayri realized that this constituted a grave danger to him and began at that time to intensify and escalate the campaign against us. The situation had to end up in conflict sooner or later and the campaign against the Islamic movement escalated.

The fact is that it became obvious to the regime that there was no opposition other than the Islamic opposition posing a danger to it. This is why the regime inflicted harm only on the Islamic opposition. The entire assault was focused on the Islamic movement and on the manifestations of its presence in society. Moreover, in the wake of the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a in Sudan, the international powers were terrified by the Islamic awakening--terror that is due to old memories dating back to the Crusades and revived by modern memories beginning with the Islamic awakening. This awakening aroused extreme fear in the hearts of these powers, which began to intensify the pressure on Numayri who had an intrinsic desire to respond to those pressures. But he estimated that confronting the Islamic movement could pose a devastating danger to his regime and this is why he attacked but was reluctant to take the decisive step until he finally realized that the world powers had totally despaired of him and turned to an prepared for another alternative. This is why Numayri sought in a final and desperate move to restore that trust and why he struck at the Islamic movement in all of Sudan's cities and sought to liquidate the movement's leaders and educational, missionary, cultural and economic institutions. But God so willed that Numayri's sole fear would be in its place, meaning that the only barrier preventing his downfall was that anxious and tense connection or relationship between him and the Muslim Brotherhood. As soon as this relationship broke down, Numayri was exposed and the regime collapsed less than a month afterwards.

[Question] Is it true that you were planning to topple the former regime or was that, as you say, a pretext to strike you?

[Answer] The talk about our having engaged in amassing arms or anything of the sort is pure myth. Our principles of political action are founded on respecting covenants. If we make a pledge, we fulfill it and we do not betray anybody. Even if our calculations and estimates change, we first renounce the pledge and then the confrontation may take place. We did this in the past. We did it with the military in October 1964 and with the opposition National Front after 1969. Even though we got extremely annoyed with the National Front and realized that its maneuvers to change the regime included a plot against us, we observed our pledge to the Front and departed from it only when the others began to depart and enter into the reconciliation. We then joined them in an independent reconciliation with the regime.

We would not have turned against Numayri without first parting company with him after making our explanation. As for the rest of the talk about "Islamic circles that were supplying us with the funds and weapons we received," it is no more than an echo of accusations supplied to Numayri by foreign intelligence agencies which viewed the Islamic movement as a jihad or terrorist movement, as these foreign circles called it.

Sudan's Islamic movement, with its broad dimensions and with Sudan's climate of tolerance, will not be compelled to resort to this jihad method of armed resistance. But the reports received by Numayri were mostly foreign report, especially since the recent period witnessed the infiltration of the Sudanese security agency by foreign forces, with this agency thus being turned into an extension of the intelligence of various countries, some close and some remote.

Calculations of Dealings with Numayri

[Question] If we accept your opinion that you had no intentions or plans to topple Numayri's regime, does this mean that you saw hope in the possibility of reforming the regime?

[Answer] We decided ultimately that the regime had to be bypassed because the Islamic application was confined only to applying the laws to the people's criminal and civilian dealings. We hoped this application would expand to the point of including the state itself so that it may become a pure and consultative state, as an Islamic state should. We also decided that implementation of the Shari'a would suffer from distortions as a result of the ruling regime implementing it.

Thus, the issue of Islam became one of the reasons for the dispute with Numayri. The second reason was that the phenomenon of bringing to account and of punishment intensified to the point where some Islamic elements present in the arena, both in the People's Assembly and in the judiciary agencies, confronted this phenomenon. It was our assessment that we should help with this criticism of any distortions that may develop. We actually began to escalate this criticism through the foreign and local information media and through public meetings. Our objective was either to get a response to this criticism or to lead matters to the point where Numayri would take the breakup step after which we would be free of any pledge and would confront him.

We realized that with the escalation in the corruption issue, with the disagreement over the issue of the Islamic application and with the disagreement over the foreign policy which deviated sharply in the end, the breakup had become a possibility. This is why we were not surprised by the means, origins or causes of the blow dealt to the Muslim Brotherhood.

[Question] The matter in which the Islamic Shari'a laws were implemented in Sudan has aroused great debate at home and abroad. Do you now have any reservations on that method, or do you believe that no mistakes were made in this regard?

[Answer] As of the first day in which the Islamic laws were promulgated, it became evident to us that the issue had two aspects: the aspect of the principle embodied in moving away from British colonialist laws to Islamic laws, and the aspect of the details concerning the phrasing of those laws, their interpretive choices and the applied methods with which they were implemented. We decided that priority must be given to the first aspect because the details can be dealt with later. As for the phrasing, it could be evaluated later, considering that no phrasing is perfect. This is why our support for the Islamic legislation was decisive, even though we pointed out our reservations and bypassed them. When the principle was established, we began to discuss reexamination of the phrasing of some laws because the Islamic rules included other rules inserted with the regime's interpretation. The penal code which was added to the Islamic laws included a certain viewpoint regarding the unfeasible rules which usually pertain to non-muslims. Various provisions of the state security law were also included with the Islamic laws. For example, the procedural regulations and the proceedings for trials had nothing to do with Islam. They were merely issued at the same time as the Islamic laws and bunched with the laws which are at times called the September laws and at others the Islamic laws. Those laws which were bunched with the Islamic laws either contradicted Islam or were, at least, known not to have been derived from the Islamic rules.

Numayri tried to do the same thing insofar as the constitution is concerned. But this was an enormous and momentous matter which we could not endure, and so we stopped it. Numayri tried to amend the constitution to turn himself into an absolute imam ruling Sudan for life and then give instructions as to who is to rule if after his death, with Numayri thus shirking all responsibilities while monopolizing all powers. We confronted him directly on this issue and compelled him to back down on this formula. He then despaired of amending the constitution because he wanted a constitution that would enhance his power.

Generally, the currently existing laws contain Islamic laws, such as prohibiting usury and levying alms taxes. These taxes have become a must in a country where IMF policies have caused the elimination of the subsidies for essential foodstuffs, thus causing the poor to live in extreme hardship. Moreover, the false socialist policies which were applied have given rise to excessive class distinctions unprecedented in Sudan. Consequently, the problem of poverty needs to be tackled with special measures.

Generally, levying alms taxes, prohibiting usury and alcohol and implementing Islamic restrictions and the Islamic system of contracts may be called the application of Shari'a laws. As for the presence of mistakes as a result of the judiciary's interpretation of the laws, then I can also say that implementation of the old British law was also distorted. But only the professionals were concerned with this distortion whereas the Shari'a is the concern of all the people.

There is another point concerning corruption and the other problems which the regime tried to cover up. Islamic law dictates that its provisions be applied with absolute equality and without distinction between rich and poor, mighty or weak. But such application requires that the rule be Islamic and that it follow the example of this justice. What happened in Sudan is that some corruption problems were covered up because of the regime's distortions, especially near the end of Numayri's era. We can say that this problem pertains to application and that its future depends on the purity of the regime which will be established in Sudan and which, I hope, will be pure and upright.

As for amending the laws concerning taxes, traffic regulations or some provisions that restrict movement, this is something necessary and likely.

This issue is being approached with premeditated confusion, especially on the part of those who do not want to declare abolition of the Shari'a openly and who resort instead to generalizations. There are other people who confuse what is Shari'a-based and what is positive in these laws.

[Question] You warned recently that you will stage demonstrations and processions and will oppose any attempt to back down on the Shari'a. Don't you think that this matter should be left to be determined by consultation and democracy instead of pressure and coercion?

[Answer] Popular mobilization is a legitimate democratic method. We have not said that we will stage an armed revolution but that we will express our opinion through demonstrations, pamphlets and processions, which are legitimate means and are of the essence of consultation. In all democratic countries, people do not leave matters to their deputies alone. Rather, public opinion continues to express itself through the press and through conferences so that the people may develop a continuous public opinion which the deputies appreciate and underline.

However, there are not at present any forces with a popular mandate. The existing government, with both its military and civilian wings, has a limited mandate to take power from the May regime and restore it to the people. Talk about a popular mandate can come only when the constituent assembly is founded. The Islamic Shari'a issue and the problem of the south are constitutional issues which can be settled in a decisive and legitimate manner when a constituent assembly representing the people and their tendencies and drafting their firm constitution is founded. As for our temporary constitutional measures and our transitional government, they are intended to manage current affairs and to organize the procedures for transferring power to the people. Any circle that currently wishes to exploit the absence of a direct popular democratic

mandate to take the final steps on a matter which must be subject to the people's authority--any such circle must be resisted. We can resist with the democratic means embodied in gathering the people to express their opinions and to send cables and delegations.

[Question] Here emerges a two-sided question: first, did Numayri's regime have a popular mandate to impose the Shari'a laws and, second, why shouldn't the issue be presented to a popular referendum?

[Answer] My answer to the first part is that the Islamic Shari'a did not suddenly materialize in Numayri's regime and the Sudan continued to be ruled by the Shari'a laws, except in the periods of foreign intervention. The Shari'a was interrupted with the entry of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha to Sudan. But then a revolution which united south and north Sudan erupted for the sake of the application of the Shari'a. That revolution was foiled only through foreign intervention. When colonialism ended, the call for an Islamic constitution and Islamic law started. This is Sudan's normal and instinctive position, unless there is foreign intervention.

Even Numayri applied the latest Shari'a laws in Sudan because he wanted to enhance his popularity and usurp the popularity of an Islamic movement which had been calling for this application. The popular support given to the Islamic Shari'a has not been given to any other cause in Sudan's history. Since the beginning of this century, it never happened (except on occasion of the application of Shari'a laws) that more than 1 million Sudanese citizens proceeded to demonstrate for any national cause or even for independence. All these are indications of the sweeping popular support for the Shari'a. There were representative institutions present. It is true that they were suffering from some sort of distortion but they still had their representative aspect. There were people's councils and a national People's Assembly.

As for submitting the Shari'a to a referendum, we welcome such a step. There will be no surprise in the north. Rather, the surprise will come from the south. The entire south is being now subjected to confiscation in the interest of its Western-educated leader despite the presence of no less than 1 million Muslims in this part of Sudan, not to mention the presence of large numbers of animists regarding whom it cannot be said they are closer to the British laws than the Islamic laws or closer to the British European mentality than to the Sudanese Islamic mentality. The segments opposed to the Islamic Shari'a are now moving actively in the political arena. But I don't think they have popular strength.

[Question] Are you going to call for implementing the Islamic Shari'a laws in South Sudan?

[Answer] Yes. The Islamic Shari'a is applied to an integrated society. Fundamentally, no Islamic state confined to the Muslims alone has ever been established. This is something that is perhaps known to the church sects that wanted states to be established on the basis of a certain church sect and to expel Jews and other sects.

But all the Islamic states were established to include all people. Egypt, for example, has been an Islamic state and groups of non-Muslims continue to live in it. Even the city of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, contain a non-Muslim element. As a framework of life, the Shari'a is implemented fully. As for the private religious aspect, it is not applied to the non-Muslim because it is an aspect founded on denominationalism. The area of interpretation, faith, rites, personal status, education and child raising is considered a free one and a sphere of religious freedom that is much broader than the religious freedom permitted the Muslims living in Britain or France, for example.

There are some aspects that cannot be partitioned. The contract laws, for example, cannot be partitioned because a contract cannot be divided so that one part of it is applied to the Muslim and another to the Christian.

Brothers Have Become Stronger

[Question] Do you think that you have lost a not inconsiderable part of the Sudanese street because of your cooperation and alliance with the former regime?

[Answer] If we compared our strength in 1969 with our strength in 1985, we would find that we have doubled the support we enjoyed at that time, especially in the form of Islamic institutions whose voice and cultural, economic and social reflections have been extended to the entire Sudanese reality and which have revived the Islamic presence in South Sudan.

[Question] Are you going to enter into any political alliances with other forces during the coming phase?

[Answer] It is difficult for one to evaluate the pattern of alliances that may develop in Sudan. The parties have been out of touch with political activity for a long time and one cannot realize now the nature of the principles on which these parties will agree. They are now united over memories only and they still have to lay down the principles because memories are not enough for a popular mandate. We will examine the situation to find out where all the generations rising remotely from the parties for 16 years are inclined and what has happened to the old partisan bases. When the programs and dimensions of the parties crystallize, it will become possible for alliances to be established on the bases of principles and on political effectiveness. Naturally, we have always believed in the necessity of the unity of Sudan's entire national Islamic entity so that this entity may give the country some sort of stability.

I realize that we are facing an era engulfed with the dangers of political turmoil because of the conditions of poverty, famine and which division Sudan has now reached and because of the state of political division, considering that the parties have lost many of their leaders and because of the historical significance on which they were founded. Moreover, numerous parties have now come into existence and this multiplicity is a cause for turmoil and for confusion on the citizen's part about how to cast his vote. This is why the situation does not call for central alliances but rather for an endeavor to

unite the ranks of the largest number of political forces that are capable of representing the genuine character of the Sudanese people legitimately and capable of efficiently leading Sudanese life amidst this sea of problems and challenges that are engulfing the country.

[Question] What is your conception of political activity in the coming phase, and do you think that the elections must be held on the basis of the old districts or that some modification must be introduced into the old division of electoral districts?

[Answer] The May regime introduced a certain method into the elections system which had previously been tried by the October 1964 government. It is a method based on diversifying parliamentary representation into direct local representation and professional representation, so that a person is represented as a citizen through his geographic district and is also represented from the angle of his social and professional status. We tried these various patterns in our experiences after the independence and the October revolution and during the May regime.

The matter requires that there be an objective and independent approach so that the districts may not be run in a manner that does some forces an injustice. The geographic districts have been greatly destabilized due to the emigration of the Sudanese citizens in search of work, because of famine or as a result of emigration to the urban areas. The regional rule has also been introduced into the country's system and I do not think that the transitional government will abolish or liquidate this system because it is tied to a popular demand contained in the draft constitution prepared in 1967, as is Islam in the essence of that constitution.

Insofar as the system of government is concerned, we emerged in the wake of the October 1964 revolution with a lesson from and with consideration for our previous democratic experience with its turmoil, with its coalitions and with the fall of those coalitions. This is why we were in favor of a presidential system subject to the law, contrary to Numayri's system. Such a presidential system is a better guarantee for the government's stability and for enabling the government to plan and implement and to be tasked for the outcome of its work after a reasonable time instead of having the cabinets suffer from turmoil and fall day after day. This will be a better guarantee for achieving a degree of stability and security in a country like Sudan which suffers from numerous problems.

These are the main options made by the 1967 constitution, which was drafted by a national committee and was one of the best constitutional documents that could be proposed in a modern country. This document can be a good base from which to proceed, all the while trying to utilize any lesson or experience we learned during the recent circumstances.

[Question] What is your idea for settling the problem of South Sudan?

[Answer] The Islamic movement is not just a political party. It is also a civilizational movement that seeks to elevate public life. This is why its

activity is evident in the fields of culture, literature and art and in social, charitable and economic activity. Through all these aspects, we seek to develop lifestyles independent of the Western pattern. Political independence is meaningless if it is denied this comprehensive civilizational independence.

It is from this comprehensive civilizational starting point that we view the problem of the south. The problem of the south started with the estrangement imposed by colonialism between the north and the south. Such a psychological gap always generates an opportunity for a misunderstanding that turns every problem into a crisis and every crisis into a civil war. Second, the economic disparity between the north and the south is something for which colonialism, and then the civil war circumstances which did not make it possible to develop the south, is responsible. But the southerners' feeling of grievance and racial and cultural differences have generated all these tensions which have been turned into a constant ground for the emergence of problems between the north and the south.

As a political movement, we support a political settlement to be reached with our brothers in the south and to rely on a new division of powers and a new arrangement of the priorities of developing the south and the other provinces. As for the issue of Islam, we met with our southern brothers in the 1960's and reached a settlement that was acceptable to them. We can take precautions for any fear on their part regarding application of the Shari'a or any fear for their liberties and entity by offering exemptions. We believe that this does not mean an undermining of the Islamic Shari'a but rather achieves the Shari'a dictates on such a matter.

Moreover, we believe that Sudan must exert efforts outside the government framework to contact the south and to transmit to it the cultural activity, the Arabic language, Islam, economic development and commercial activity so that the country may unite and that the economic situation, be it miserable or prosperous, may be shared and not be a cause of conflict and so that we may unite the north with the south. There are now in the south more than 1 million Muslims suffering from a total absence from any political activity or any role in public life. Moreover, there are nearly 3 million animists who may or may not become a part of the Arab and Islamic culture. Islam is characterized by tolerance and freedom. But Sudan's historical role is that it is a Muslim Arab entity that wants to extend its identity to its African brothers, not to exploit them as the Westerners, who use the pretext of Christianity to tie Africa with the West so that they may become an easy prey for cultural exploitation, do. Insofar as we are concerned, we have guidance and a civilization which we want to offer people and they are free to accept or reject it. This is why we will proceed to the south and beyond to transmit Islamic religious culture and values and to deal at the same time tolerantly and charitably with the Christians and the others. This is a historical role which many leaderships have neglected.

[Question] A lot is being said regarding your relations with Egypt. Some describe them as tense, or at least suffering from certain sensitivities. How would you describe your current relations with Egypt?

[Answer] They are like the relations of the Sudanese people generally with Egypt. They harbor a great deal of love at the popular level and some political complexes. People consider the Islamic movement in Sudan and Egypt almost as a single movement, though not a single organization. This is the reason for the relationship and the tension I have mentioned. At one time, the Islamic movement in Egypt was persecuted for the same reason for which this movement was persecuted in Sudan recently, namely foreign intervention. The estrangement that has developed between the Islamic movement and the government in Egypt has caused this government to view the Islamic movement in Sudan on the basis of its position toward the Islamic movement in Egypt.

The second issue in our relations with Egypt is our call for applying the Islamic Shari'a in Sudan. This is something that evokes various problems in Egypt by virtue of the strength of the Islamic presence there--a presence that is stronger, firmer and more entrenched than the Islamic force in Sudan itself--and by virtue of the struggle between this firm Islamic presence and the deep-rooted secular sector. Many have thought that our call for applying the Islamic Shari'a in Sudan may infect or hit Egypt and create pressures to apply the Islamic Shari'a there. In this respect, the past acts of persecution against the Islamic movement in Egypt did generate a degree of tension in religious relations in Egypt because they gave rise to limited movements that were forced to fight when the doors of freedom were closed.

But I wish to stress that we support strongly any relationship binding Egypt with Sudan, regardless of its degree. We even supported the integration proposed by Numayri--an integration that was tantamount to no more than one of the forms of dealing with Egypt which had been tried by all the Sudanese regimes. What we faulted this integration for is that it was an integration made at the bureaucratic level whereas we wanted popular integration. Another point which has tarnished the integration is that it is a security, political and military source supporting U.S. policies in the area that are aimed at harming the countries to which the United States is hostile and are intended for rapprochement with Israel. The dealings with Egypt must be purged of such imputities and then we will have the firmest possible relations with Egypt.

[Question] What are the features of your foreign policy and relations?

[Answer] We support the normalization of relations with all the Arab and Islamic countries and support modernization in our international relations so that we may not be accused of belonging to the West. In the final period of Numayri's regime, we saw how all our foreign policies were dictated from abroad, how our foreign policies turned into an extension of what the West wanted from Sudan and how some movements came into existence on direct instructions from Western forces.

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SUDAN

POST-NUMAYRI SITUATION DESCRIBED

Paris LE MONDE in French 18, 19, 20 Jun 85

[Article by Eric Rouleau: "The Sudanese Springtime"]

[18 Jun 85 pp 1, 5]

[Text] The Dammed Torrent

Khartoum--Sunk into the soft upholstery of his armored Mercedes, preceded and followed by motorcycle police, Marshal Numayri traveled to the Khartoum airport last 27 March in order to emplane for Washington. Despite the rebellion rumbling in the capital city since the preceding evening and the insults shouted at him by demonstrators along his route, he doubtless never dreamed that 10 days later, the "street" would bring down the regime he had established by dint of sheer force 16 years earlier.

History will without a doubt place responsibility for the launching of the revolutionary process on him. "Why must the Sudanese eat 3 times a day?" he burst out indignantly during a speech delivered 2 days before his departure, with the explanation that the shortage of foodstuffs and the spiraling prices were basically due to "abusive consumption." Unfortunately for the marshal-president, the comments he made to an elite group of well-fed dignitaries were repeated over the radio, and thus heard by millions of Sudanese in the grip of famine, a people who had just learned from his own lips that the price of basic foodstuffs, bread in particular, had been increased by 33 to 100 percent. The chief of state failed to explain that the new inflationary upsurge was caused by the implementation of a series of "austerity" measures demanded both by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United States and designed to "correct" the economy.

The following day, the students at the Islamic Oumduurman University paraded in the twin city of Khartoum shouting "The people are hungry!" "Down with America!" "Down with the IMF!" and "The World Bank will not govern Sudan!"

The day following that, it was the turn of the students at the technological institutes to go into the streets and to plunder the premises of banks and commercial companies, including that of the president of the republic's own

brother. However the president departed for the United States certain that the uprising could be easily overcome.

Cautious despite everything, while in the main hall of the airport building, he signed a decree law which had been lying in a drawer for a year, raising the wages of policemen, who had shown some tolerance with regard to the demonstrators. The army, for its part, was in good hands. General Siwar-al-Dhahab, the minister of defense, the very man who 10 days later was to seize power, was an "apolitical" officer, conservative and disciplined to the point of caricature. General 'Umar al-Tayyib, the first vice president of the republic, loyal beyond question, could if the need arose send the 45,000 men of the "security" apparatus he personally headed into battle. Equipped with heavy weapons, including antitank rockets, stored in arsenals scattered discreetly throughout the country, and with its own communications network and radio and television installations, this praetorian guard, reputed to be ferocious, would be capable, if need be, of canceling out the regular army.

However, Marshal Numayri underestimated a number of things: the demoralization of the army, blocked and humiliated by the Southern resistance fighters; the exasperation of the populace; the irrepressible vitality of the clandestine political parties, decimated and disorganized though they were thanks to constant and cruel repression; and the dynamism of the trade unions, professional associations and student organizations, which since the battle for independence in the 1940s have been the spearhead of all revolutionary undertakings.

The student demonstrations on 26, 27 and 28 March, spontaneous to begin with, became in the following days popular demonstrations directed or organized by the professional associations and the leading parties. On 29 March, the population in the suburbs, the full-time and seasonal workers, the unemployed and the low-level employees spread throughout in the capital, protesting against visible signs of wealth and chanting slogans whispered to them by the secret cadres of the Communist Party (PC), the smallest but the best organized of the major groups.

On 30 March, the Communist Party distributed its first tract, urging an unlimited general strike until the regime was overthrown, a slogan which was taken up on their own account on the following day, at the conclusion of a joint meeting, by the associations of teachers, lawyers, judges, doctors, nurses and engineers, as well as the trade unions of the railroad, textile, and banking workers, in particular those allied since January within the Trade Union Rally for National Recovery.

All of the political parties buckled down to the task of preparing for the "mass demonstration" on Wednesday, 3 April, the very event which was to tip the army into the camp of the rebels. But beginning on 31 March, tracts signed by anonymous "free officers" denounced "the tyrant Numayri."

On 1 April, Mr Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the spiritual and political leader of the Ansar Brotherhood and a former prime minister, met secretly with two higher officers, one of whom was General Taj-al-Din, who was to become the moving spirit of military sedition. "We need your support," he told them, "or

otherwise the strikes and demonstrations will lead to a bloodbath." Shaken, his interlocutors answered: "The army will not repress the popular movement, but it will not take its side unless it proves irresistible." That same day, President Reagan gave Marshal Numayri a warm welcome at the White House, and assured him that American aid would be fully resumed, if not increased, in view of the implementation of the austerity measures "recommended" by the IMF.

Avoiding Catastrophe

Meanwhile, the revolt spread to the whole of the country. In the cities and in the countryside, here and there, the hungry people took government buildings by storm and seized the contents of warehouses in which foodstuffs were stored, in most cases for speculative purposes. Counterdemonstrations ended in laughable fiascoes. The reaction in Khartoum on 2 April involved about 1,000 persons, most of them dignitaries and notables of the regime.

The following day, a large part of the population of Khartoum and Oundourman--between 1 and 2 million people, according to various estimates--invaded the capital to demonstrate their anger and determination to bring down the dictatorship. This was the greatest mass movement Sudan had experienced in all of its history. It was more imposing than the crowd celebrating the winning of national independence in 1956, or the popular uprising of October 1964 against the military regime of Marshal Abboud. The human wave moved forward, a compact surging mass, overrunning the main thoroughfares and byways, the bridges and the public squares in the capital. From east to west, from north to south, throughout the republic, the same slogans were chanted again and again: "We want Numayri's head! Bread and freedom are well worth a million martyrs!"

That said it all. The police fraternized with the demonstrators. The gendarmerie was ordered to retreat, while the army was confined to the barracks. Only the security forces, the praetorian guard headed by General 'Umar al-Tayyib undertook efforts, soon abandoned, to contain the furious crowd. Curiously, this force refrained from firing, probably for lack of instructions, while in Washington, Marshal Numayri proclaimed that "no one can force me out of power."

Curiously again, General 'Umar al-Tayyib proved very conciliatory on the following day, 4 April. The man enjoying the confidence of Marshal Numayri was "invited" to participate in "consultations" at the high command headquarters. He found himself faced with 13 of the 15 generals who were to seize power "in the name of the people" 2 days later. They asked him not to proclaim a state of emergency and not to involve the armed forces in repressive measures. Without the slightest hesitation, General al-Tayyib adopted the recommendations of his subalternates. However, the general strike and demonstrations continued, and, he recounts, the chief of state urged him by telephone to take merciless repressive steps.

At this point the mystery begins to be clarified. According to General Tajal-Din, one of the main authors of the 6 April coup d'etat, "General 'Umar al-Tayyib betrayed Numayri from the very first, by minimizing the importance of the rebellion and discouraging him from returning to Sudan. The general hoped

to replace the president, relying on the army and the constitution which designated him as interim president in the event of a power vacuum." The first vice president of the republic, according to the general view in political circles, had "previously reached an understanding with American and Egyptian departments, according to which he would succeed Numayri."

Be that as it may, the passive reaction of General al-Tayyib extended into the following day, 5 April. The leading army commanders, after a "tour of the mess halls," informed him that the young officers were demanding that the chief of state step down, or otherwise they "would take matters in hand." Two other events alarmed them. The representatives of the parties, the trade and professional unions, meeting together, put the final touches on a sort of joint program, the "national charter" (which they did in fact approve on the night of 5-6 April), which would give the revolutionary movement unified leadership, clear goals, a strategy and irresistible impetus. On the other hand, that same day, Marshal Numayri left Washington for Sudan, which made a bloody clash inevitable.

In order to avoid catastrophe, the generals concluded, the army high command should seize power immediately. General al-Tayyib agreed without protest and at 7 am the following morning, he made a curt announcement to the Council of Ministers about the coup d'etat which was to occur 2 hours later.

The first proclamation of the junta, which was to name itself modestly the "Military Transition Council" 2 days later, provoked an explosion of joy among the hundreds of thousands of Sudanese who had occupied Khartoum in the predawn hours. Columns of demonstrators converged on the sinister Kober Prison, took it by force, broke open the cells with axes, and liberated 1,300 prisoners, 400 of them "political," whom they carried in triumph on their shoulders to the doors of their homes.

The ouster of Marshal Numayri, the "suspension" of the constitution which institutionalized totalitarianism and the reestablishment of the multiparty system and public freedoms made it possible to avoid bloodshed (there were, finally, 10 or so people killed), and above all, to halt the revolutionary torrent. In this connection, the generals sponsoring the putsch equipped themselves with suitable tools. They declared a state of emergency, which they had opposed 2 days earlier and, despite repeated appeals from the parties and the trade unions, they refused to abrogate the repressive legislation introduced by Numayri, including the so-called state security and Islamic "shari'ah" laws.

Paradoxically, the "restoration of democracy" promised by the Military Transition Council within a year had to be launched in the shadow of what many Sudanese call the "nefarious laws."

[19 Jun 85 p 6]

[Text] Troubled Waters

A popular uprising without precedent in the history of Sudan forced the army, at the urging of the young officers, to seize power "in the name of the people" on 6 April. But the 15 generals governing the country simultaneously reestablished public freedoms and took steps to halt the revolutionary torrent (LE MONDE, 18 Jun).

Khartoum--"Long Live the Sudanese-American Friendship!" The giant banner hangs in the heart of the capital, across an avenue along which hundreds of thousands of Sudanese have often paraded, shouting "Down With the United States!" On the walls of neighboring buildings, intact posters praise the merits of the Sudanese Socialist Union, the single party which was one of the tools of the fallen dictatorship. Today as yesterday, the walls at the universities are covered with manifestoes, communiques and charges of the most contradictory nature. Texts drafted by the Communist Party and the Muslim Brothers, various groups both secular and religious, workers unions and dismissed officers, Southern autonomists and unionist nationalists blend in seeming harmony.

Idlers, political and trade union militants, teachers and students pass back and forth before these notices, reading the documents posted impassively before moving on without saying a word. "It would not occur to anyone to tear down or deface a poster offensive to him," it was explained to a passing stranger who was amazed, being unfamiliar with the tolerant nature of the Sudanese.

Two Military Regimes

That nature was not altered by 16 years of dictatorship. A few days after the regime of Marshal Numayri was swept away by the popular flurry, political life resumed as if it had never been interrupted. In the weeks which followed the "liberation," the political parties emerged from clandestinity to hold almost daily public meetings. Each attracted thousands, sometimes tens of thousands of men and women who came to participate and departed again in calm and orderly fashion. The orators attacked the ousted regime, analyzed the preceding period, set forth their respective programs and criticized their political adversaries, most often implicitly, with a courtesy which, in a comparison, would have made many parliamentarians in our Western democracies blush.

The Sudanese have no need of any apprenticeship in this connection. It is true that in 29 years of independence, they have been subjected for 22 to the iron rule of two military regimes, that of Marshal 'Abbud (1958-1964) and that of Marshal Numayri (1969-1985). But they rose up to overturn both and to reestablish the parliamentary system they adopted for themselves in 1954 when their country won international sovereignty. In both cases, the professional and trade unions and the parties--true popular groups which gained their impetus in the 1940s--served as catalysts and guides.

This phenomenon can be explained. The democratic institutions which Sudan borrowed from its neighbor, Egypt, during their joint battle against British occupation, took root in fertile ground. In fact, the state apparatus, embryonic and decentralized, did not profoundly affect the customs and traditions of nomad peoples who, since time immemorial, have enjoyed those freedoms deemed natural. Feudal landholding and serfdom are unknown here. The land remains generally owned collectively by the tribe or clan. A consensus was indispensable for community management, dialogue is the rule, in particular in the form of the "shura" (consultation) within Islamized tribes. Also, this primitive parliamentarianism was practiced even in the shadow of the single party of Marshal Numayri, in which diversity of opinion and factions were allowed, theoretically, it is true.

In the era of the democratic dawning, the politicians belonging to inimical groups left the premises of the National Assembly, following vehement debate, to sit together at tables on the terrace of a leading hotel in the capital. One could see them chatting most convivially over a cup of tea or glass of whiskey, a habit inherited from the British colonials. The members of the Sudanese elite often maintained privileged relationships among themselves. Few in number, they came from the same social class, the same schools, same tribes, clans and families, all allied through marriage bonds. Their differences rarely led them to break off relations.

Although they had long been political adversaries, Mr Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of the Muslim Brothers, who served as minister and then personal adviser to Marshal Numayri, and Mr Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the spiritual and political leader of the Ansar Brotherhood, fell into each other's arms the day after the regime fell. The former is married to the latter's sister. Similarly, the secretary general of the Communist Party, Muhammad Ibrahim Nuqud, never ceased, in the course of 15 years or so of clandestine life, to meet secretly with cabinet members and those close to Marshal Numayri who, along with Mr al-Turabi, was one of his colleagues in secondary school.

The repression which was imposed on all the political groups also contributed to bringing their leaders together. Mr Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, who appears to be the leader of the Sudanese right wing, also met discreetly with the clandestine head of the PC before continuing his talks with the number two man in that same party, Mr al-Tayyib al-Tijani. These two men had shared a cell in the Kober Prison for 15 long months in 1983-1984. The exchange among the leaders of all the parties led to the drafting last July of the plan of action which was to overthrow the regime (see our article entitled "The Strategy of the Revolt," LE MONDE, 29 December 1984) before embarking on 5 April, just prior to the ouster of Marshal Numayri, on the establishment of the Rally for National Recovery, a front group including the political parties and trade and professional unions on the basis of a joint program.

Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

The statements by the various groups blended thereafter to the point of confusion. Even when the pronouncements differed in form, they varied little in content. With the exception of the "hard" faction of the Muslim Brothers, headed by Mr Hasan al-Turabi, all of the groups, from the Islamic right to the

Marxist left, including the dyed-in-the-wool nationalists, came out in favor of abrogation of the "nefarious laws," including the shari'ah ("Islamic" legislation introduced by Marshal Numayri in September 1983), for the court trial of the officials of the old regime and the confiscation of ill-gotten gains; for the liberation of the economy from "imperialist control" and the implementation in the realm of foreign relations of a policy of nonalignment; for the drafting of a new constitution which would guarantee all individual and collective freedoms, the separation of powers, independence for the court system, multiple parties, and autonomy for the South; and, finally, for universal suffrage and the holding of a constituent assembly before next April, the date when the transitional period should, in principle, end.

The consensus was not, however, lacking in elements of conflict, both obvious and suspected. Although Mr Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi would pay homage to the "positive role" played by the Communist Party, a compliment returned to him by Mr Nuqud, who praised "the democratic and humanistic aspects of Islam," the fact nonetheless remains that the two political leaders perceive the future state institutions differently. The leader of the Ansar Brotherhood, like those of other "religious" groups, urges the establishment of an "Islamic state," democratically fashioned and adapted to the demands of modern life, it is true, and also functioning in accordance with the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Man, in particular with regard to equality of rights for non-Muslims and women, while the PC as well as the Baas and Nasser factions, and above all the Southern autonomists, Christians and animists, demand a secular regime which would fully guarantee their political future.

To resolve this conflict, as well as others, Mr Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi suggested to all of the groups, whether Islamic or not, that a "strategic long-term alliance" be established, which would make it possible in addition to combat famine and underdevelopment efficiently and to build modern and democratic institutions. The Communist Party, pursuing a no-holds-barred policy of openness, nonetheless imposes the condition that this agreement not lead to "the throttling of the class struggle, the motive force of progress." It refuses, among other things, to limit "trade union autonomy of action" and the right to strike.

The provisional government established on 22 April by "independent technocrats" is for its part caught between the devil--the Military Transition Council (the junta) which sponsors it--and the deep blue sea--the Rally for National Recovery, from which it is supposed to emanate. The professional and trade unions and the political parties are already challenging its representative nature, charging that it is incapable of resolving the dramatic problems of the country, and above all, criticizing its "submission" to the junta. These are reproaches which might seem unjust if one realizes that the attributes of real power are legally assigned to the Military Council, the provisional government being but its executory tool. However, this reality has not prevented the government from cracking under the pressure of centrifugal forces.

Contrary to what was long believed, the Military Council is not homogeneous, either. Through the screen of "conservative generals" in power, one can glimpse profiles which do not at all fit the stereotyped image.

It is true that there is General Siwar-al-Dhahab, the head of the junta, and still others, who loyally served the old regime out of conviction or "an apolitical inclination." But there are others. General Taj-al-Din 'Abdallah, the number two man on the Military Council and the real "brain" behind the coup d'etat, is a fervent nationalist who very often challenged the decisions of the fallen dictator. A member of the National Security Council, which was at the time the highest decision-making body, he successively, but unsuccessfully, opposed the alliance with the Muslim Brothers; the establishment of the shari'ah; the division of the South into three provinces; the "provocative" attitude of Marshal Numayri toward the USSR, Ethiopia and Libya; the granting of military facilities to the American forces; and the implementation of the slogans of the International Monetary Fund.

A United Facade

One might also mention the case of Brigadier General 'Uthman 'Abdallah, the minister of defense, said to be one of the representatives in the Military Council of the "radical" young officers who had threatened to take action themselves if their elders refused. Intelligent, cultivated and ambitious, General 'Uthman pursued the delicate negotiations which led to an agreement between the army and the political and trade union groups. There are also said to be three or four members (out of 15) of the Military Council who are close or at least have access to the leaders of the Communist Party.

To judge from the conduct of the Military Council, one might however think that the "conservatives" have the upper hand in public affairs, at least for the moment. The junta has in fact retained the arsenal of repressive laws, and in mid-May, it prohibited popular parades and demonstrations and placed the two main daily newspapers in the country under government control. In addition, it has slowed the "government house-cleaning" movement and released a number of the officials of the former regime, thus substantially reducing the number of those who were to be taken to court for maladministration.

Will the Military Council be able to maintain its united facade? Will it be forced to yield to the pressures from the parties and the trade unions, presuming that they themselves succeed in maintaining their own cohesion?

There are not really just two partners in the game, but three. The third is John Garang, the redoubtable head of the guerrilla movement in the southern part of the country, who more or less holds in his hands the future of the transition regime, so substantial are the trumps he holds. There remain the foreign powers, which have the means if not to influence events in a decisive fashion, at least to alter their development in a country deemed "highly strategic."

[Text] The Neutralist Drift

The popular uprising which caused the fall of the regime of Marshal Numayri this spring gave rise to a double authority: that of the army which formally governs the country, and that made up of a front including political parties and trade unions linked by a joint program (see LE MONDE, 18 and 19 June).

Khartoum--What does John Garang really want? Nothing and no one is viewed favorably by the head of the Southern guerrilla force. Neither the Rally for National Recovery, which headed the popular uprising, nor the Military Transition Council, which overthrew Marshal Numayri on 6 April, nor the provisional government, nor the cabinet appointed at the end of May to administer the three southern provinces, now reunited, measures up to his expectations. As to the representatives of the South involved in the new government--within the junta (two generals), the provisional government (three ministries, including the vice presidency) and the regional cabinet (all the ministers), he regards them either as "corrupt" or as "traitors," depending on the case. Moreover, the conflict in his view is not between the black, Christian or animist South and the Arab-Muslim North, but also between the peoples of Sudan and their "oppressors" and their "exploiters."

John Garang says no to everything, including repeated offers from the Military Transition Council to undertake negotiations without prior conditions with him. His response never varies: rather than engage in dialogue with what he calls the "gang of four" (the generals who organized the coup d'etat), he prefers that hostilities continue, appealing to his fellow citizens in the North to join him in the armed struggle until democracy triumphs, a secular state and socialism are established, the right of all ethnic groups to autonomy is recognized and a national independence policy is adopted.

The attitude of the head of the Sudanese Popular Liberation Movement (SPLM) is paradoxical. He represents himself as the champion of national unity and democracy, but he shows hostility or skepticism toward "reactionary or opportunistic groups" and the elections which are expected, in one year's time, to bring back parliamentarianism, as well as the reestablished freedoms, which he deems illusory. In conferring the "vanguard" role on the SPLM, is he not revealing a secret desire to establish a single party under his aegis? In any case, is he not thus alienating his natural allies, the secular parties and the trade and professional unions which, in the North, occupy a key position on the political scene?

As everyone has, John Garang has doubtless made an analysis of the balance of forces which would justify his ambitions. The 6 April regime is vulnerable, perhaps even shaky. The 12-40,000 resistance fighters (according to different estimates) whom he heads are particularly active in the three southern regions peopled by black Christian or animist tribes. The army of the central government which they are fighting is inadequately equipped and rather demoralized, as the frequent desertions bear witness. Three-quarters of the soldiers are of the black race, unlike their officers, the majority of whom are Arabs, and naturally, these soldiers are sensitive to the concept of

"Africanness" and "identity" about which the radio station of the Southern rebels broadcasts all day long.

Isolating John Garang

The collapse of the transition regime seems the more plausible since its coffers are empty and its foreign debt--\$10 billion--is constantly increasing, thanks to its lack of resources. While the war in the South is costing it more than \$100 million a year, the International Monetary Fund is refusing to grant it additional credit because of its incapacity to settle an interest balance of \$120 million. The foreign exchange brought in by exports, accounting for almost all of the national total, is inadequate to cover the debt service.

One can still better understand the intransigence of John Garang if one knows that his guerrilla fighters have paralyzed the two most promising projects in the country: oil extraction in the Bantiu fields and the building of the Jongley canal, designed to supply the agricultural sector with an additional 6 billion cubic meters of water. Meanwhile, the drought is taking over the land and starving an increasing number of Sudanese, in proportions as alarming as in Ethiopia. According to the estimates of specialized UN bodies, some 15 million individuals (out of a population of 22 million) will be affected by the drought in the coming months. A million children will die because of it before the end of the year, unless adequate aid is provided by the international community.

Doubtless also having assessed the balance of forces, which is unfavorable to it, the junta in Khartoum speedily decided to turn to the good lord rather than their own prophet, and to deal directly with John Garang's protectors. Proclaiming its "nonalignment," the junta has taken steps to improve relations with the USSR, and in the name of "good-neighborly relations," has dispatched delegations to Ethiopia and Libya, which are supplying the SPLM with Soviet weapons, funds and logistic aid. Diplomatic relations with the government of Colonel Qadhdhafi have been reestablished since 23 April. As soon as this was done, the transactions were launched. Sudan closed the camps in which military training was being provided to the Libyan opponents, who were expelled. In exchange, Tripoli supplied oil and foodstuffs and, above all, promised to cease all aid to John Garang's SPLM. The honeymoon has not really begun, however. Colonel Qadhdhafi is asking more. He "hopes" Sudan will formally denounce the Camp David agreements, will clearly put a distance between itself and Egypt and the United States, and...will embark along the path of unity with Libya.

Ethiopia, for its part, imposed conditions which are more difficult to achieve in another way. As the price of "letting go" of John Garang, it would insist, among other things, that Sudan deport (or release?) the leaders and cadres of the movements for the independence of Eritrea and Tigre who are in Khartoum, that it prohibit the million refugees in these provinces from engaging in any political activity, and that it close the frontiers between the two countries tightly.

The task is doubly difficult. In the material realm, the Sudanese authorities do not have the resources to oversee a frontier which is so long, so imprecise and in many places, inaccessible. Politically speaking, they do not want to take the risk of tangling with countries which are aiding the Ethiopian opposition movements in one way or another, in particular the United States, Saudi Arabia and Somalia. To these arguments, Addis Ababa puts a plea in bar. Its intransigence matches that of John Garang, and one can wonder then if Ethiopia is not also relying on the fall of the present Sudanese regime and the emergence of a new government which might then be more favorable to it politically. Such a calculation would be the more sound since the prevailing anti-Americanism in Sudan conceals within it a neutralism which is much more militant than the nonalignment of the current leaders.

In fact, the Sudanese, taking all factions together, nurture a bitter resentment toward the United States, its origin lying in the double blame for having supported the bloody regime of Marshal Numayri for 14 years running, and having used him to make Sudan a satellite nation. The trials for "treason" of the former officials for which preparations are being made might turn against the United States.

The local press, as in Iran just following the overthrow of the shah, has begun to publish reports and documents, some of which seem beyond challenge, concerning the various secret agreements reached between the former leaders and Washington. One of them has to do with the planned construction of four air bases designed to accommodate units of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), while the building of a powerful listening station near Port Sudan is near completion.

The Muslim Brothers say that substantial quantities of American weapons were stored in the country. For its part, the Communist Party maintains that the CIA had installed its regional "branch" in Khartoum, where it perfected Operation Moses, involving the transfer of some 8,000 Ethiopian Falashas to Israel. To which the London weekly OBSERVER, quoted by all of the media in Sudan, added that Marshal Numayri and his collaborators received \$56 million, or \$7,000 per Falasha, as the price of their tolerance. Moreover, it is reported, again by the OBSERVER, that "tens of millions of dollars" were promised to the former Sudanese leaders if they would authorize the burying of radioactive waste in the western desert of Sudan.

Doubtless having learned some lessons from the catastrophic Iranian experience, the American officials took note, with good grace, of the neutralist drift and hastened to come to the aid of the junta. To the \$400 million promised to Marshal Numayri for this year, \$50 million of it destined for the army, they added \$30 million to supply food for the victims of the drought, and then \$62 million for the import of energy products. Saudi Arabia, for its part, is graciously supplying oil, financing the import of goods of first necessity, and replenishing the coffers of the state, when necessary.

This generosity has been repaid, at least in part. With the assistance of the tolerance of the Sudanese, the leaders and politicians in Khartoum have adopted a relatively moderate, cautious and doubtless self-serving attitude. The secretary general of the Communist Party, Mr Nuqud, told us that the Sudanese people "thanked" the United States for its aid and did not want to follow the Iranian example by breaking off diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Washington, "an archaic form of political reprisal." Mr Hasan al-Turabi, the supreme guide of the Muslim Brothers, assured us that despite the barely disguised hostility of Washington toward his movement, he opposed the "obsessive anti-Americanism" of many of his compatriots. But both these politicians, as well as Mr Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the head of the Ansar Brotherhood, say that they will demand that the treaties or agreements concluded between Washington and the old regime, which impair the sovereignty or the neutrality of Sudan in the East-West confrontation, be abrogated.

A New Dynamics

Another demand which is a part of the national consensus calls for the cancellation of the joint defense treaty signed with Egypt in 1976 and the "integration charter" signed by the two countries in 1982. "These accords are not consistent with the popular will and we regard them as henceforth null and void," the president of the provisional government, Mr Al-Jazuli, declared last 22 May. The Sudanese have not yet forgiven their "brothers" in the North for their many forms of support of the ousted dictatorship, in particular the political asylum they granted the "criminal Numayri."

Since the government in Cairo has turned a deaf ear to the insistent demands for extradition, although they are in accordance with the convention in effect between the two countries in this connection, the junta in Khartoum has asked that at least the former dictator be forbidden to leave Egypt. Are we about to witness a test of strength similar to that between Iran and the United States in connection with the extradition of the shah? No one in Khartoum wants this, particularly since some "slippage" in the relations between the two countries is always possible.

In a more general way, there can be no doubt that the nationalist passion, the determination of the Sudanese to leave the "American camp," to put an end to the civil war which is ruining their country, through an improvement, among other things, in their relations with the USSR, Ethiopia, and Libya, have given rise to a dynamics which it will be difficult to control in the Sudan, and perhaps even in the neighboring countries.

John Garang, then, is making no mistake, from his own point of view, in backing the diehards.

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BAHRAIN

WOMAN REJECTED FOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BOARD CANDIDACY

Manama SADA AL-USBU' in Arabic 7 May 85 pp 8-12

[Interview with Huda Hamid Sanqur, Candidate for Board of Directors of Chamber of Commerce, by 'Asim Rashwan; date and place not specified]

[Text]--Huda Hamid Sanqur

--Born 1958

--Graduated from al-Manamah Secondary School for Girls

--Studied engineering at College of the Gulf

--Took courses in interior decorating in the United Kingdom

--Traveled to a number of countries including the United States, France, Italy, Switzerland, Austria and India

--Prepared a complete group of studies about architecture, during which she was influenced by "Mogul" art

--Loves beauty, art and sensitivity

--Owner of "Venus Interiors", an interior decorating business

--Still unmarried!

--Believes in destiny and fate!

It was not strange that the electoral committee rejected her candidacy. That is a question decided by the provisions of the law and registered by the articles of the bylaws. However, the strange and perhaps new thing is that a Bahraini woman set out to make "bricks" in the wall of the chamber of commerce, disregard all obstacles, leap over all hurdles, break all tradition, and plunge into the arena of the struggle to compete with men for a seat on the board of directors of the oldest Chamber of Commerce in the Arab Gulf!

Huda Hamid Sanqur, the woman whose candidacy was rejected, confirms her superior ability to incite men into action!

She also confirms the chamber's failure to control violations and says that the board is not infallible!

Huda wishes that the members of the board would divert themselves of self-interest

SADA AL-USBU' wanted to report on the chamber elections and the dismissal of its former president, Muhammad Jalal. We believe that our readers have the right to learn why her candidacy was rejected and to hear about her ideas, her views and her opinions!

The fact which has been recorded from the beginning is that the "charming woman of the chamber" was more than frank and more than candid!

She is an open book. One can turn the pages, study the words, and get to the heart of the letters!

[Question] It was not strange that your request to be a candidate in the elections for board of directors of the Chamber of Commerce was rejected. That is the law, and those are its provisions. The strange and also new thing is that you are the first Bahraini woman who ventured to nominate herself for the Chamber of Commerce elections, and perhaps for other elections!!

Huda, was that a kind of "love of publicity," or are there specific programs that you are trying to implement?

In a few words, Huda, why did you nominate yourself?

[Answer] Let me answer you with a question. Why not nominate myself?

[Question] You are the only woman who reached the base. That is why I ask. There must be a strong motive behind that?!

[Answer] When I entered engineering in the College of the Gulf I was the first girl in the college. I remember when I first entered college, when I took my enrollment papers to the English director, he wrote on them that I was entering secretarial school. I told him: "I have come to study engineer." He said: "That is for men only!" I said: "There is no law to prevent women from entering engineering."

I entered engineering as the only woman with 20 other students. The next year, four women entered engineering. Now there are more girls than boys in the college of engineering!

[Question] You consider yourself a pioneer in engineering and in the Chamber of Commerce also.

[Answer] I am proud of that.

Why didn't any Bahraini woman think of entering the chamber elections before?!

I am a businesswoman and a citizen. I am a chamber member. Since I had the right to vote, it is natural that I should have the right to be a candidate!

[Question] How many women are members of the Chamber of Commerce?

[Answer] More than 200, I believe.

[Question] And were you able to move 200 businesswomen to the elections committee to give you their votes?

[Answer] I am very confident in myself, and I was certain that not only women but also men would grant me their votes.

[Question] Why are you so sure?

[Answer] Because of my feeling that I am qualified for this position and could make a contribution through it. I am also confident of my ability to "motivate" the chamber.

[Question] How?!

[Answer] We have "competition" between men and women, and my presence on the board of directors would move the men to greater efforts to assert their presence!

If I entered the elections, even if I did not win, this would encourage more women to venture into this field.

Two years from now, even if I do not nominate myself, I would like to nominate one or more women for membership on the board of directors of the Chamber of Commerce.

The matter is not connected with one person but is a question of representation of women in all fields.

[Question] If your request for nomination had not been refused and if you startled everyone by winning these elections, could it have led you to go too far in your ambition and nominate yourself for the presidency of the chamber?!

[Answer] Why not? Yes, I would nominate myself.

[Question] Huda, it seems that there are specific ambitions that you would like to achieve through the Chamber of Commerce. This is not for your personal interest, but to improve the existing situation.

Let me ask you: do you have a particular, clearly defined picture of the current economic situation? Are there specific programs which you would like to help to reform?!

[Answer] I did not submit my nomination for these elections to ask for a "headache." I have plenty of them. Whenever I have free time, it is for myself and my family.

I nominated myself because I feel that we are in a very critical situation.

The Saudi-Bahrain bridge will soon be opened. You know what is behind the bridge?!

Then there is spreading economic stagnation in the country, for another thing.

[Question] And a third thing?

[Answer] Third are accusations exchanged between the chamber and businessmen in which each party claims that the other is remiss in meeting its obligations and duties.

I could be the best real choice to deal with these matters.

I believe that my failure or my being thwarted in these elections means a failure for all Bahraini women. I was determined to enter the fray with all of my might!

I believe that men have no monopoly on ability. Does "opening the mind" depend on whether you are a man or a woman?!

Let me say that there are many women who are more capable than men.

I achieved in 2 years what men could not do in 10.

[Question] How did you do that?

[Answer] I opened my office on my own and at first had to go out and acquaint everyone with myself and my work. Everyone would welcome me, and when I left they would forget my name! No one recognized my existence! Now I compete with the best companies in Bahrain in the interior decorating business!

My present occupation is shared by only two people in Bahrain. I am one of them.

All of these things encourage me to greater activity and enterprise. I am not content with what I have done, and I want to achieve more!

[Question] Huda Hamid Sanqur, perhaps you have been able to achieve those steps on the road to success because you have special abilities which might not be available to others?!

[Answer] I did not rely on the name of my father, head of the bar association, or on my family name. I did everything through my own efforts and my own intelligence. My father offered to help me when I started to work, but I did not accept his offer.

[Question] Huda, you raised three points which were the impetus behind your candidacy for membership on the board of directors of the chamber. The first: economic stagnation; the second: the Saudi-Bahrain bridge; the third: accusations exchanged between the chamber and businessmen.

Give us your views on each of the three points. First, what is your concept of the economic stagnation, and how do we get out of the bottleneck?

[Answer] Stagnation is spread throughout the Gulf and the outside world as well. There are many solutions, but there are no clear outlines of them at this time, because it is impossible for the previous way of life to return again! We had a "blessing" and did not appreciate its value!

There was manipulation involving shares, Suq al-Manakh and oil revenue.

All of these things affected small businessmen more than big, because big businessmen have several outlets to get out of the bottleneck of economic stagnation. The small businessman who relies on a specific type of business is affected more than others. If his business ends, his livelihood ends with it.

However, the small business in turn affects the big business, and then the whole state is affected. Therefore, solutions must be worked out by all parties.

[Question] How is the small businessman affected more than the big businessman?

[Answer] If a small businessman wanted to invest his capital in stock and had, for example, no more than 1,000 dinars, perhaps this 1,000 dinars shrank to only 200 dinars some time after it was invested through stock speculation. Imagine with me how badly this affects this small businessman?!

Even if a big businessman with several companies and several activities lost 100,000 dinars, there are other sources through which he can compensate.

In addition, there are dozens or perhaps thousands of small businessmen, but only dozens of big businessmen. Imagine with me what happens as the circumstances of thousands of small businesses become shaky. Consequently the banks are shaken, and the chain of circumstances affects the big businessman.

The small businessman buys his raw materials from the big businessman. If the small businessmen fail to buy, the big businessmen will not find distributors for their goods, and all of us are connected in some way. I personally feel that the spread of "disintegration" affects everyone!

The big businessmen must realize that they must extend their hands to the small businessmen so that they are not frozen out.

What amazes me is that there are companies operating in Bahrain with Bahraini capital which purchase their necessary raw materials abroad in their countries, although they are available in Bahrain. Imagine what effect this behavior could have. The effects on our economy have started to appear during the last few years. The work is in our country, and the capital goes to their country.

That applies not only to the field of interior decorating but also to cement and cars, which they bring from their country and do not purchase from Bahrain.

This affects not just one sector alone but affects all sectors working in the Bahraini economy, because it is a closely linked, connected series.

There is also that "capital drain" which has emptied the Bahraini and Gulf economy of one of its most important factors, liquid capital! Imagine to what extent economic activity is affected by the absence of cash flow.

There is also the OPEC decision to set a ceiling on oil production and impose it on exporting nations.

All of that has played a part in hindering the movement of the Gulf economy.

[Question] This is your view of the problem of economic stagnation. How would you treat it?

[Answer] The solutions do not depend on one person. Everyone must cooperate to get out of this dilemma.

[Question] How do you apply that to yourself?

[Answer] I personally buy my raw materials from Bahrain as often as I can, but the strange thing is that I do not find people in the local market who cooperate with me, people who buy from me in turn when I buy from them.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Frankly, I do not know. I say that one of the important solutions is for us to stand together. As they say: "You scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours"!

[Question] What do you have to say about the Saudi-Bahrain bridge?

[Answer] I believe that the Saudi market is large and will drown the small Bahrain market. Indeed, I am still looking for positive aspects of the bridge project! I cannot find any, except that Saudi Arabia wants to market its goods. I do not understand why any Saudi would leave his own marketplace to buy his needs from us!

I believe that the question will not be simple for us! Everyone hopes that business will start to move. I believe that reform is not sufficient and cannot realize the hopes!

[Question] But competition here is in the interest of the consumer, and businesses are small in number in comparison to consumers?

[Answer] Yes, we are few, but we are talking about businessmen and not consumers.

[Question] If we discuss businessmen we cannot ignore the consumer, since we agreed in the beginning that the commercial operation is a connected series of links, and the consumer is a very important link in that series?

[Answer] If the consumer is active, then that is better for us as businessmen, but I am telling you that the consumer now has no liquid assets.

Consumers used to be able to buy. Now I do not believe that the consumer can take in the influx of Saudi business, or even Bahrain's business.

In general, we need at least 2 years to deal with the situation of the Saudi-Bahrain bridge.

[Question] One point remains of the three which you raised, Huda Sanqur, or Huda Hamid Sanqur, as you like to stress the second name, and that is the relationship between the businessmen and the chamber.

In this regard, it has been said that the Chamber of Commerce understands the interests of only a certain group of businessmen. Are these only big businessmen?

[Answer] I do not agree with that view.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Each one of the elected members of the board of directors bears on his shoulders the interests of all those who came to cast their ballots in the elections, and not the interests of one group without another or one group at the expense of another.

Any person on the board of directors must feel the responsibility toward all. First, toward his country; second, toward business; then, toward everyone involved in the market, whether they are businessmen or consumers.

If the chamber were for big business only, this would mean inequity for a number of commercial sectors in a way which in the end would affect the public interest.

If there was "favoritism," that must end.

I agree with you that there are several important problems before the chamber which have not been dealt with at all.

I found that in the matter of the "corrupt" electric lines which serve modern buildings.

Another matter concerns foreign companies which enter the country and work here with complete freedom with no supervision by the chamber or anyone else.

And even about those persons who enter to work in our country, the chamber says not one word, on the plea that "so-and-so or such-and-such" is behind these people.

[Question] What do you mean by that?

[Answer] I mean that a company or person comes in and turns into a serious force competing with and threatening the native Bahraini businessman. In spite of that, the chamber moves to confront but then stands silent before many violations!

I wish that there were open meetings for all businessmen who are members of the general assembly of the chamber to discuss their problems completely, as was done in the time of the "Shahbandar of Businessmen."

When the "Shahbandar" sat with all of the businessmen, he discussed their problems and tried to make an effort to work to find solutions which were suitable to them. I believe that this attitude would solve many problems. However--

[Question] There is a special committee of the chamber whose function is to investigate complaints and business problems?!

[Answer] "Whenever there is a violation," but there are plenty of problems which occur of which the chamber knows nothing!

There are numerous complaints by many businessmen of which the chamber knows nothing, unless it is through the press!

I do not mean that meetings of the board of directors should be abolished, but there should also be an expanded meeting for all businessmen in Bahrain at least twice a year to discuss their affairs with complete candor.

The members of the board of directors are not infallible. They are not better people who are able to give the correct views whenever there is a dispute between ordinary or small businessmen who have a certain opinion which could benefit everyone!

[Question] One of the members of the general assembly, in its recent meeting, opposed your nomination and spoke of your being "banned" if you joined one of the chamber's delegations to Saudi Arabia?!

[Answer] The Chamber of Commerce is not restricted to Saudi Arabia alone. There are hundreds of countries which have a Chamber of Commerce.

If this country did not accept a woman in the delegation, then they could choose a man to replace me! From another point of view, it would be courageous if we would announce to all that this is our position and they could either take use or leave us! There is no problem in traveling to Saudi Arabia!

Even if I were president of the chamber, I could delegate a man to travel to Saudi Arabia for me.

On the contrary, these things are more a matter of logic to be reasoned out than a failure for a particular person.

[Question] Huda, do you know the law of the Chamber of Commerce?!

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] You know that there is no specific legal quorum for winning membership on the board of directors of the chamber. Do you agree with the statement that that does not mean the election is not entirely legal?

[Answer] That means that only 695 or 696 voters out of about 3,000 businessmen can choose the board of directors of the chamber. Was this number, which is only a quarter of the members, able to grant legitimacy to the board of directors? Of course not.

However, I say that in addition to the loophole in the election law, there is an aspect which may be more important than the law.

Is it comprehensible that only 5 out of 200 or more women cast their ballots?! Is it comprehensible that only 695 out of 3,000 businessmen came to vote? Where are the rest?! Why don't they vote?! Were they all sick?! Were they all at meetings?! Were they all busy?!

[Question] The reason is not "being too busy," as they say?!

[Answer] I was very busy, but I went to cast my vote.

[Question] How many of those for whom you voted won, and how many lost?!

[Answer] Only four!!

[Question] Who are they?!

[Answer] No--that is a secret.

[Question] What do you see for the next elections?!

[Answer] I believe that there will be more than one woman among the candidates for membership on the board of directors. I hope that there will be better acceptance of this in the next elections.

[Question] More than one woman other than yourself?

[Answer] It is not necessary for me to nominate myself?!

[Question] Does this mean you are changing your mind?

[Answer] I will never retreat from my position!

[Question] Then you will be a candidate?!

[Answer] --

[Question] What do you have to say to those who won in the elections?

[Answer] If people would forget themselves and think about the community, it would be best for everyone.

[Question] Do you mean that they are seeking personal profit?!

[Answer] I didn't say that!

[Question] Then could you elaborate?!

[Answer] In the past, the chamber lost its dynamic ability to keep up with events and follow developments in Bahrain and the region. This is what I would like its new board of directors to change!

The interview was over, and I gathered up my things. Finally there were words of thanks to that charming woman, the woman of the chamber, the candidate who was thwarted, Huda Hamid Sanqur.

I thanked her for her frank answers and her candor in discussing the situation of the Chamber of Commerce!

7587

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ISRAEL

IDF NAVAL OPERATIONS IN 1982 LEBANON CAMPAIGN ANALYZED

Koblenz MARINE-RUNDSCHAU in German Mar/Apr 85 pp 97-101

[Article by Abraham Zohar: "The Israeli Navy in the 1982 War in Lebanon"]

[Text] An Israeli reserve officer, an assistant at the Historical Institute of the University of Tel Aviv, describes herein the operations of the Israeli Navy in June 1982.

Indirect Course of Action at Sea

The Lebanon campaign was marked by the cooperation of the ground forces with the air force and the navy. The decisive battle was fought on land, however, while the fleet and the air force were used mainly in support of ground forces.


These circumstances, plus the fact that the Syrian fleet refrained from intervening, shifted the point of main effort of the Israeli fleet to the amphibious sector and to operations near the coast in support of ground forces, and to giving cover to the western flank, facing the Mediterranean Sea, all the while in a state of combat readiness in case the Syrian fleet should intervene.

The Israeli Navy was only active in one theater--Lebanon--along the coast from Rosh ha-Niqra to a point north of Beirut. The Palestinians laid the foundation in Lebanon for a Palestinian fleet near the large centers--in the areas of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Damour. By the summer of 1982, the Palestinians had already made substantial progress in the establishment of this foundation, which also included combat divers (frogmen), naval officers and enlisted men. From 1978 on the Palestinians used the marine option for operations against Israel and were successful on two occasions: the attack on an omnibus on the coastal highway in March 1978 and on the town of Naharia in the northern part of the country in April 1979.

Following the attack on Naharia, the Israeli Navy increased its activity against the naval forces of the Palestinians. Aside from patrol duty and searching suspicious ships, it was also used against Palestinian bases. And sure enough, since the spring of 1979 the Palestinians have been unable to carry out a single successful operation from the sea.

THE NAVY IN THE LEBANON WAR

- (1) U-Boote - Abschreckung und Sicherung
- (2) FR-Schnellboote - Abschreckung, Sicherung, Feuer auf Küstenziele, Verhinderung der Flucht der Palastinenser über See
- (3) "Dabur" Patroller - Sicherung, Verhinderung der Flucht der Palastinenser
- (4) Landungsschiffe - Landung von Infanterie und Panzer an der Libananküste
- (5) Marine-Kommandos - Errichtung und Sicherung des Brückenkopfes



Key:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|---|
| 1. Submarines | --Deterrence and security |
| 2. Guided Missile Patrol Boats | --Deterrence, security, firing at coastal targets, prevention of escape of Palestinians via the sea |
| 3. "Dabur" Patrol Boats | --Security, prevention of escape by Palestinians |
| 4. Landing ships | --Landing of infantry troops and tanks on the Lebanese coast |
| 5. Naval Commandos | --Establishing and securing the bridgehead |

Thus the operation of the navy in the Lebanon war was in fact, all things considered, the continuation of its activity before the war.

The Mission of the Navy

The Israeli Navy consists mainly of guided missile patrol boats, submarines, patrol boats of type "Dabur," as well as a limited number of naval commandos and amphibious landing forces with obsolete equipment. The navy views the guided missile patrol boats as the main component in naval operations. Their mission is to assure freedom of action at sea, to support the ground forces, as well as to secure sea links during hostilities. It is in fact the primary mission of the entire navy--both in peacetime and in wartime--to assure the supremacy of Israel on the sea, to support operations on land, and to secure the sea lanes. The Lebanon war forced the fleet to observe other priorities, in that the main thrust of the tasks assigned to it was shifted to amphibious operations.

Already in the first stage of the campaign, the navy was tasked with an indirect course of action, namely with the support of ground forces deep inside Lebanon, up to a point near Sidon, so as--both in actuality and psychologically--to cut off the Palestinian forces from their Beirut base. The landing of troops in the Sidon area represented a potential threat to the north, while Israeli ground forces were advancing into the 40 km zone, i.e., toward the Zaharani River.

The focal point of the amphibious operations were the landings. The other naval elements, including the guided missile patrol boats and the naval commandos, were used to secure the combat area and to give fire support to the units fighting their way forward on the ground.

The tasks of the navy during the Lebanon campaign were thus the following:

- a) Achieving freedom of action at sea.
- b) Landing of troops on the Lebanese coast.
- c) Fire support of ground forces.
- d) Isolating the combat zone along the coastal flank.

The Attainment of Freedom of Action at Sea

Freedom of action at sea signifies the capability to operate without interference by the enemy on the water and in the air, and at the same time to hinder combat operations of the enemy at sea through offensive operations and blockades.

The "Palestinian fleet" played no decisive role; nor were Palestinian terrorists able to fire at Israeli ships from the coast.

The only fleet able to intervene was the Syrian one. This fleet consisted of two frigates of the "Petya I" class and 18 guided missile patrol boats of the "Osa I," "Osa II" and "Komar" classes. The Israeli fleet consisted of three submarines and 22 guided missile patrol boats of the Sa'ar and Reshef classes, plus a small flotilla of landing ships.¹

The naval theater of operations involved was already known to the Israeli Navy from police actions at sea, preventive operations, as well as the Yom Kippur War. In the course of that war, Israeli and Syrian guided missile patrol boats engaged each other, and despite the superiority of the Russian "Styx" missiles (50 km range compared to 20 km for the "Gabriel") the Syrian boats were defeated and for the most part sunk.² The guided missile patrol boats were this time confronted by ZAHAL with more modern ones, armed with "Harpoon" missiles having a range of over 110 km. Syria did not commit its guided missile patrol boats, however, and thus relinquished freedom of action to the Israeli fleet without a fight. This restraint by Syria at sea was the more remarkable in view of the Syrian efforts in the air.

Troop Landings on the Lebanese Coast

Since the 1950's the question of a possible landing operation from the sea had been the subject of discussion in the army and the navy. Not that the potential possibilities of such an operation were questioned--in view of the stepmotherly treatment of the amphibious component it was more a question of budgetary difficulties. These limitations, as well as the decision to make the guided missile patrol boats the primary backbone of the navy, prevented the expansion of the amphibious element.

In June 1982 the landing unit consisted of the landing ship Bat Sheva (95 m long), formerly used for transporting iron ore on inland waterways in Holland, several LCT's of the Ash class (63 m long), among them Ashdod, Ashkelon and Achziv, as well as LCT's 36 m long, including Etzion Gueber, Shigmona and Kessaraya.³

In September 1970, during the so-called war of attrition, the small LCT's (36 m) landed a small armored unit on the west bank of the Gulf of Suez and evacuated it after it had carried out its mission circa 50 km inland. In the Yom Kippur War, the landing units on standby in the Red Sea area were not used. In the Six Day War, as well, the landing of a paratrooper unit near El-Arish was called off, and only in the War of Liberation in 1948-1949 were small-scale landings of troops carried out (operations "Ben-Ami" near Naharia in the northern part of the country and "Uwdah" on the Dead Sea).

Landing operations face an extremely difficult task, in which joint forces of the navy and the army work together to establish a bridgehead and in addition must secure the operating area. The landing itself is an operation requiring a high level of professional ability. Taking the risk factor into account, it is nevertheless extremely effective considering the size of the forces committed.

It was for that reason that extensive landing exercises were carried out by infantry and armored units, even though little had been invested in the landing flotilla per se.

The first landing was executed during the night of 6 to 7 June. When the ground forces troops crossed the border at noon on 6 June, an infantry and armored unit were already under way on board LCT's with their vehicles. Guided missile patrol boats and Daburs secured the slower landing craft, and the air force was ready to prevent any hostile attempt to intervene. The landing unit reached Sidon as dusk began to fall, ready to land at the mouth of the Awali north of the city. The order to do so was given at 1610 hours.

From this point on, events followed the pattern set in the numerous exercises that had been conducted before the war. The bridgehead north of the bridge across the Awali was established by a naval commando unit, later reinforced by a paratrooper unit, which enlarged the bridgehead. In the process, the naval commandos encountered Palestinians who had entered the area with their vehicles, and destroyed them.

Toward midnight the maiden voyage of the LCT Bat Sheva in this campaign took place, and thereafter the other LCT's unloaded their cargo. Aside from several minor incidents--a tank that would not start, mortar fire from Palestinians, who still did not understand what was going on to their rear--the operation went off smoothly.

The bridgehead was enlarged during that same night by the landed troops, who also occupied the Buxata area from which the Palestinians had fired at the bridgehead. The next day, toward 1430 hours, another landing wave was put ashore. This unit operated in broad daylight under the eyes of the Palestinians. The Bat Sheva conducted its landing while under mortar fire. To silence this fire, barrage fire was laid down on land by guided missile patrol boat cannons and the air force, so that the other LCT's were able to unload their cargo.

Further landings were carried out by LCT's along the Awali coast during the days that followed. On 9 June the LCT's made several short trips offshore around Sidon. Land passage through Sidon was still being fought for, and materiel and equipment were piling up south of the city that were intended for the forces already fighting north of Sidon in the direction of Damour. This barrier was circumvented through the transport of the equipment from the mouth of the Zaharani to the Awali River with the help of the LCT's.

Also after the first phase of the operation was concluded, the transport of materiel by the LCT's continued.

In the course of the first week, the landing flotilla transported nearly 400 vehicles and tanks, and later on several hundred more during the intensified siege of Beirut.

Support of Ground Forces Through Fire From the Sea

The guided missile patrol boats waited in vain for a decisive battle at sea, so as once again to be able to demonstrate their qualitative superiority. The Syrians did not accept any of the challenges, however, and kept their fleet at anchor. Thus, since there were no naval engagements, the guided missile patrol boats, which up to this point had concerned themselves with securing and isolating the combat zone, became available for other duties and were able to give fire support to the ground forces which were advancing along the coast north of Sidon.

The guns of the guided missile boats have calibers of 76 and 40 mm, and their primary role is to operate at medium ranges against surface targets as well as against aircraft. Their fire power is admittedly not very high, but then again they have a high rate of fire.

During the fighting and up to the occupation of the area around Beirut, and during the siege of that city, the guided missile boats fired thousands of 76 mm shells at coastal targets. The targets were pinpointed partly from the sea and partly by the troops [on the ground]. Hits were scored on enemy vehicles, antitank positions, and artillery positions, as well as in the upper floors of buildings in the cities, and in this way contributed greatly to the success of the house-to-house combat. Enemy fire from the coast--both from the Palestinians and also the Syrians--had little effect, since the guided missile boats were constantly on the move.

The guided missile patrol boats thus became extremely effective gunboats.

Isolation of the Combat Zone

Already in the first phase of the campaign, when the ground forces were still fighting to advance to the Zaharani River--and beyond it to the Beirut-Damascus highway--the guided missile patrol boats controlled the sea area up to a point north of Beirut. In this way the complete isolation of the combat zone along its western flank--the sea--was achieved.

This complete supremacy also prevented the Palestinians from receiving help via the sea, not to mention escaping. Every ship in the area of the Lebanese coast was searched, and if Palestinians were on board it was detained.

Criss-crossing near the combat area were Russian and European warships as well as units of the Sixth Fleet, which avoided any sort of intervention, however. In fact, no ship could drop anchor in Lebanese ports--or leave these ports--without the permission of the Israeli Navy, which controlled Beirut and all other harbors.

Also participating in these operations were the Dabur boats, whose main task was patrolling the Lebanese mooring areas and preventing the penetration of Israeli waters by foreign forces.

Maritime Operations as Reflected by Military Theory

Every war is a "one-time event," which takes place within the framework of its specific circumstances. The war in Lebanon, viewed from the naval warfare standpoint, was characterized by confinement to an area near the coast as well as by battles against semi-regular forces. Despite this, it seems important to attempt an examination of the maritime operations with respect to the doctrine observed in the IDF. We will therefore examine the war in Lebanon for its "amphibious flexibility," from the point of view of the naval power theory of Mahan, as well as for the "indirect course of action" as defined in Liddell Hart's theory.

"Naval power" and "fleet in being."--Rear Admiral Mahan is considered an important theoretician of naval warfare. Although his theses reflect the views of the end of the 19th century, his doctrine is still very much valid in the modern era of nuclear-powered, missile-carrying ships. With the appearance of missiles on the naval warfare scene, the teachings of Mahan, like other theories on naval warfare, seemed more than doubtful. This at least was the opinion of Thomas Achold in his article "Is Mahan Still Valid?"⁴ Since the summer of 1982, however, in the course of which naval and ground forces were employed, and what is more in two widely separated theaters--the Falkland Islands and Lebanon--it does appear as if the Mahan theory should be subjected to another examination. In both theaters, as different as they may have been, "naval power" was shown and employed in order to carry out operations on land.

The Syrian Navy acted during the war in Lebanon in accordance with Mahan's theory--"fleet in being"--and Thomas Achold describes it as follows: "Mahan perhaps applied the term 'fleet in being' not only to the attempts by the inferior side to reestablish the fleet, but also to the possibility that the assumed capabilities of one of the two warring powers takes effect already at the beginning of hostilities, simply because of the initial distribution of forces of the adversary."

However that may be, the Syrians from the beginning preferred not to intervene in the naval warfare theater of operations and relinquished it to absolute Israeli supremacy at sea and in the air.

Amphibious Flexibility.--In his paper titled "Amphibious Flexibility and Amphibious Forces," Liddell Hart⁵ explains, among other things, that the modern amphibious force is to be preferred to the air force, since it does not rely on airfields, which require maximal preparation and defense and whose maintenance is extremely expensive, and since heavy vehicles cannot be transported by air. He sees in the amphibious force the "penetrator" of the greatest significance during the first few hours of hostilities, mainly because of the capability of tying up and threatening enemy forces through the rapid exploitation of advantages and through expansion of the bridgehead.

Also in the opinion of Bernard Brodie,⁶ naval forces are first and foremost to carry out troop transports to the enemy coast.

In the Lebanon war, ZAHAL exploited its landing potential, favored by the short distances from Israel to the Lebanese coast, and it did this in the early stage, as a "penetrator." The troops were put ashore north of Sidon, while the ground forces were still on the move toward Sidon. The IDF exploited its amphibious flexibility further and landed additional troops, which circumvented the Sidon bottleneck. This time it was not a scouting party from the sea, such as in operation "Raviv" (September 1970--at that time several tanks and APC's were landed on the coast of the Gulf of Suez), but a regular combat action designed to make an impact already in the initial phase.

"Indirect Course of Action" in the Naval Sense.--According to Liddell Hart, the purpose of an indirect course of action is to circumvent the thought process of the enemy and disturb his equilibrium so that his ability to defend himself is shaken.

Indirect course of action finds expression in the direction of the attack, the strength of the forces employed, and the type and timing of the attack.

While the ground forces in the Lebanon war were in most cases forced to apply the direct course of action, it was possible, here and there, with the help of the navy, to employ the indirect course of action. In this way, realities were created deep in the enemy's territory and in the hinterland of the Palestinians already during the initial stage. The latter were cut off from their command centers in Beirut, and reinforcement as well as withdrawal possibilities in the coastal area were prevented. In addition, they were subjected to fire from the air and from the sea.

The Palestinians did, to be sure, expect an amphibious operation, but not in this strength, not in the area selected, and not with the involvement of the navy at a time when the ground forces were still fighting their way to Tyre and Sidon.

It has not yet become clear to what extent the naval operations affected the fighting power of the Palestinians, for later on, too, there was heavy fighting in the cities. In any case, the naval operation increased the feeling of being cut off in the coastal area among the Palestinians.

Summary

The commander of the navy, Rear Admiral Ze'ev Almog, summarized the operation as follows: "In my opinion, the great potential of the navy has once again been shown--the capability of the navy to support, indeed decide, operations on land. For the first time in the history of the IDF, the possibilities inherent in the LCT's were exploited on such a large scale, with the fire support given by the ships being perhaps of even greater significance in this instance."

"The effectiveness of combined forces operations is another conclusion which we were able to draw as a result of the planning, the maneuvers and the experiences of the past several years, during which time planned actions

against the Palestinians were carried out. The total employment of all units with their weapons and vehicles offers advantages which outweigh single service branch operations tenfold. We have adopted the concept of combined forces operations and have adapted it to the requirement for support from sea to shore, including bombardment of the coast."

The navy is learning from the experiences of this sea war, which is not yet over, but is trying to avoid drawing hasty conclusions from the "special case" of the Lebanon war. It is obvious that the enemy as well, particularly the Syrians, has likewise drawn conclusions from the fighting, and without a doubt "problems" arose as a result of the campaign with respect to the defense of the Syrian coast.

Those who tried to see similarities between the war in Lebanon and the fight for the Falkland Islands claim that in both cases it was shown that also in the missile age the skillful employment of naval surface ships, together with amphibious units, is still very relevant.

FOOTNOTES

1. All data taken from "Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-1982."
2. See also Telem, Benyamin, "Die israelischen FK-Schnellboote im Yom-Kippur-Krieg" [The Israeli Guided Missile Patrol Boats in the Yom Kippur War], in MARINE-RUNDSCHAU 75 (1978), pp 635-641.
3. All data taken from "Jane's Fighting Ships 1981-1982."
4. In "U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings," August 1980.
5. Liddell Hart, B. H., "Deterrent or Defense" ("Amphibious Flexibility and Forces"), London, 1960, pp 110 ff.
6. Brodie, Bernard, "Sea Power in the Modern Age," Chapter 1.

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AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN STEP UP ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT-SOVIET FORCES

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Jul 85 p 5

[Text] New Delhi (Dispatches)--Afghan Mujahideen stepped up attacks on Soviet and Afghan government forces in the strategic Panjsher Valley, killing up to 450 soldiers in a week of "intense" fighting, reliable sources said last Tuesday.

"Fighting in the Panjsher is heating up," one report said. "Multiple sources report Mujahideen attacks on Soviet and Afghan military outposts in the lower Panjsher."

The valley, about 40 miles (65 km) north of Kabul, lies near major Soviet supply routes between the Afghan capital and the Soviet border. Lower parts of the valley were occupied by Soviet and Afghan troops after a fierce offensive early last year.

The recent upsurge in attacks by Islamic fighters is under the command of Massoud Ahmad Shah, known as the "Lion of the Panjsher."

The sources reported that at least nine Soviet and Afghan military posts were attacked by the last week of June and that "fighting has apparently been intense around Anawa, Rokha and Bazarak"--three towns in the valley.

"A large number of dead have been brought to Kabul," one report said.

One Afghan source reported 450 Afghan and Soviet bodies were brought into the capital during the week and 2,000 Soviet troops were moved into the valley to bolster defenses early last week.

They said 200 Afghan commandos were killed or captured when they parachuted into the upper Panjsher Valley for a search and destroy operation.

"The Mujahideen were waiting for them and opened fire as the commandos parachuted down, killing many."

In another incident a "damaged Soviet helicopter crashed atop an Afghan armored personnel carrier near Bazarak (a town in the Panjsher), killing 20 and wounding 40 Afghan soldiers. [quotation marks as published]

The crash on June 16 may have been the incident in which an Afghan brigadier general was killed.

Two other Afghan generals and a senior Soviet military adviser were reported killed or captured during the Panjsher fighting.

One report indicated Soviet forces may have initiated "the serious escalation" after the end of a large Soviet operation in eastern Afghanistan freed more troops for operations in the valley.

"With much of the fighting reportedly taking place in the lower Panjsher Valley, it appears the initiative at this point is with the Mujahideen," the report added.

The freedom fighter forces in the Panjsher had recently received new arms supplies which included "one-shot, disposable, light anti-tank weapons."

The Islamic fighters are fighting to oust an estimated 115,000 Soviet troops and the Afghan government Moscow installed after the 1979 Soviet invasion.

185 Mujahideen Civilians Martyred

Meanwhile, the Mujahideen are reported to have blocked the way of Soviet-Karmal forces in Safara area in Helmand province of southern Afghanistan where 185 Mujahideen and Afghan civilians have sacrificed their lives in an attempt to foil a major offensive by the invading forces in that area.

The details of the fierce fighting have said that the Soviet-Karmal troops attacked the Mujahideen's positions with tanks and heavy guns in Safara area last month. The invaders struck at the Mujahideen strongholds with heavy guns while the Soviet aircraft also continued severe bombardment for two days.

The report adds that most of the Mujahideen of the area were engaged in guerrilla operations in the adjacent areas. However the Mujahideen force present during the attack resisted till the last bullet. It was learnt that in the course of bombardment and heavy shelling, 185 Afghan Mujahideen and civilians were martyred including the regional commander of the Mujahideen Col. Ghulam Dastagir. The killed Soviet-Karmal troops during the operation were estimated over 350. The Mujahideen were able to knock down a Soviet MiG aircraft, the debris of which was still lying in the affected area. The Soviet pilot and other crew was killed on the spot. The Mujahideen also wiped out eight tanks and 13 armored cars during the battle.

Arghandab Attacked, 16 Killed

The Mujahideen attacked the sub-divisional headquarters of Arghandab in Qandahar Province as a result of which 16 people were killed. They included the local chief of the ruling party Sher Jan Watan Wal and five other office bearers.

The Agency Afghan Press sources reported that on May 30, a group of Mujahideen conducted an attack at a time on the sub-divisional headquarter when the Karmal officials and the Parcham party office bearers were in a session to discuss the measures for curtailing the resistance activities in the area. With the use of rockets and light guns the Mujahideen turned into debris most of the part of the building of the offices. The participants were killed having been buried under the rubble. In the course of the operation, two Mujahids were martyred and 17 others were injured by the firing from the other side. However, the Mujahideen managed to move to their places before the reinforcement reached.

The Afghan freedom fighters conducted guerrilla operations in Sarkani, Scheigal and Kunar's provincial headquarter Assad Abad at a time when the eminent resistance leader Gulbadin Hikmatyar was present in the area.

The AAP sources said that the Afghan leader stayed for nine days in different areas of Kunar province where he inspected the Mujahideen's centers and organized the Mujahideen and devised the strategy against the Soviet-Karmal troops. On his instruction the Mujahideen launched a missile attack in the provincial headquarter of Assad Abad under the leadership of commander Kashmir Khan. By the missile attack, important places in the town and the sensitive installations received extensive damage. These include a trading center, Karmal Militia cantonment and the airport. In the operation the army camp of Sarkani was completely destroyed as it was burnt down. The Soviet-Karmal troops had to flee towards the provincial headquarter.

Newly Set Up Army Posts Wiped Out in Paktika

According to the information received from Paktika province, the Mujahideen conducted guerrilla operations in the area Khunish of Kitwaz sub-division.

The army post had recently been set up. It is reported that when they received information about establishment of the army post, the Mujahideen decided to attack it. On the night of June 8, the Mujahideen attacked the army post. The Soviet-Karmal force stationed at the post fled away without any resistance. The Mujahideen killed eight Soviet-Karmal troops and captured five others and later destroyed the post building by hand grenades.

CSO: 4600/547

AFGHANISTAN

MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY DESTROY SOVIET CONVOY IN HINDU KUSH

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 11 Jul 85 p 1

[Text]

ISLAMABAD (Reuter) — Afghan guerillas destroyed a big Communist convoy crossing the Hindu Kush mountains and pounded Kabul with at least 25 rockets, Western diplomats said Tuesday.

The guerillas knocked out about 150 Soviet and Afghan trucks, mostly fuel tankers, in an attack just north of the Salang Pass in the Hindu Kush on June 28 and captured about 150 Afghan soldiers.

Several helicopters were later seen ferrying wounded to hospitals in Kabul.

Other guerillas fired at least 25 rockets into Kabul on July 1 and 2. Two hit the Soviet Embassy compound, killing or injuring six Soviet guards and damaging several vehicles, they said.

One rocket damaged the dining room at the Japanese charge d'affaires' residence, another landed close to the West German Embassy and several landed near the Turkish and North Korean embassies.

Soviet and Afghan Forces responded with massive artillery and rocket fire at guerilla strongholds around Kabul for four nights. On July 6, the shelling started at 8 pm, and ended at 7.30 am the next day.

The convoy attack near the Salang tunnel was the first big guerilla raid since April on Afghanistan's northern highway, which links Kabul to the Soviet Union. The diplomats said the highway was closed to civilian traffic for six days from June 25.

A beer truck driver who drove past the wrecked convoy when the road was reopened said he had to pay tolls to young Mujahideen (Islamic warriors).

In the nearby Panjsher Valley, base for many of the guerillas attacking the highway, guerillas were reported to have attacked an Afghan military police convoy early this month, the diplomats said.

They cited unconfirmed reports of 200 Soviet and 300 Afghan soldiers being killed in the valley during the last few weeks.

They also quoted Kabul sources as saying death and desertions in the increased Panjsher fighting had reduced the Afghan Army's crack 444th Commando Brigade to 20 percent of its normal strength.

Other unconfirmed reports said the Army's eighth Division had lost more than 1,000 men the same way, they added.

CSO: 4600/555

AFGHANISTAN

ENFORCEMENT OF LAW MAJOR STEP TOWARD DEMOCRATIZATION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 29 Jun 85 pp 1, 2

[Article by Acmat Sadat]

[Text] The approval of the Law on Local Organs of State Power and Administration by Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, has been enthusiastically hailed by vast strata of our people. It was earlier approved by the Revolutionary Council of the DRA during its extraordinary session.

The enforcement of the law is a major step towards the democratisation of socio-political relations in the country. It ensures mass participation of people in state affairs and people through their democratically elected representatives would lead economic, social and cultural activities of the state.

The Law on Local Organs of State Power and Administration is unique in its kind in the long history of Afghanistan. Through enforcement of this Law, the PDPA and the DRA state have abode by their earlier promise made to people and have fulfilled the long cherished desire of our people participating in the state power and ensuring democratic rights.

According to the law, the Jirgahs (assemblies) consisting of authoritative people's representatives will administer power at the province, district and sub-district levels. These Jirgahs will sit in session at least twice a year. Jirgahs at their first sittings will elect their executive committees for carrying out the day-to-day activities of provinces, districts and sub-districts. Each executive committee is to be headed by the president of executive committee. These committees are accountable to the Jirgahs (assemblies) which elect them and to the upper executive committees. The provincial executive committees and that of Kabul city are accountable to the Jirgahs which elect them and to the Council of Ministers of the DRA. Hence, vast executive and financial power has been bestowed on the executive committees of provinces, districts and sub-districts.

Each Afghan national completing the age of 18, irrespective of sex, nationality, language, religious beliefs and social status is eligible to vote and can contest the elections.

The Law strengthens and ensures people's sovereignty. The Law, once implemented, will attract more people to running state affairs and for solving the local problems.

The enforcement of this Law has once again demonstrated the fact that the revolutionary process in the DRA is irreversible. With every passing day the revolutionary state takes major steps in the interests of the people in order to put into practice the lofty objectives of the Revolution. The mass-base of the PDPA is being greatly consolidated and expanded.

But, if there had not been the undeclared war launched by imperialism and reaction against our people and homeland, these gains would have been much greater. World imperialism, led by US imperialism, is sparing no effort to put obstacles on the path of revolutionary changes in the DRA. For this end it is arming, training and dispatching the counter-revolutionary bands into our homeland. In these ominous schemes, Pakistan has been assigned the role of gendarme of the region. The territory of this country has been turned into a springboard of aggression against the DRA, India and other independent states of the regions. With the connivance of the Pakistani militarist regime, the country is being further drawn into the orbit of the militaristic strategy of the USA in the region.

All this has no impact on the will and determination of our people for living independently and for building a new and prosperous society.

The recently concluded [word indistinct] Jirgah (grand assembly) of our people clearly manifested the desire and will of our people for warding off the imperialists' tricks and for ensuring a country-wide peace and tranquillity. It was a befitting response to the enemies of our people and homeland. And, now, the Law on Local Organs of State Power and Administration creates a sound basis for people's participation in state affairs and ensuring peace in our beloved homeland.

CSO: 4600/552

AFGHANISTAN

WDOA TO ENSURE SOCIO-POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 30 Jun 85 p 4

[Text] Kabul (BIA)--Being at the threshold of the 20th founding anniversary of the WDOA, the women of the country increasingly assemble in the ranks of the organisation. They show total readiness to realise the ideals of the PDPA and that of the April Revolution.

A source of the WDOA provincial council of Balkh province reported that having two city and three district councils, it has organised 1200 women in 64 primary organisations. Out of the organisations, 13 are in productive plants, 23 in educational institutions and 6 in administrative offices.

Moreover, the provincial council has set up 22 primary organisations for the housewives in the related villages of Balkh district. These organisations were established in a bid to avoid the women not to be far away from the ranks of their organisation and to enable them to defend their just rights. Because, the aim of founding the WDOA and its 20-year-long struggle is to ensure the extensive participation of women in all socio-political, economic, productive and cultural spheres of life.

Nowadays, 149 woman workers, 105 female peasants, 215 housewives and 635 woman intellectuals and artisans have membership in Balkh WDOA provincial council. The heroic women of Balkh province have taken up arms and zealously defend the revolution and revolutionary sovereignty in the localities of the province. They do not allow the enemy to disturb the peace and security in their regions.

The provincial council also runs literacy courses which are taught by the members of the organisation. The council has undertaken and put into practice a wide range of measures devoted to the 20th founding anniversary of the WDOA.

The council recently decided to hold extraordinary sessions at provincial city and district levels and hence necessary measures were adopted for the festively marking of the 20th anniversary of the organisation. The month of July was declared as a month of crash work on the occasion.

In this way, crash work aimed at admitting new members to the WDOA ranks was launched by the primary organisations of the council which achieved impressive results.

Contribution to families of martyrs, establishing peace camps, in the center and districts of the province, affixing wall weeklies and distributing publicity sheets, organising collective and voluntary work in the plants, survey of literacy courses in villages, are among the measures at hand being implemented by the council and its process still goes on.

CSO: 4600/552

AFGHANISTAN

FARAH MEDICAL SERVICES EXPAND

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 27 Jan 85 p 4

[Text] In order to render medical assistance to people, the plans of the PDPA and the DRA state are being implemented throughout the country.

Farah Province is one of the remotest provinces of the country from the capital. But due to the attention paid by our revolutionary state, a hospital, health centres and mobile health groups equipped with modern means are active and medical services are further expanding.

Touching upon the health activities in the province, a spokesman of the Public Health Directorate of the Province said, "A zonal sanitary epidemiology station having different sections with school, kindergarten and nursery was established in the province last year. Similarly, the branch of Ibnisena pharmacy selling medicines to needy people is open round the clock. [quotation marks as published]

The general polyclinics with all their sections are at the service of people. A branch of the Blood Bank was also reactivated last year. The brigades of social order established by the DYOA are taught for three months the essential medical aids by the Public Health Directorate of the Province to serve people in emergency cases.

He added, "In order to render assistance to people of the remotest areas of the province, doctors of the Public Health Directorate of the Province go to different districts of the province and examine people. During the last year, 12,768 patients of the centre and 109,280 patients of the districts of the province were examined and treated.

"Similarly, patients suffering from various diseases were examined, admitted and treated during last year. Similarly about 4,000 children were vaccinated against various diseases during the same period".

CSO: 4600/550

AFGHANISTAN

BLIND CITIZENS PROVIDED WITH EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Jul 85 p 4

[Text] It is considered that man can read and write only with the eyes to see and enjoy life through education and work. Here, they are all blind but weave, print, play music and live quite a normal life. They are hopeful for a bright future and this hope helps enlighten their minds.

It is an interval, boys and girls, young and aged are walking round the courtyard of the Institute for the Blind and repeating what they have been taught. Although they can not see each other but talk to each other and help one another.

Entering the Institute, we were attracted by the textile section. The workers of this section were attentively running the weaving units. Really, what else can give them this energy except love for the homeland and hope for a bright future.

One of the workers of this section responding to a question said: "I lost my sight 30 years ago as a result of measles. It is 11 years now since I have come here. Not much attention was paid to us at the beginning but now it is much better. They have provided us with all facilities. I always thought that I am a burden of the society. But when the working possibilities are provided for the man he does not suffer and is not feeling humiliated. Despite I am blind, I know what is happening in our homeland.

"Whenever I hear of the subversions by the counter-revolution, I am shocked and want to exterminate the counter-revolution, but alas I can't. No matter, my elder son is serving in the army.

"Our teachers are very kind".

Touching on the activities of the Institute the Director of the Institute said that it was running various sections such as brush-making, textile, printing, basket-making, envelope-making, binding, music and tailoring where 120 blind persons are engaged.

The school of the Institute follows the curricula of the Ministry of Education. Its teaching materials are supplied in braille alphabet. Three

literacy courses are also being run in the Institute. Two of them are composed of the blind.

The kindergarten of the Institute accommodating 25 children has provided much facility for the blind mothers there. The Institute is functioning in the framework of the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education.

CSO: 4600/551

AFGHANISTAN

WATAN NURSERY OF PAKTIA INAUGURATED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 4 Jul 85 pp 1, 2

[Text] The Watan Nursery of Paktia Province was inaugurated in Gardiz city on Sunday. Following is a report on the proceedings of the inauguration of this Nursery:

We set off for Paktia, which is famous for its people, who in the course of centuries, have been fighting alongside other fraternal nationalities, tribes and clans of the country, in the defence of the motherland, and left behind them eternal epics. Today these brave people, as they did in the past, dedicatedly defend the Revolution and its gains.

We arrived in the centre of the province, Gardiz city, which like many other cities of the country is living a new life now.

We got close to the building of the Watan Nursery, where all were awaiting its inauguration. Near the gate of the Nursery, we saw the children wearing national costumes. Flowers in their hands, boundless happiness could be observed on their faces. For the children of the nursery have regained their happiness once again, and would live a tranquil life in the kind embrace of the homeland protected from the grief and suffering. However, these future builders of the new society of tomorrow, will always remember the black faces of the counter-revolutionaries, and will curse for ever the war and war-mongers.

They sincerely welcomed the guests. After a few moments the function of Gardiz citizens, who gathered there on the occasion of the inauguration of the Watan Nursery, was opened.

Mahbooba Karmal, General President of the Watan Nurseries, delivering her speech at the inaugural ceremony of this Nursery, attended by the chieftains, elders, school students, children of Gardiz city and those of the Nursery, said:

"Let me express, first of all, the warm greetings and felicitations of Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and President of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, to you, and through you, to all

heroic brothers and sisters, who have always displayed heroism and staunchness against the aggressions of imperialism and its Pakistani hirelings, and have been safeguarding the frontiers of their beloved homeland.

"Though the enemy of the prosperity and tranquillity of the Afghan people continues his ominous subversive plans for the destruction of schools, mosques, hospitals and other public utility establishments as well as mercilessly kills our men, women and innocent children, our party and popular state provide every possibility for the rearing of orphans and fatherless children to whom the future belongs. In order to take care of such children the first Watan Nursery was established in the country. This act has not been limited only to Kabul city, but such nurseries have been established in a number of provinces of the country. Now, we are inaugurating the 11th nursery in Paktia province."

Delivering his speech at the function, Secretary of Paktia Provincial Party Committee said: "Today, the people of our province are witness to a considerable event, in other words, due to the constant attention of our revolutionary party and state and comrade Babrak Karmal in person, we are inaugurating the Watan Nursery in our province.

"The children who have lost their parents, of those who had sacrificed their lives for safeguarding the Revolution and the aspirations of the working man, are accepted and reared in this benign centre."

At the end, in accordance with the customs of the province's people, Mosa Jan Baba, one of the elders of Paktia Province, presented a gift to Mahbooba Karmal and asked her to hand it to Babrak Karmal, who takes a special care of rearing children of the homeland and their future. Women of the province also presented a dress and a veil to Mahbooba Karmal, woman who takes special care of the children of Watan Nurseries.

After the function Mahbooba Karmal visited different parts of the Watan Nursery of Paktia and was warmly greeted by children.

Amina, one of the nursery's children, while greeting the President of the Watan Nurseries in the children's bed-room, said: "Miscreants killed my father and mother before my eyes. I would not forget that day. I want to put into effect the aspirations of my parents. Since I am in the Watan Nursery now, therefore, I would achieve this aim for sure."

Every one of these children has the stories of their own, the stories about the martyrdom of their endeared about the counter-revolution and their black deeds. They were narrating about those who deprived thousands of children of the warm embrace of their families despite the clean and sincere faces of these children with their hope and desire to live with their fathers and mothers in happiness.

Thanks to the PDPA and the revolutionary government which without any hesitation, put all possibilities at the disposal of the children for their happiness and prosperity.

The Watan Nursery is built on an area of 2/5 of hectare of land. It has 11 rooms including recreational centre, a hostel, dining and class rooms.

AFGHANISTAN

INHABITANTS SUPPLIED WITH SAFE DRINKING WATER

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 4 Jul 85 p 4

[Text] During the past three months, 48,000 cu. m of drinking water have been supplied to Kabul inhabitants around the clock through five water supplying zones. The Water Supplying Enterprise as a public utility and a non-profitable enterprise has undertaken the distribution of hygienic water in Kabul city and some cities of other provinces.

Likewise, the enterprise has performed fruitful task during the first quarter of the current Afghan year (began March 21, 1985) in installation of new water-transmission pipes and repairs of the old ones.

The Water Supplying Enterprise in order to produce concrete and iron pipes, has undertaken the construction of a factory for this purpose, the work of which has advanced by 65 per cent.

The factory once commissioned will be able to meet all the needs of the first phase of the drainage canalisation (sewerage) system of Kabul city.

In order to remove the difficulties of inhabitants of the third part of Khair Khana area and Shah Shaheed area, basic water supplying pipes of these areas were renewed during the first quarter of the current Afghan year. The Enterprise has also carried out a number of other important works out of the plan during the said period of time.

The construction work of water supply project on the Logar River costing 875 million Afghanis which is one of the major water supply projects in the country was completed at the end of the last Afghan year (ended March 20, 1985). The project was commissioned on the eve of the seventh anniversary of the April Revolution.

The Afshar Water Supply Project which is another major water supply project of Kabul city supplies 8-10 thousand cu. m of water to needy families of Khair Khana area.

Similarly, the Water Supplying Enterprise has extended 2.7 km of water pipes to residential blocks of the 'Third Parwan' and has supplied hygienic water to over ten thousand inhabitants of the third part of Khair Khana Mena. The enterprise has also earned an amount of 48,243,000 Afghanis from its services during 1363 (last Afghan year) which shows 108 per cent of the planned income.

CSO: 4600/550

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

MEASURES AGAINST INFECTIOUS DISEASES--Kabul (BIA)--A meeting on prevention of infectious diseases was held here under the chairmanship of Zohor Razmjo, alternate member of the Politburo of the PDPA CC and Secretary of Kabul City Party Committee at the headquarter of Kabul City Party Committee. The meeting was attended among others by incharges of party and state organs and representatives of mass media of the country. Addressing the meeting, Zohor Razmjo drew the attention of the concerned organs to the intensification of work at this time of the year for protection of environment, cleaning of the city, quarantine of Antani Hospitals, purification of potable water, etc. During the meeting, it was decided to set up a commission under the chairmanship of Wali Mohammad Abdiani, Kabul city Mayor. The commission has been assigned to take steps at the first place for cleaning Kabul city and adopted other measures, for prevention of infectious diseases. The employees of mass media have also been asked to resort to vast campaign in this regard among people in order to attract the cooperation of people towards this end. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 4 Jul 85 p 4]

HELMAND CONSTRUCTION WORK--Lashkargah (BIA)--The Chah-anjir unit of the Helmand Construction Corporation has earned a sum of over 102 million Afghanis as a result of its constructional work, i.e., digging and repair of canals in provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Nimroz. A spokesman of the unit saying the above added, due to the hard work and efforts made by the engineers and employees, the unit was able to overfulfil its last year's plan by 64 per cent. The spokesman added: "In addition to the digging of drainage basins, repair and cleaning of canals and ditches in the regions of Qalai Gaz, Aabbazan, Babaji, Adam Khan and Marja regions of the province, carried out by the Helmand Construction Corporation, fruitful constructional work has also been accomplished in provinces of Kandahar and Nimroz. The total revenue made during the last Afghan year (ended March 20, 1985) shows an increment of 57.7 million Afghanis as compared to the preceding year. Similarly, the unit won the third position in the work competitions launched last year. It fulfilled its obligations registered in the collective contract, which was concluded with the trade union of the unit, during the said period." Concluding the spokesman said: "Over 400 workers and employees of the unit are members of the trade unions of the province." [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 4 Jul 85 p 1]

SOVIET ECONOMIC COOPERATION--Kabul (BIA)--A Soviet delegation is here to evaluate the execution of the decisions of the fourth session of the Afghan-Soviet Permanent Commission on Economic Cooperation. The delegation paid a visit to a number of Afghan-Soviet projects in the provinces of Kabul, Balkh and Jauzjan and observed the progress of the work in those projects. It also visited Jalalabad irrigation complex in Nangarhar province. The delegation also visited the Hadda and Ghaziabad farms and the olive processing factory. The visiting delegation was satisfied with the successful execution of the work plan. The visiting Soviet delegation held talks with the Afghan authorities in connection with the preparations for the fifth session of the Afghan-Soviet Permanent Commission on Economic Cooperation to be held in August in Moscow. With the technical cooperation of the Soviet Union work on 66 projects is currently in progress. The amount of the Soviet assistance to the DRA this year comes to about 105 million dollars which forms over 70 per cent of the total foreign aid given to the DRA. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 1 Jul 85 p 1]

CSO: 4600/550

INDIA

SOVIET LEADERS REPORTEDLY UNHAPPY OVER CPI POLICIES

Calcutta THE SUNDAY STATESMAN in English 30 Jun 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, June 29.—Leaders of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were understood to have recently expressed their unhappiness over the policies pursued by the CPI which have landed the party's organization in India in a deplorable state and rendered its mass fronts inactive.

The Soviet Communist leaders, Mr Ponomarev and Mr Kutshovin, asked Mr Rajeswara Rao and his colleague Mr Jagannath Sarkar, to explain the CPI's dismal record on ideological education, lethargy in the circulation of party journals, periodicals and loss of mass contact.

It has pointed out to Mr Rao and Mr Sarkar that the strength of the mass organizations—trade unions, kisan sabhas, the Khet Mazdoor Union, the Students Federation, the Womens Federation and others—had declined. They were reportedly asked to explain the reasons for the desolation.

The criticism by Mr Ponomarev and Mr Kutshovin and the refusal of the CPSU general secretary, Mr Gorbachov, to grant an interview to Mr Rao reportedly came up for discussion at the recent meeting of the party central executive committee from June 16 to 18.

According to sources at the party's headquarters in Ajay Bhavan here, the Soviet Communist leaders were reported to have told Mr Rao in Moscow that the CPI should not and need not give much importance to the CPI(M). The Soviet leaders wanted the CPI to build its own strength and project its own ideological posi-

tions through mass organizations rather than ally with the Marxist Communists on every occasion for mass actions.

The Ajay Bhavan sources said that Mr Rao had assured the Soviet Communist leaders in Moscow that the CPI would soften its political line of opposing Mr Rajiv Gandhi and his Government and keep away from conclaves of Opposition parties. The Soviet leaders did not have any objection to the CPI's opposition to the economic policies of the Government they wanted the CPI to do so on its own strength and not in alliance with other opposition parties like the Janata, BJP and Mr Charan Singh's Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party.

It was against the background of strong criticism by the Soviet party leaders of the CPI's political line that the central executive committee decided to hold an all-India conference in Hyderabad from September 6 to 8 to identify weaknesses and failures of the party organization from top to bottom.

PTI adds: The CPI and the Communist Party of Vietnam have supported international efforts to turn the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and called for dismantlement of military bases in the Indian Ocean.

A communique issued by the two parties at the end of the CPI general secretary, Mr Rajeswara Rao's visit to Hanoi yesterday noted that the balance of world forces continued to favour of peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.

CSO: 4600/1747

INDIA

CPI-M LEADER SCORES MUSLIM STAND ON CIVIL CODE

Madras THE HINDU in English 30 Jun 85 p 13

[Text]

TRIVANDRUM, June 29.

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) would fight tooth and nail against any move to delete Article 44 of the Constitution which enjoined upon the Government to enact a uniform civil code, Mr. E. M. S. Nambuthiripad, general secretary of the party said here today.

In a statement, the Marxist leader minced no words in offering the party's help to "those progressive and forward looking Muslims" who wanted changes in the present laws. "It will not be wise to change overnight the existing 'Hindu code' as the common civil code. Legislation can be contemplated after a conducive atmosphere for such a change is built up from the Muslim community itself," he said. The CPI(M) would support the activities of progressive forces in the Muslim community which were fighting the outmoded rules now, he added.

Citing the Beemapally episode in Trivandrum, Mr. Nambuthiripad said his party would resist any move to take the law into one's own hands in the name of the Shariat. It would support the people and the Government in their fight against these trends, from whichever quarter.

While this was the stand of the CPI(M) posing a plain question to the president of the Indian Union Muslim League, Mr. Ibrahim Sulaiman Sait, the marxist leader wanted to know whom he (Mr. Sait) was eager to protect in the name of "safeguarding Shariat"

Moreover, the IUML leader who considered the marxists on par with the RSS, and who was complaining even a couple of months ago about the "religious oppression" meted out by the Congress (I) Government, was today trying to rope in the help of the same Government to "safeguard the Shariat", Mr. Nambuthiripad said.

Supreme Court judgment: Mr. Nambuthiripad who dealt with the various aspects of the Shariat also wanted to know whether the IUML leadership was trying to safeguard the interests of the Muslim community or to endanger them. The question arose because of the statements and activities of Mr. Sait who was trying to let loose the Muslim community against the Supreme Court judgment.

How can the court judgment—that divorced Muslim women in indigent circumstances were entitled to maintenance from former husbands—be viewed as an encroachment into the fundamental religious freedom of the Muslim community, he asked.

"Mr. Sait and his cohorts are now criticising the judgment. Their complaint seems to be that the authorities were trying to take away the 'freedom' to marry any number of women at one's fancy and to send them out at one's pleasure. Their action seems to be a call to array the Muslim population against this taking away of the 'freedom', Mr. Nambuthiripad said.

Fond hope: If the IUML leader is nursing any fond hope that the Congress (I) headed by Mr. Karunakaran in Kerala and by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi at the Centre would support such a stand of the League then 'let Allah save' Mr. Sait and his party, Mr. Nambuthiripad observed.

The marxist veteran reminded that it was only months since Mr. Sait and Mr. Banatwala went to Pakistan and complained about "the oppression of Muslim minorities" under the Congress (I) rule. Also, much time has not elapsed after Mr. Sait showed his interest to cooperate with the Opposition parties (including the Leftist parties) against the onslaughts of the Congress (I) which was indulging in religious oppression. The same Mr. Sait was now set to safeguard Shariat with the help of people like Mr. Karunakaran and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi.

CSO: 4600/1748

INDIA

UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PRESIDENT, GANDHI 'COMPLETE'

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Jul 85 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 4.

There is complete trust and understanding between the President and the Prime Minister, a Rashtrapati Bhavan spokesman affirmed today.

He regretted that "speculative stories" on the subject were still appearing in some sections of the press and appealed for the highest office of the land not to be dragged into public controversy.

The spokesman said: "The controversy regarding alleged differences between the President and the Prime Minister, appearing in certain sections of the press, which was totally baseless, was expected to have been set at rest with the Prime Minister's categorical remarks at the airport press conference on June 18 that there were no differences and no problems between him and the President. It is emphasised that there is complete trust and understanding between the Prime Minister and the President.

"It is to be regretted that speculative stories on this subject are still appearing in some sections of the press. It is hoped that the healthy tradition of not dragging the highest office of the land into public controversy will be respected by all, and all such speculative stories brought to an end".—PTI.

I volunteered advice: Sanjiva Reddi

Our Anantapur Correspondent writes:

The former President, Mr. Sanjiva Reddi reiterated that the President, Mr. Zail Singh's visit to him at Anantapur was purely personal, without any political overtones at all.

Expressing sorrow over certain comments in a section of the press, Mr. Sanjiva Reddi said, "I have the highest respect for the fourth estate. I agree they (the press) have a right to comment on events but any comment without support of facts will cause harm to persons holding high offices and to the nation".

The former President said he volunteered to suggest to Mr. Zail Singh not to resign. "I volunteered to do so (make the suggestion) because some newspapers reported that the President was contemplating to resign. Mr. Zail Singh did not ask for any suggestions on the issue".

Mr. Sanjiva Reddi also said there was no truth that the Government spent a couple of lakhs of rupees to refurbish his Nagavihar residence during the President's visit.

INDIA

ANALYST DISCUSSES INDIAN ROLE IN SRI LANKA TALKS

Appreciation of Gandhi Handling

Madras THE HINDU in English 20 Jul 85 p 1

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Excerpt]

PM's key role

There is considerable appreciation in foreign diplomatic circles in Delhi over the deft handling of the Sri Lanka problem by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, who has played a key role behind the scenes in bringing about the ceasefire and, in the process, placed adroitly the onus on the Sri Lankan President of proving that he is really serious about finding a lasting political settlement to the Tamil problem.

A good many of the Delhi-based heads of diplomatic missions, who are concurrently accredited to Sri Lanka, have been following very closely India's efforts to help resolve this ethnic tangle that has led to the loss of so many innocent lives. Though some of these diplomats have tended to sympathise with Mr. Jayewardene's plight in his quixotic crusade against the Tamil extremists who have been fighting for separation, the outrageous behaviour of the Sri Lankan armed forces has appealed them to the point of wondering whether he had lost all control over this tragic situation.

Sigh of relief

The intervention of the Prime Minister came at a psychological moment when almost everybody was looking forward to some imaginative move by India to end this senseless slaughter of innocents in savage reprisals in the wake of indiscriminate violence. It was not, therefore, surprising that even those Sinhalees, who have been led to believe that the Tamils were bent on dividing their homeland under the guise of demanding regional autonomy are reported to have heaved a sigh of relief over the announcement of the ceasefire, whatever the hazards of renewed violence in the absence of an early settlement.

As India sees it, the tempo of expectation of a negotiated solution can be kept up only through a timely resumption of the dialogue before feelings begin to harden again. It is for this reason that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is believed to have sent a fresh message to Mr. Jayewardene through his brother to get the political talks into stride soon.

There are some smart alecks around Mr. Jayewardene who are known to be still toying with the idea of negotiating from a position of strength, partly to undermine the position of their President and partly to advance their unbridled political ambitions. It is quite possible that they might try to dissuade him from conceding anything even remotely approximating to regional autonomy by decrying it as a catastrophic concession that is bound to lead logically to a more determined separatist bid at some time or the other in future.

It is for this reason that India wanted to work out the broad outlines of the proposed autonomy for the Tamil majority areas as a basis for a negotiated settlement, before allowing its good offices to be used by the Sri Lankan Government for bringing about a ceasefire.

The question is whether Mr. Jayewardene and his colleagues are going to honour the commitment made during the recent summit to grant an adequate measure of autonomy to the Northern and Eastern provinces within the framework of the present Constitution.

The Indian efforts are also directed at persuading the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Sirimavo Bandernaike, and her son, who is the leader of the Opposition, to cooperate with Mr. Jayewardene in finding a lasting solution to the Tamil problem, without playing politics and insisting on a general election to get the people's approval for it. She has expressed a desire to visit Delhi—on her way back from Yugoslavia after her medical treatment—for talks with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi on the ethnic issue, which can be done only with Mr. Jayewardene's concurrence.

Objective of Indian Effort

Madras THE HINDU in English 30 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by G. K. Reddy]

[Text]

The Eelam Tigers did not take into account the basic reality that nowhere in the world has a terrorist movement succeeded in compelling a government to concede its demands, unless it acquired the complexion of a national liberation struggle backed by the great majority of the people. It is only when a liberation movement is able to establish control over a sizeable area and use this as a base for extending the armed struggle that a government is under pressure to negotiate to retrieve its own tottering position.

Unfortunately, such a situation has not existed in Sri Lanka at any time in the sense that the Sinhalese who constitute three-quarters of the island's population remain bitterly opposed to the demand for Eelam and the three million Tamils also are not totally behind the militants in their struggle for separation. The moderate Tamil leaders are inclined to settle for autonomy for their linguistic region, if the Sri Lankan Government is prepared to concede adequate legislative, executive and judicial powers to it. The whole Indian effort at present is directed at securing for the Sri Lankan Tamils in the area where they are in an overwhelming majority the same sort of powers that are available to the Indian States.

Deep scars

The Sri Lankan Tamil leaders, especially the militants, believe that there has been a perceptible change in Indian policy which is true up to a point. But the change, if any, does not amount to abandoning the Tamil cause, only a redefinition of the Indian position to make it abundantly clear that the present Government of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is prepared to help them to secure a reasonable measure of autonomy and not independence for their region.

The indiscriminate killings and brutal reprisals in which an estimated 2,000 people have lost their lives, over 100 villages were burnt down and entire shopping areas razed to the ground have left behind deep scars on the minds of the people. The Tamil militants too have indulged in needless violence, but what has appalled the world is the kind of State terrorism that was permitted by the Sri Lankan Government against its own people by its marauding armed forces.

There are, no doubt, excesses of one kind or the other when an army is sent to restore order and given a free hand to deal sternly with those indulging in violence. But what has happened in Sri Lanka is that the Government has lost all control on its army which has been behaving quite brazenly as an occupation force, killing and plundering at will as though it is engaged in a punitive mission.

Healing touch

The real need of the hour, therefore, is for

a healing touch with some degree of penitence on the part of Mr. Jayewardene to assuage the feelings of those Tamils who have suffered grievously at the hands of his rampaging armed forces. It would be equally appropriate if the Tamil militants also atone for the killings of Sinhala civilians, especially the Anuradhapura massacre for which there was no justification whatever the provocation.

The ceasefire has at least temporarily broken this ghastly cycle of violence and counter-violence, and what is needed now is some sort of heart-searching on both sides to ensure that innocent men, women and children are not slaughtered if the talks do not succeed in closing this tragic chapter in Sri Lanka's life. It is one thing to wage an armed struggle with revolutionary fervour to uphold a lofty cause or defend a legitimate interest, but another thing to let the devil seize the human mind and make even perfectly normal persons behave like animals in moments of inflamed passions.

There are bound to be ups and downs during the negotiations, giving rise to misgivings on either side about each other's intentions, but India will have to play a quiet mediating role behind the scenes, impressing on both the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil leaders that an agreement can be reached only through a balance of concessions. The idea of limited devolution through district and provincial councils must be dropped once for all by Mr. Jayewardene as a starting point for these crucial negotiations. The Tamil leaders, in turn, should be prepared to accept the Indian pattern of provincial autonomy if it is offered in good faith as a credible alternative to separation.

The first task is to restore the missing element of mutual trust between the Sri Lankan Government and the Tamil leaders, more particularly the militant organisations. The third dimension that was added to this crisis of confidence when Mr. Jayewardene and his colleagues started doubting India's intentions is happily over to the extent they feel reassured that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is doing his best to bring about a reasonable settlement. The Sri Lankan Government is satisfied that India is not taking a partisan view of the ethnic issue and espousing the Tamil cause to the detriment of Sinhala interests.

Dilatory tactics

When the present crisis exploded in Sri Lanka in July 1983, Indira Gandhi was under strong pressure to take a firmer stand because public opinion in Tamil Nadu was greatly incensed over the terrible carnage. But she did her best to calm the ruffled tempers by urging Mr. Jayewardene to initiate a dialogue with the Tamil leaders and sent a special emissary to

Colombo to prepare the ground for it. But unfortunately the Sri Lankan President chose to drag his feet and let go this opportunity to arrive at an amicable settlement. It was his dilatory tactics, followed by an unabashed attempt to seek a military solution, that infuriated the Tamil militants and left them with no alternative except to intensify their armed struggle.

But Mr. Rajiv Gandhi started tackling the Sri Lanka crisis in entirely different circumstances. He was no longer under any political compulsion at home to placate Tamil opinion beyond a point after the parliamentary elections. So he decided to make a few conciliatory gestures to reassure Mr. Jayewardene that India was not trying to solve this tangle at the cost of Sri Lankan interests. He took steps to restrain the activities of the Tamil Tigers on Indian soil and simultaneously entrusted the task of resolving this tangle to a new set of Indian negotiators who in his view would be more acceptable to the Sri Lankan Government.

Change of tactics

Apart from the Prime Minister, the two others who are now closely involved in this exercise are the Defence Minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao, and the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, besides some other minor functionaries of the Government. It remains to be seen whether he was right in making this

abrupt change which has given rise to the feeling among Sri Lankan Tamils that the Government of India was no longer championing their cause with the same fervour as before. It was difficult to convince them that a change of personalities did not imply a change of policy, but only a change of tactics for achieving the same results.

It is going to be highly embarrassing to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi if Mr. Jayewardene tries to wriggle out of his commitment to grant an adequate measure of autonomy to the provinces, as he promised during the summit meeting in Delhi. The Prime Minister has taken a calculated risk in reposing faith in him, hoping that he would not let go this opportunity to settle the Tamil problem and restore peace in this Emerald Island by rediscovering the lost paradise.

For a Victorian figure like Mr. Jayewardene brought up in the great liberal tradition, there can be no greater place in the history of Sri Lanka than as a good Buddhist who has resolved this tragic ethnic tangle, without leaving behind a bitter legacy of endless strife. And the Indian approach to this whole problem is to help Mr. Jayewardene to help himself and his people in ending this distressing era of disastrous conflict and cross-purpose—without heeding the advice of the political adventurers around him.

INDIA

INDIA, KENYA SET UP JOINT BUSINESS COUNCIL

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 4 Jul 85 p 5

[Article by Chander Mehra]

[Text] NAIROBI, July 3--India and Kenya set up a joint business council yesterday as a regular forum for promotion of bilateral trade, industrial cooperation and investment. An agreement was signed by Mr Charat Ram, who led a high-level delegation of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, and Mr Francis Macharia, chairman of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

The council will meet once a year, alternately in India and Kenya. During discussions between the FICCI team and representatives of the Kenyan Chamber, both sides agreed to make joint efforts to conduct detailed research and make recommendations to their respective Governments on how best to improve economic cooperation.

In an interview Mr Charat Ram said there is much scope for the expansion of economic cooperation between India and Kenya because Kenya has a relatively larger domestic consumption in comparison with several other African countries and also has excellent port facilities.

India-Kenya trade has been picking up in the past couple of years. It currently stands at about Rs 30 crores annually, the balance of trade being substantially in favour of India.

Mr Charat Ram's view is that India's exports to Kenya may increase marginally in the few years in some fields such as chemicals. But, the long-term and durable approach would be to establish new joint ventures in such areas as the manufacture of vegetable oils, synthetic plastics, chemicals, paper and paper products, even fertilizers, and such like.

The FICCI delegation had earlier spent about four days in Mauritius on a similar "fact-finding trip" On the scope of India-Mauritius economic cooperation, Mr Charat Ram said it was "tremendous" The policies of the Mauritius Government "are favourable and positive. But any business there can only be export-oriented. Decision-making is extremely quick and commercial as well as development banks are highly competitive". However, Kenya offers greater scope.

"We are exploring in detail some of the items Kenya can export like soda ash, sunflower oil and graphite", even though "a study of the trade situation had clearly shown that there was not much scope for a substantial expansion over the present low levels of trade".

The joint business council, he said, had already set up a standing committee to work out the possibilities of any surplus soda ash which Kenya might have for export to India.

"The delegation (FICCI) has laid the foundation for cooperation and, hopefully, has closed the communication gap between the business groups of both sides," Mr Charat Ram said.

Indian technology for a developing nation like Kenya "will be economical and good" This was the main thrust of the FICCI delegation's talks with several Kenyan leaders, including the Minister for Finance and Planning, Professor George Saitoti.

CSO: 4600/1752

INDIA

CORRESPONDENT FORESEES MAJOR RESHUFFLE IN FOREIGN OFFICE

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 1 Jul 85 p 1

[Text]

About 40 officers, at various levels of the foreign service, will be affected by a major reshuffle at the External Affairs Ministry soon.

The periodic reshuffle is caused by the expiry of tenures of the foreign service personnel in the Ministry. In some cases, though, the changes are being effected to tone up the working of the Ministry, which is headed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi himself.

At the apex level, Additional Secretary S K Bhutani, currently in charge of the Ministry's administration, is being posted as Ambassador to Egypt.

He will be succeeded in the post by Mr Peter Sinai, at present Deputy Chief of Mission in Washington. Mr Sinai had earlier been Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires in Moscow after the death of the then Ambassador D P Dhar, while Mr Bhutani has been Ambassador to Poland and Indonesia.

Ambassadors in four neighbouring countries have also changed. While Mr J N Dixit has been posted to Colombo, Mr S K Singh has been sent to Islamabad. Both have already presented their credentials.

Mr Dixit, who was till recently Ambassador in Kabul, is being succeeded by Mr Khosla, currently High Commissioner in Dhaka. The new envoy to Bangladesh will be Mr S M S-Chadha, currently joint secretary in the Ministry's economic division.

In Colombo, Mr Dixit replaced Mr S J S Chhatwal, who has taken over as the High Commissioner to Canada. The

posting has suddenly become very important and active in the wake of Air India Jumbo crash and the activities of the terrorist groups based in Canada.

Mr J R Hiramath, currently Ambassador to Yugoslavia, is being shifted to Vienna, in succession to Mr S K Singh, now in Islamabad.

With India's improving bilateral relations with Yugoslavia, senior career diplomat Mr L L Malhotra, till recently Ambassador to Argentina and tipped to go to the Mauritius is the likely choice.

An important vacancy that had remained unfilled for a long time and led to unsettled effects was at London. Dr P C Alexander, the former Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, is expected to play a key role in significant improvement in Indo-British relations.

Over the next six months, changes in the envoys to Moscow and Washington are also likely. Prof Nurul Hasan, who was Indira Gandhi's choice for Moscow, has reportedly expressed his desire to return home following her death.

Mr K S Bajpai, one of the senior-most career diplomats in service, is due to retire in January next year. Unless he is given an extension in the posting, a successor to him would have to be found by the year-end at Washington.

A large number of middle and lower level officers are also being reshuffled. Among them, Mrs Shashi Tripathi, the secretary of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, is being posted to Ottawa.

INDIA

AGENCY REPORTS ADVANTAGES OF NEWLY RECEIVED MIRAGES

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 1 Jul 85 p 11

[Text] JUNE 30--The first batch of the Mirages which India received are fitted with Shecma M-53 turbo fan jet engine, but the subsequent ones, according to Air Force officials, are likely to have even more powerful M-53 P-2 engines for better thrust-to-weight ratio, reports PTI.

The Mirages are fitted with two Super Matra Magic 530-D air-to-air missiles as well as two Matra 550 missiles under the wings. The missiles have a longer range than any other comparable weapon in the sub-continent

Other armaments of the Indian Miraages include--two 30mm DFFA cannons and, the only one of its kind in the world, a terrain-following and navigation-updating radar; the Anilope-5 (Jointly developed by the Electronique serge Dassault and Thomson-CSE), two Sagem inertial navigation platforms, two Thomson-CSE multi-mode colour head-down displays and extensive ECM means

The Air Force officials said that the two high class inertial platform sensors and specialized computers allow for very accurate navigation which can be updated by visual means or blind through the Antilope-5 radar.

They said the precise navigation obtained by the two INS platforms after a long-penetration flight provides for operational advantage for actual terrain masked high profile, the required safety for all-weather radar terrain-following and high system reliability

The Mirages can operate an exceptionally wide range of armaments, including laser-guided weapons, anti-ship and ant-radar missiles, sub-munition bombs and reconnaissance sensors

The Mirages also have additional attachments and systems to carry any nuclear air-to-ground missiles. The advanced Mirage 2,000N of the French Air Force carry the ASMP air-to-ground N-missile.

India has purchased 40 Mirage-2000 jet fighters under a contract signed in 1983 and the IAF pilots have been training in France for the past several months to fly the sophisticated aircraft.

The French Air Force version of the Mirages called 2000N are twin seaters with the front pilot responsible for mission decisions, flying and immediate safety measures, the rear pilot is responsible for navigation and weapon management. The Mirage 2000 is a single-seater.

India is the second country after France to acquire the Mirage 2000, which, according to its manufacturers, is capable of destroying any known type of hostile aircraft flying even at Mach three (three times the speed of sound) or at very low altitude within four minutes after brake release.

Speed

The Mirage 2000 has a normal speed level of more than Mach 2.2 compared to Mach 2.0 of the U.S. built F-16A nicknamed the Fighting Falcons', acquired by Pakistan. At low level, the aircraft can fly at over 1,110 km an hour.

The Mirages acquired by India have also a higher service ceiling than the U.S. fighters and the aircraft is able to fly up to 60,000 feet compared to the F-16 service ceiling of 50,000 feet. The aircraft has a longer range of 1,480 km with a bomb load of 250 kg, but with additional to 1,700-litre drop tanks, it can fly up to 1,800 km.

The U.S.-made Fighting Falcons have a range of 925 km with a bomb load of 250 kg, but with drop of 2,100 litres, the aircraft has a range of 3,890 km.

In the air-to-air role, the Mirages also carry beyond the Visual range Super Matra 5300 missiles which can shoot down approaching enemy aircraft at very long range and well before either pilot can see each other. In the air-to-ground role, the aircraft can deliver besides conventional bombs and rockets laser-guided bombs and missiles with pin-point accuracy. Other weapons which can be carried by the aircraft are runway penetration bombs, cluster weapons, radar lock-on and anti-radiation bombs.

CSO: 4600/1749

INDIA

CENTER SCRAPS OVERDRAFT FACILITY FOR STATES

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 5 Jul 85 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, July 4 (PTI). In a drastic step to enforce financial discipline of states, the Centre today announced its decision to scrap the facility of overdrafts enjoyed by the states, thus ending a long-standing financial arrangement.

Announcing this decision, the finance minister, Mr. Vishwanath Pratap Singh, told a press conference that 90 per cent of the over-draft amount of Rs. 1,808 crores as on January 28, would be converted into medium-term loan. It is to be repaid by the states in the next four years.

Ten per cent of the overdraft amount would be recovered in the current year itself, Mr. Singh said, adding that the loan would carry an interest of eight per cent against the 13 per cent which the states were paying for overdrafts.

After a series of meetings with the chief ministers in the last few days, Mr. Singh also announced that the Centre would soon take a decision on bringing forward legislation on levying consignment tax which would give additional resources to the states.

The Centre was seized of the matter and administrative and procedural issues were being sorted out, the finance minister said.

The overdraft issue has been one of the major irritants in the financial relations between the Centre and non-Congress-ruled states.

The position got aggravated after the Centre told the states early in February that they should not cross the overdraft level reached as of January 28, and if any state exceeded the limit for seven continuous working days, the Reserve Bank of India would stop payments on that government's account.

"From now onwards, there is no provision for overdrafts. Further overdrafts will not be allowed," the finance minister declared.

Stating that the entire revenue from consignment tax would go to the states, he said the chief ministers had agreed that 50 per cent of the revenue from consignment tax would be pooled and shared by all states and the rest would be kept by each state.

Mr. Singh said from this year onwards, the states would have to maintain sectoral financial discipline as well and no diversion of funds from priority sectors would be allowed.

If any state diverted the funds, then the Centre would deduct that amount from its assistance in the following quarter, the minister said.

The finance minister noted that the Centre's step to strictly enforce its decision not to allow any overdraft over and above the amount as on January 28, had paid dividends.

The overdraft amount which was Rs. 1,808 on January 28, came down to Rs. 932 crores on June 26, he said, appreciating the co-operation of the states in maintaining financial discipline.

The conversion scheme would be on the basis of the earlier overdraft so that the states would not suffer from a lack of funds for development.

Most states had urged the Centre that their overdrafts as on January 28 be converted into term-loans and that they "would ensure that overdrafts do not recur in future".

The chief ministers "have assured the Centre that they would take necessary steps to raise the resources which they had promised while finalising their plan outlays and also control their overdrafts."

The ceiling on overdrafts for the current year (from October) had been earlier reduced to Rs. 7,628 crores.

Bangalore: Karnataka is likely to take up the question of scrapping of the overdraft facility at the National Development Council.

An Indication to this effect was given by the chief minister, Mr. Ramakrishna Hegde, over trunk telephone to "The Times of India" News Service.

"The finance minister's proposal to convert overdrafts of states as on January 28 into short-term loans will not help the states," he said.

Karnataka Unhappy

"If the overdraft amount is to be repaid in four years, including the current year, to that extent it will cut into the plan outlay. That will not be fair," he said.

Mr. Hegde has suggested instead converting the present overdrafts into long-term loans "to be repaid after the seventh plan over a period of 15 years."

The chief minister said there was nothing new in the proposal of the Union finance minister. "Even at the time of discussions on the states seventh plan with the Planning Commission, the deputy chairman had made this suggestion. It was only on that basis that our plan was drawn up", he said.

If the finance minister was quite serious about putting an end to the overdraft facility for the states, the state governments should have some kind of latitude in respect of the existing level of overdraft. I understand the anxiety of the finance minister not to allow in future overdraft facility. I had also made a suggestion to him that the existing ways and means advance should be slightly enlarged as it was fixed several years ago," he said.

Our staff reporter adds: At the end of the previous financial year, the Maharashtra government had not taken any overdraft from the Reserve Bank.

State government sources said various steps were being taken to avoid overdrafts, though the overdrafts sometimes become unavoidable.

The steps included proper planning and regular recoveries of loans. Also, steps are taken to obtain Central government aid on time.

PTI adds: The Tamil Nadu, Finance minister, said in Delhi that the state which had Rs. 43 crores overdraft when the Centre decided to apply the brake towards January-end, had been liquidated.

Mr. Nedunchezhiyan said the Rs. 264-crore deficit envisaged in the 1985-86 budget of the state would be reduced to Rs. 96 crores with additional Central assistance, market borrowing, negotiated loans and increased devolution of Central taxes.

He said though the state had a plan outlay at Rs. 42 crores more than the Planning Commission's figure of Rs. 960 crores and "we will try our level best to perform within the prescribed plan and our resources."

CSO: 4600/1754

INDIA

SIKH STUDENTS FEDERATION LEADER INTERVIEWED

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 5 Jul 85 p 6

[Interview with Charanjit Singh, the de facto head of All India Sikh Students' Federation, by Sanjeev Gaur, in Amritsar]

[Text]

He is one of the most popular men in the Golden Temple complex today. And he is not yet 25. Charanjit Singh is the de facto head of the All India Sikh Students' Federation (AISSF). With Bhai Manjit Singh and Mr Harminder Singh Sandhu, president and general secretary respectively of the AISSF, under detention since Operation Bluestar, Mr Charanjit Singh is the man running the organisation these days.

He has lately been in the news too. The Bombay police claimed to have arrested him from the airport on June 24 while Mr Singh, who is also the nephew of senior Akali leader Jathedar Jagdev Singh Talwandi, was in the AISSF office within the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. The matter is now being probed by the Intelligence Bureau.

Mr Singh is the son of Mr Dev Raj Singh who is Mr Talwandi's elder brother and an Akali leader in his own right. The young man has all the makings of a future leader. He is ambitious, sharp and friendly with the press. And his language is militant which goes down very well with the youth. A top state intelligence officer told this correspondent, "Watch this boy, he may become another Bhindranwale."

Q: Let us start with the demands of the AISSF. What are they?

A: We have no demands, we have only rights.

Q: What are those rights?

A: The promises made by Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru to Sikhs between 1929 and 1948, asking Sikhs to join their future with that of India. Let me quote one instance. Both Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Nehru promised us that a state will be created in northern India where Sikhs will enjoy the glory of religious, political, economic, social and cultural freedom.

Q: How many AISSF members are in jail at present?

A: We are trying to collect the correct figure. But the number would be around 10,000.

Q: What is your programme?

A: It is the same as it was prior to the attack on the Golden Temple in June last year.

Q: What was that?

A: To inspire Sikh youths to become amritdharis (be baptised), to make them aware about Sikh history, to make them abstain completely from all types of intoxicants and social evils, and, above all, to make them join the Akal Purakh Di Fauj (The Army of God) of Guru Gobind Singh.

Q: What is the total membership of the AISSF?

A: Before the attack on the Golden Temple, the total membership of the federation was 80,000. Now enrolment has begun again and the target for 1985-86 is to have a unit of the federation in all the 12,845 villages of Punjab.

Q: During the last three years or so, the AISSF has been dubbed as a terrorist organisation. Many of your members are also reported to have been arrested on charges of terrorist violence. What do you have to say on this?

A: The federation was formed in 1944. It is an organisation of the Sikh youth. During the last three years, the AISSF has been maligned by the government. It has levied false charges against it. When you have to malign someone you cook up false charges against him. This is exactly what has been happening to the federation activists. They have been implicated in false cases.

Q: Do you believe in terrorism to achieve your goals?

A: A Sikh does not commit atrocities against anyone. But neither does he bear atrocities. A Sikh can take up his sword given by his gurus for the protection of the oppressed.

Q: What do you think about the Punjab situation today?

A: I feel the government is daily oppressing the Sikhs in India in many ways. It does not

want the problem to be solved I will give you a recent example. Go and see what is happening in Nabha jail. Under the pretext of settling a feud, the BSF and the CRPF men mercilessly beat up over a score of federation boys including the Ropar district president, Sardar Sarabjit Singh. The Punjab police arrests Sikh youths from their houses, keeps them under illegal detention for 10-12 days and later shows that it has arrested them after an encounter.

Q: What are the main issues in the Punjab tangle?

A: Sikhs feel that their religion, their dignity and their self-respect are not safe in this country. This is the biggest issue.

Q: Does the AISSF believe in holding talks with the Centre to solve the Punjab problem?

A: For securing its rights the AISSF is ready to go to any negotiating table in the world. But here I would like to mention that our organisation president Bhai Manjit Singh has, in a press statement issued from the Jodhpur jail, put certain pre-conditions for the talks, in the light of the false promises made by the Delhi government to the Sikhs during the last 37 years. The conditions are the release of all Sikh youths under detention, reinstatement and withdrawal of cases against Sikh soldiers who left the barracks in protest against the attack on the Golden Temple, repeal of all black anti-terrorist laws. Besides, the gov-

ernment should apologise to the Sikh community for attacking the Golden Temple and the Akal Takht.

Q: What do you think of the Centre's attitude towards the Punjab problem?

A: The government is neither sincere nor serious. If the government had been sincere it would not have tried to finish Sikhs who are in a majority in Punjab.

Q: What have you to say about the recent "goodwill gesture" of the Prime Minister, the release of all youths detained since 1982 against whom there are specific cases?

A: Arjun Singh has made a meaningless announcement. Nearly 99 per cent of the Sikh boys who are in jail have been booked under false cases of murder, dacoity, etc. How will they be released? Recently, the police arrested over 500 Sikh boys against whom they have registered false cases of murder and robbery. I feel that instead of giving such meaningless statements, the government should take concrete and bold steps. The federation rejects the recent announcement about the release of Sikh youths made by Arjun Singh. We want all Sikh youths to be released.

Q: What do you think of Mr Rajiv Gandhi?

A: He is a clever politician and he is most clever in crushing the Sikhs.

Q: Since how long have you been associated with the AISSF?

A: Since 1977—the year I joined college. But I became active after the convention of

the federation held here in the Golden Temple in September 1983.

Q: When did you become the AISSF secretary and who appointed you?

A: After the lifting of the ban on the organisation in April. The ad hoc committee of which I am a member appointed me as the AISSF secretary.

Q: What are your views about Sant Longowal, Jathedar Tohra and Mr Prakash Singh Badal?

A: My views about Longowal and Tohra are the same as what a common Sikh thinks about them. They are responsible for the blot on the Golden Temple in the form of the attack on the holiest of Sikh shrines. Prakash Singh Badal is also with them.

Q: What do you think about Baba Joginder Singh?

A: I have the greatest regard for him. I have no words to express my regard for him. The Akali Dal in its past history has never had such a powerful personality (to lead it). And the sacrifice of his family for the Sikh cause is known to the world now.

Q: Does the AISSF plan to launch any agitation for the fulfilment of its demands?

A: It is a policy matter and I am not the decision making authority.

Q: What are your views about Khalistan?

A: Have you come with a proposal for Khalistan? (Smiles) When the government discusses the issue with us, we will express our views on the subject.

INDIA

RECOMMENDATIONS OF STEEL WORKING GROUP REPORTED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 28 Jun 85 p 9

[Text]

NEW DELHI, June 27 (UNI).

THE working group on iron and steel for the seventh plan has emphasised the need for installation of two new steel plants at Daitari and Vijayanagar to check increasing deficits of steel by the end of the plan period.

The working group has also recommended that funds also be made available for completion of the Visakhapatnam steel plant.

According to the working group assessment, the gap in the finished steel demand over availability would range between 1.43 million tonnes in 1985-86 to 0.84 million tonnes in 1989-90 which are to be met through imports.

The total capital investment in steel sector, as recommended by the working group, during the seventh plan is estimated to be of the order of Rs. 13,141 crore against the revised outlay of the sixth plan of Rs. 5,722 crore.

For Visakhapatnam steel plant, the working group has recommended an amount of Rs. 5,923 crores of which Rs. 262 crores would spill over beyond the seventh plan period.

The group's suggestion for the proposed new steel plants at Daitari and Vijayanagar is Rs. 400 crores each.

According to the working group's suggestions, total outlay for the new schemes in the steel industry during the seventh plan period would be Rs. 5,393 crores.

This also includes Rs. 1,242 crores for modernisation, additions and modifications of Durgapur steel plant.

The group, however, suggested no

expansion of the existing steel plants. It emphasised the need to complete the sanctioned and continuing schemes.

The major share of investment required during the seventh plan amounts to Rs. 7,743 crores budgeted for the continuing schemes carried over from the sixth plan.

It has been emphasised that after meeting the continuing schemes, the balance would be for addition, modification and proposed modernisation.

While deliberating on the quantum of investment in the seventh plan, the working group compared the investment in the steel sector as a share of plan allocation during the sixth plan.

It was found that from the third plan onwards the share of the steel industry had fallen from 5.29 per cent to 2.32 per cent.

The group observed that in order to keep the steel output growing this trend had to be arrested.

Quoting a National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) study, the working group had pointed out that the gap between the demand and availability of finished steel would increase to 5,264,000 tonnes in 2,000 AD—increasing from 836,000 tonnes at the end of the eighth plan.

It has been pointed that there would be a sizeable gap in respect of structurals, wheels and axels, hot rolled coils, sheets and electrical sheets by 1990.

On the other hand, the study foresaw surpluses in railway materials, plates, GP and GC Sheets, tin plates and pipes.

CSO: 4600/1746

INDIA

PAPER GIVES BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON NEW AIR CHIEF

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Jul 85 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 3: Air Marshal Denis Anthony La Fontaine, PVSM, AVSM, VM, presently air officer commanding-in-chief, Western Air Command has been appointed the chief of the air staff in the rank of air chief marshal. He succeeds Air Chief Marshal L. M. Katre.

Air Marshal La Fontaine is the commodore-commandant of No. 46 Squadron.

A graduate of the National Defence College in 1978, Air Marshal La Fontaine is an outstanding fighter pilot. He was awarded the Vayu Sena Medal in 1971, Ati Vishisht Seva Medal in 1973, and Param Vishisht Seva Medal in 1984 for distinguished services of an exceptional order.

Born in Madras on September 17, 1929, Air Marshal La Fontaine was commissioned in the flying branch of the air force in 1950. During his long distinguished service career, he has held a variety of commands, and instructional and staff appointments with distinction at various levels including policy-making.

His command appointments include two frontline fighter squadrons, two major operational bases and two air commands.

He was chief instructor at the Air Force Academy at the time of its inauguration and was personally responsible for the meticulous planning and methodical moving of the entire flying training school from Jodhpur to Dundigal.

As the air officer-in-charge (personnel) at the air headquarters, he played a major role in giving a new dimension to employment and optimum utilisation of manpower in the air force.

CSO: 4600/1751

INDIA

FIFTH ANTARCTICA TRIP PLANNED FOR DECEMBER

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Jul 85 p 2

[Text]

NEW DELHI, July 3.

DR. S. Z. Qasim, secretary in the department of ocean development, said here today that the fifth Indian Antarctica expedition will be leaving in December this year.

Speaking to newsmen, he said that plans to have a second Indian station in Antarctica had also been finalised. He said the second station would be set up on land. It would have similar facilities like the first station except that the water supply to the station would be from a lake.

Earlier, 12 members of the fourth Antarctica expedition led by Lt-Col. S. S. Sharma were introduced to the Union defence minister, Mr. P. V. Narasimha Rao. The defence minister congratulated the Indian scientists for their work.

The team members narrated their experiences at the Dakshin Gangotri station in the Antarctica and some slides were shown to the defence minister.

Lt-Col. Sharma recalled the difficulties faced by the team in establishing the station and how combined efforts had seen them through. Soon after they had reached Antarctica, a MI-8 helicopter carrying five expedition members had crashed. Fortunately no one was killed.

He said the crew of the ship that

had taken them there started ridiculing and kept on asking them when would they be returning. There was a heated exchange of words between the team members and the crew. This made them all the more determined to fulfill the task they had been sent for.

Lt-Col. Sharma said that adverse weather conditions were a new experience for them. At one stage, a very severe blizzard at the wind speed of 255 km. per hour continued for 17 days. He said that there were encouraging moments also. The entire team oozed with confidence after the former Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, had spoken to them on the telephone.

He said the expedition had met scientists from the GDR and Russia. It was for the first time that the Indian Independence day was celebrated in Antarctica.

Major Naramjit Singh, communication officer of the expedition, said it was a unique experience for the team members to listen to the "forces request" on the All India Radio at a distance of 15,000 km. He said they had been able to set up a good communication network through which they were able to talk to their family members and VIPs.

Mr. S. G. Prabhu Matundkar, a microbiologist who has been with all the antarctica expeditions so far, said he had collected about 500 samples which were being studied in a laboratory in Goa.

CSO: 4600/1751

INDIA

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST CONGRESS DATE--New Delhi, June 29--The Communist Party of India (CPI) will hold its 13th party Congress in Patna from February 15 to 20. The national council and the central executive committee will meet and finalise the draft documents for the congress. The central executive in its recent meeting in New Delhi decided it would meet on November 9 and 10 and the national council from November 11 to 15 to finalise the draft documents. A preparatory All-India conference on party organisation will be held from September 6 to 8 in Hyderabad to be followed by a meeting of the of the central executive committee in Delhi from October 5 to 8. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 30 Jun 85 p 5]

DEMAND ON KASHMIR--New Delhi, June 19 (UNI)--The Communist Party of India has demanded dismissal of the G.M. Shah ministry in Jammu and Kashmir for allegedly abetting communal and secessionist forces in the border state. The central executive committee of the party, in a resolution, has demanded dissolution of the state Legislative Assembly and fresh elections after Mr Shah's dismissal to strengthen "emotional integration of the people and safeguard national security." In another resolution, the committee has demanded that the inquiry into the "massacre" of 15 tribals by the Bihar police in Banjhi village in Sahebgunj district of the state on April 15 should be completed early and the guilty officials punished. It also demanded an enquiry into the alleged gunning down of five Communist leaders of Modangunge village in Gaya district in Bihar on May 14. [Text] [Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 20 Jun 85 p 5]

RAJIV DISMISSAL PLEA--NEW DELHI, June 19--The dismissal of a petition by Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) against the election of Mr Rajiv Gandhi to the Lok Sabha from Amethi constituency in Uttar Pradesh was challenged in the Supreme Court today, reports UNI. The appellant, Chaudhary Azhar Hussain, an advocate and brother of Mr Akbar Ahmed of the Rashtriya Sanjay Manch, in his appeal, submitted that the High Court had dismissed his petition summarily on the ground of being "frivolous and vexatious". This was illegal under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In his petition, Mr Hussain alleged that the entire election of Mr Gandhi had been fought on communal lines creating hatred between different communities, which, he said, was violative of Section 123 (3) read with Sections 100 (1) (B) and 100 (1) (D) (11) of the Act. While dismissing the petition the High Court had observed that it was absolutely vague and did not give anywhere the material facts to prove the case. The High Court also observed that the election tribunal had the power

to dismiss an election petition at the preliminary stage without proceeding on merits and even before the conclusion of the trial. [Text] [Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 20 Jun 85 p 9]

TALWANDI NEPHEW ARRESTED--Bombay, June 24 (UNI)--Charanjit Singh, nephew of Akali Dal leader Jagdev Singh Talwandi, was today arrested by intelligence branch personnel at the airport here while trying to "sneak out of the country". Police told a Metropolitan Magistrate before whom he was produced, that Charanjit Singh came to the airport with an Iraqi airways ticket for Baghdad and produced a service agreement when questioned for migration clearance. The Metropolitan Magistrate remanded him to police custody till 28 June. The 24-year-old Panjab University graduate failed to satisfy interrogation officials about his "exact intention to leave the country", they said. The officials referred Charanjit Singh's case to the computer information service at the airport which answered that no passport formalities of any kind be rendered to him without prior approval of the External Affairs Ministry and he should not be allowed to leave the country. A pro-All India Sikh Students' Federation youth, he was allegedly involved in several extremist acts, officials said. The youth told the officials during interrogation that the information provided by the computer was "justifiable" and that he toured various States in disguise to mobilise public opinion in favour of "Khalistan". He is the twelfth Sikh youth to be arrested by airport personnel during this month. Nine youths, who arrived here from West Germany were arrested on 1 June. On Thursday, intelligence branch personnel had arrested two Sikh members of the so-called National Council of Khalistan immediately after their arrival here from Hamburg in West Germany and seized from them incriminating documents and pro-Khalistani pamphlets. The Metropolitan Magistrate also remanded these two Sikhs--Reshama Singh (26) and Harbachan Singh Khinde (47) to police custody till Friday. [Text] [New Delhi PATRIOT in English 25 Jun 85 p 5]

KERALA CPI-M LEADER--TRIVANDRUM, June 23 (UNI)--Mr. K. Chathunni Master, former MP, a top leader of the Kerala unit of the CPM and vice-president of the All-India Kisan Sabha, has been expelled from the party. A brief announcement by the state secretariat of the party here today said that Mr. Chathunni Master had been expelled for "financial irregularities and for anti-party activities." Mr. Chathunni Master (64), joined the Communist Party of India in 1941 and was a member of the state committee of the party at the time of expulsion. He was actively associated with the kisan movement and had risen to become the vice-president of the All-India Kisan Sabha. He had been a member of the Kerala assembly for two consecutive terms from 1968 and completed a five-year term as member of the Rajya Sabha only in March last. [Text] [Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 24 Jun 85 p 15]

CSO: 4600/1753

IRAN

FADLALLAH: U.S. REPRISALS WILL PROVOKE MORE HATRED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Jul 85 pp 1, 2

[Text]

BEIRUT, July 7 — Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami and other Muslim leaders held talks with Syrian President Hafez Assad Sunday as Syrian efforts intensified to "close the Lebanese crisis file" after 10 years of fighting.

Commenting on U.S. efforts to isolate Beirut airport in the wake of the hijacking of a TWA airliner, Karami said President Reagan was attempting to "take revenge" on Lebanon for its political stand against U.S. plans in the Middle East.

Karami also blamed "Israeli interests that want to occupy Lebanon" and "a conspiracy aimed at the whole region" for its troubles. "All these things are pushing us towards Damascus," he told reporters.

Shi'a Muslim leader Nabih Berri has been meeting with Syrian officials in Damascus since Friday while Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was expected to arrive later before a "broad Islamic meeting" Monday.

"We believe that it is not only Lebanon which is a target but the aim is to prevent Syria from carrying out its effective role to help Lebanon to restore its normal life and carry out its national duty," Karami said.

Nat'l Reconciliation

State-run Damascus radio said Karami and Lebanese parliamentary Speaker Hussein Huseini later met with Syrian President Hafez Assad and discussed ways of ending insecurity in west Beirut and plans for "national reconciliation."

Official sources said Syria hoped to forge a new pact between the Muslim leaders before a grand political settlement between Christians and Muslims in an attempt to end a decade of factional fighting in Lebanon.

State-run Beirut radio said the Muslim conference Monday would group political and spiritual leaders in an attempt to "achieve order

and stability in west Beirut and agree on a national view on a comprehensive security and political formula."

Beirut newspapers quoted Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam as saying Syria is pushing for a settlement again because "Syria will exert all possible efforts to close the Lebanese crisis file."

Meanwhile, in Beirut, Shi'a Muslim scholar Seyyed Muhammed Hussein Fadlallah, warned in a published statement that a U.S. retaliatory raid for last month's hijacking would only provoke more hatred and revenge against America.

Fadlallah was quoted by the leftist 'As Safir' newspaper as saying the United States may be planning a strike against Lebanon's Beka'a Valley.

"It won't achieve anything but more hatred toward the policy of the United States and more tension that forces people to express it with whatever means they bear, legitimate or illegitimate," Fadlallah said.

CSO: 4600/546

IRAN

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION REGULATIONS, PROCEDURES ELABORATED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1 Jul 85 p 2

/Text/ Political dispatch - Mostafa Tehrani, director general of the state election headquarters in a special interview with the ETTELA'AT correspondent explained the procedures and details of the presidential elections.

Regarding the election regulations, the director general of state elections stated: Based on the responsibility which the Ministry of Interior is endowed with as regards the presidential elections and since the previous regulations pertaining to the presidential elections were experimental and were valid only for the previous elections and in view of the expiration of the experimentation period of those regulations, the Ministry of Interior was obligated to present a new bill to the Council of Ministers and the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

Mr Tehrani added: Therefore, some time ago the Ministry of Interior prepared the new election bill and after approval by the Council of Ministers it was presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly; after various investigations and studies by the Internal and Councils' Affairs Commission it was finally approved.

Tehrani went on to add: In consideration of readiness, simultaneously with the on-going investigations in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Ministry of Interior also made the preliminary preparations for the acquisition of the election equipment and paraphernalia. Right now all the necessary election equipment, documents and ballots are ready and the provincial and township representatives respectively should apply to the election headquarters of the Ministry of Interior in order to arrange delivery of their needed equipment and paraphernalia.

Regarding the number of ballot boxes, the director general of the state elections stated: For the collection of the ballots throughout the country a total of 24,000 ballot boxes and about 25,000 ballot forms have been prepared. Mr Tehrani also added: So as to make it possible for Iranians who are residing abroad to take part in the election of their favorite president, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, nearly 150 to 200 of our embassies or delegations abroad are ready to carry out presidential election procedures. In all these delegations, our brother ambassadors or the plenipotentiary ministers carry out exactly the duties of the governors in the execution

of the election procedures abroad. Tehrani also added: On the other hand, the employees of the Ministry of Interior and the representatives of other pertinent organizations will be invited to participate as the representative of their own organs or institutions in the operation of the State Election Headquarters for the execution of election procedures. In other words, they will be cooperating with this headquarters and in the final run they will be in charge of the election procedures throughout the country.

Mr Tehrani stated: We predict that in the same way that our countrymen showed their overall view in the form of a referendum on the Day of Qods and in the same way that with their presence of million upon millions they confirmed the policies of the Islamic Republic throughout our cities and various parts of the country, the people will likewise welcome the presidential election.

The director general of the State Election Headquarters went on to say: Since the constitution has entrusted the supervision of the elections to the honorable Council of Guardians and also since the same respectable council is in charge of the selection of the qualified candidates for president, therefore the Council of Guardians will use the services of the overseers and the supervisory councils throughout the country. As you already know, the legal bill for the supervision of the presidential elections by the Council of Guardians which had been contemporaneously presented to the Majlis with the bill for the election of the president has been approved and it has been put at the disposal of the responsible supervisory officials of the Ministry of Interior in the form of a law.

The director general of state elections added: At the present time, preliminary preparations for the assignment of the supervisors have been completed, and clearly the supervisors will be dispatched throughout the country before the issuance of the order regarding the commencement of the elections.

As regards the time period for casting ballots, the director general of the elections stated: The time period of 10 hours for casting ballots has been decided upon; however, if it is deemed necessary to increase the time period, interior minister will make the proper decision. Here I have to note that the same time period of 10 hours will be applicable abroad for those Iranians who wish to cast ballots.

Regarding the registration of the presidential candidates, Mr Tehrani stated: Within five days of the official announcement of the order for the commencement of the elections the candidates can introduce either themselves or their official candidates who are being introduced in writing to the Ministry of Interior, therefrom their relevant documents as electoral candidates will be forwarded to the honorable Council of Guardians. After confirmation by the Council of Guardians, the names of the candidates will be announced by the Ministry of Interior.

Concerning the conditions of eligibility for the candidates, the director general of the state elections stated: The candidates for president must be distinguished religious or political men and full-blooded Iranian. They ought to be a citizen of the Islamic Republic and be skillful managers and administrators. They should be pious, of good reputation and trustworthy, furthermore, they have to believe in the basic tenets of the Islamic Republic and the official religion of the country.

Here I must mention that the members of the cabinet, the representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, members of the Supreme Judicial and Guardian Councils can become a candidate for president only after they have resigned from the official post before registering to become a candidate. As regards the conditions of eligibility of the voters, the director general of the state elections said: The minimum age for voters is 16 years, they have to be Iranian citizen and of a sound mind.

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CSO: 4640/650

IRAN

EDITORIAL VIEWS HAJJ'S MAIN PURPOSE AS POLITICAL

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Jul 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Hajj and Its Political Functions"]

[Text]

The national seminar on hajj began and ended. But the difficulty in finding a solution to the current year's hajj has just begun. The congresses, seminars, and big national congregations and the accompanying "hajj week" programs should be able to provide the best opportunity to prepare thousands of hajj pilgrims for the Holy Ka'aba both mentally and spiritually.

We also would like to take the opportunity to call the attention of hajj pilgrims to a number of points in this connection. Certainly, none of our pilgrims should take an exception to these recommendations.

The first question deserve emphasizing is the political dimension of hajj. On the other hand, emphasis on this question should not diminish the religious and spiritual dimensions of it. Experience has shown a majority of pilgrims have a comprehension of the religious aspects of it and there seems to be no need to go into length to define and outline those. Secondly, over the centuries, both intelligent enemies, and ignorant friends of Islam have promoted hajj in ways contrary to its avowed intentions.

If we believe in the Holy Qur'an and Islam that we all do the verses and admonishments of the Holy Book (including that of repentance verse), the Prophet's and Imams' traditions, stories and narrations attributed to them all call attention to the socio-political aspects of hajj.

Of course, nowadays not even make-believe Islamic governments are denying that fundamental function of hajj among others. But what they are doing in practice is to change this "political function" to a social one and thereby treating and interpreting that as an affair very

much like diplomacy. A kind of affair and relationship with, on the one hand, formalities and ceremonies and, on the other hand, held mostly between dignitaries and government appointees and conducted completely under their control.

The Saudi Arabian government acknowledges that fact: Yes, they say, Hajj possesses a significant social dimension. But the way they see it must be realized is for government officials and personalities of different countries, the representatives of political parties and delegations to come to Saudi Arabia at their invitation, with Saudi Arabian members of government as host, to hold seminars and meetings to allegedly help Muslims of the world to resolve their problems in this fashion.

We repudiate that social and political interpretation of hajj. The Qur'an addresses directly the masses of people, i.e., every individual in a Muslim society and urges them to struggle against the enemies of Allah and the Nation of Islam and not the heads of states, the affluent and aristocrats.

However, even if we are to be completely optimistic and take their (Saudis) suggestions at their face value, we must point out that there are certain obstacles in the way of executing propositions and realizing our aims.

Every time governments and government officials step into a matter, nothing is accomplished and often their participation brings outcomes unintended and the opposite of what is desired that is because governments and their representatives are restricted with numerous problems and responsibilities and cannot exercise as much freedom as the ordinary masses.

Globally governments are into a kind of relationship which by their very nature, and inevitably so, restrict them both in what they can do and say (deeds and proclamations) and push them into observing diplomatic codes and what can best serve the transient requirements of time and place. Of course, as was previously pointed out, this is just one among a number of problems.

What the opponents of active participation by masses of Muslims into political affairs of the Islamic world and some palace (subservient) mullahs and a bunch of ill-informed theologians advocate, is that political activities in a religious context would negate and question faith, its depth and good intentions, and would damage, so they claim, the individualistic and private aspect of faith.

One of the most significant aspects of the Iranian hajj is its mass demonstrations and the fact that the pilgrims never intermingle their religious duties with political plans and programs. Iranian pilgrims do not stage demonstrations and marches during times they should be carrying out their religious duties such as in Tawaf, i.e. when they have to do the ritual of circumambulating the Ka'aba and the day of sacrificials, ... Only in Manna, while moving towards Jamrat, with the intention of bringing about harmony, discipline and control among Iranian unfamiliar with the place, pilgrims together and in concert shout "God is Great". The Iranian pilgrims have in practice shown themselves to be highly organized, disciplined and united. Both religious duties and political assertions are done in their appropriate time and place.

During the foregoing year some 150,000 Iranian pilgrims staged several demonstrations under the burning sun in a most organized fashion, without any intention to cause disorder or attempting to circumvent the law of the land (Saudi Arabia). If ever there were instances of disorder or violence it was solely due to the uncalled-for and unwarranted interference of Saudi "security" forces. It has never been the intention of the Iranian pilgrims to disturb and interrupt others with their religious duties or ever to stir them into committing them to participate in matters (political) they would not want to do so. In Islam politics and religion are one and the same.

CSO: 4600/545

IRAN

GCC CONCERN FOR GULF SECURITY NOTED

GF101951 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 10 Jul 85

[From "Behind the News" program]

[Excerpts] Once again, the Iraqi aerial aggression yesterday against the Turkish tanker Vatan caught the attention of international political and media circles. Some of these circles pondered the possibility of increased tension concerning international navigation in the Persian Gulf.

It is worth noting that the aggression against this Turkish tanker has coincided with escalating calls by more than one international or regional side for the need to secure the freedom of navigation and preserve security in the Persian Gulf region. We would like to especially refer to the meeting of the GCC states' foreign ministers in Abha, Saudi Arabia, which placed the topic of Gulf security and freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf at the top of its agenda--within the framework of the GCC following up on the developments of the aggressive war begun in the region by the ruling regime in Iraq.

The GCC states, more than any other international group, are concerned with confronting these over-stretching and persistent violations, a result of the Iraqi rulers' practices against international navigation in the Persian Gulf, as well as the spreading of the war to a civilian arena, affecting civilians and innocent people. Events have shown that the Gulf states' security and stability in the economic and political fields are greatly connected with the subject of the war, its courses, and its sad outcomes.

The Gulf states are passing through an exceptionally important stage with regard to transforming their anxiety into the security and safety of the gulf and its commercial navigation. We do not believe that any concerned side in the region does not know of the Baghdad rulers' blatant violations of the rights of the Gulf states, through their persistence with trying to plant the seeds of sedition and cause differences and tension among the Gulf states.

That is why ignoring the seriousness of repeated aggression by the Iraqi regime against navigation in the Persian Gulf does not signify, in any

logical manner, anything except collusion with Iraq in this deviated and strange manner. This issue carries dangers from which no one will be safe from its adverse effects. We do not believe that such a fact and all its dimensions are unknown to anyone concerned with the security and safety of the Persian Gulf region.

CSO: 4604/33

PAKISTAN

GOVERNMENT STAND ON MRD SUPPORTED

GF071524 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 5 Jul 85 p 3

[Editorial: "The MRD and the Government"]

[Text] Speaking at a press conference, Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo said in Lahore that the opinions of the MRD leaders will be welcomed on national issues. This positive approach by the prime minister is laudable. The MRD leaders who boycotted the elections and are still wary of recognizing the elected government should reciprocate in the same manner. This would compensate for the fact that due to their policy they have become isolated from events in the country. All politicians inside and outside the house should cooperate in working for the greater national interest of the nation and the country. This is the real objective, not the acquisition of positions and portfolios. The vice president of the defunct Jamaat-i-Islami has also drawn attention to this, saying that the country belongs to all, and all politicians should unite on one platform and think about treading the path of democracy for the progress, safety, and solidarity of the country. If, as the MRD claims that whatever it has done is aimed at the restitution of democracy, this objective can be achieved despite differences in views. The only correct way to do this is to give the elected representatives a chance to do this and to cooperate with them, instead of putting obstacles in their paths, so that the common goal may be achieved.

CSO: 4656/145

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS TIES WITH INDIA

GF110830 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 7 Jul 85 p 3

[Editorial: "Pakistan-India Relations Enter New Phase"]

[Excerpts] An agreement has been signed between Pakistan and India on agricultural research and development and under which both countries will exchange research literature and new information.

The foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, has said that the joint commission session was very successful and its results were beyond our expectations. He did admit however that in Pakistan-India relations there was still quite a bit of rocky terrain to traverse and the issues are thorny, but we must persevere with sincerity and fortitude.

The fact is that for years relations have remained strained. Due to the persisting tension and three wars, the chasm became wider and was worsened by the Indian rulers' attitude and the fact that the Kashmir dispute remains unresolved. In such conditions, it is difficult to normalize relations but our governments are trying to effect mutual compromise and understanding and to expand friendly ties.

During the talks between Rajiv Gandhi and Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, greater mutual exchanges and ties were discussed. It would not be too much to expect that soon a cultural accord for mutual cooperation may be agreed upon. This will pave the way for a greater mutual understanding.

The accord on the exchange of mutual agricultural knowhow and research will have far reaching and favorable repercussions on the economy of the two countries especially since both countries face population increases which demand that agriculture and animal husbandry be revamped on scientific lines to promote optimum production.

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